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Abstract 
The three articles that make up this thesis consider the diverse forms of 
contentious politics and mass mobilization that emerged during the 25th January 
Egyptian Revolution in 2011 and its aftermath. The first article, discussing the 
eighteen days of anti-Mubarak protest, pays special attention to the position of the 
Egyptian army in and around Midan al-Tahrir, and recounts how protestors sought 
to co-opt and neutralize the threat posed by regime forces. It finds that fraternizing 
protestors developed a repertoire of contention that made situational, emotional 
claims on the loyalty of regime troops. The second article explores the role of 
elections and protests during the failed democratic transition away from 
authoritarian rule that began on 11 February with Mubarak’s resignation and 
ended on 3 July 2013 with a military coup. Highlighting the Muslim Brothers’ 
demobilization and privileging of procedural democracy following Mubarak’s 
ousting, it offers an alternative account of where and when Egypt’s democratic 
project went wrong. The final article considers opposition to the 3 July coup and in 
particular the effects of state repression on the daily street protests launched by 
the Muslim Brothers and their allies in the post-coup period. Far from being 
defeated, anti-coup contention, it is suggested, has instead been contained in ways 
that have made protest less visible and less disruptive over time. Taken as a whole, 
the thesis suggests new ways to understand and explain the 25th January 
Revolution, its trajectories and legacies. 
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Nasāʾih minna lil-yunāniyīn: Tubtak fi iydak, kimamtak ʿala wishak, khamirtak fi 
gibak wa illi yiʾulak al-maglis al-ʿaskari hayehmi al-thawra, qattaʿu. 
 
Advice from us to the Greeks: keep your stone in your hand, your scarf on your face 
and yeast in your pocket and kill anyone who tells you that the military will protect 
the revolution. 
———Egyptian activist during Greek anti-austerity protests, 12 Feb. 2012
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Introduction 
Three years ago, on 25 January 2011, several thousand Egyptian protestors 
outmanoeuvred Interior Ministry-controlled Central Security Forces (CSF) to reach 
Midan al-Tahrir in downtown Cairo, triggering eighteen days of unruly and 
boisterous mass protests in the streets and squares of Egypt’s cities against the 
regime of Husni Mubarak. When Mubarak, a seemingly well-fortified dictator of 
thirty years, resigned on 11 February 2011, many believed that a definitive 
rupture had occurred. Over subsequent months and years, however, a parlous and 
deeply flawed democratic transition, unfolding under the direction of the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), revealed a new set of problems and 
ambiguities for Egypt’s self-styled ‘revolutionaries.’ With military powers and old 
regime prerogatives still intact, the rapidly-convened coalition of forces that had 
come together in Midan al-Tahrir and elsewhere fragmented, as narrow 
partisanship trumped coalition building.  
The eventual triumph of the Muslim Brothers’ candidate Muhammad Mursi 
in the second round of presidential elections held in June 2012 seemed to presage 
a new institutional rubric in which the state apparatus would, at the very least, be 
brought under democratic control, but instead revived abiding anxieties and 
uncertainties about Islamist takeover and dictatorial intent. Two years after 
Mubarak’s removal, a second round of mass protests, this time against Mursi’s 
presidency, paved the way for a military coup that took place on 3 July 2013, 
precipitating an ongoing process of elite reconstitution that has since seen Abdel 
Fatah al-Sisi, a field marshal and former defence minister, installed as president in 
an elliptical return to Mubarak-style authoritarianism. After a prolonged absence, 
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the CSF have fully redeployed to the streets of Egypt’s cities, better armed and 
more numerous than before, charged with enforcing a new protest law that 
criminalizes opposition to the military-backed government. Over three thousand 
anti-coup protestors have been killed by security forces in the past year alone, 
while tens of thousands have been detained. The arm of Egyptian State Security 
tasked with monitoring Egypt’s Islamist movements and political dissidents, which 
was nominally disbanded following the January 25th Revolution, has been 
reconstituted. A reinvigorated elite-level politics has not produced a model of 
governance responsive to the protestors’ original demands for “ʿaīsh, hurriyya, 
ʿadāla igtimāʿiyya” (bread, freedom, social justice). Human dignity (karāma 
insāniyya), which sometimes replaces social justice as the third demand, continues 
to be routinely violated through the state’s use of torture and calibrated sexual 
violence against its opponents.  
Against this backdrop of disappointments, reversals and retrenchments, the 
trajectories and legacies of what is now known as the 25th January Revolution 
present important puzzles for students of contentious politics. Eschewing top-
down, structuralist and culturally essentialist explanations, the account offered 
here suggests, across three research articles, that the patterns of political change in 
post-Mubarak Egypt can be usefully illuminated by a political sociology of the new 
modes and dynamics of contentious politics arising from the events of early 2011. 
Read as a single omnibus, the articles propose a tripartite periodization of 
Egyptian politics, covering the eighteen days of mass mobilization, the democratic 
transition and the post-coup period, through which to consider both the causes 
and the consequences of Mubarak’s removal at the hands of irrepressible ‘People 
power.’  
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Research Questions 
Scholarly treatments of the 25th January Revolution have provided some 
preliminary answers to the ‘who,’ ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the mobilization. However, as 
is inevitable with any emerging and fast-moving topic, lacunae abound: there 
remains a need for a great deal of further empirical research on both the eighteen 
days of protest and its aftermath. I propose, therefore, three research questions to 
be considered in the articles.  
Question 1: How did anti-Mubarak protestors succeed in co-opting or 
neutralizing the threat posed by security forces assumed loyal to the Mubarak 
regime?  
In comparative studies of the 2011 Arab revolts, the Egyptian military’s failure to 
use force against protestors is frequently referenced as the key variable in 
determining the mobilization’s success (e.g. Barany 2011; Kandil 2012; Nepstad 
2013). Accounting for the military’s ostensible defection from the Mubarak regime, 
these studies adopt an explanatory framework rooted in historical institutionalism 
and tend to stress three factors: the military’s professionalism; its status as a non-
sectarian conscript force; and its declining position at the apex of state power 
relative to the Interior Ministry and the Egyptian business elite led by Mubarak’s 
son, and heir apparent, Gamal Mubarak. However, these accounts frequently 
overlook the role played by the military in facilitating regime attacks against anti-
Mubarak protestors and fail to explain the killings of peaceful protestors by the 
army in the post-Mubarak democratic transition. This article advances a quite 
different account of the military’s role in the 25th January Revolution, suggesting 
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that far from abandoning the Mubarak regime, the military leadership may have 
come to question the reliability of key armoured units stationed in and around 
Midan al-Tahrir as a result of fraternization between protestors and soldiers. In 
doing so, the article explores the micro-interactive and emotional dimensions of 
contentious politics.  
Question 2: How can we explain the derailing of Egypt’s democratic transition? 
Against an emerging conventional wisdom according to which Mursi and the 
Muslim Brothers’ Islamist agenda and power-grabbing tendencies singularly 
undermined the post-Mubarak democratic project (e.g. Brownlee 2013; El-Sherif 
2014; Lust, Soltan and Wichman, n.d.), the second article offers an alternative 
explanation for Egypt’s failed democratic transition by considering several factors 
that predated Mursi’s election and contributed to his demise. In particular, the 
article examines the Muslim Brothers’ decision to demobilize and privilege 
electoral and constitutional forums in the months following the 25th January 
Revolution. Extant theories of democratization insist that protest and mass 
mobilization are exogenous to the unfolding of a successful transition (O’Donnell & 
Schmitter 1986; Huntington 1991; Przeworski 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996). I aver 
by contrast that the Brothers’ commitment to sit out further protest and focus on 
electioneering actually worked against post-Mubarak democratization, 
precipitating the breakup of the revolutionary coalition that had ousted Husni 
Mubarak and thus leaving Mursi fatally isolated during his brief presidential 
tenure when faced with a ‘deep state’ determined to roll back new forms of elected 
civilian democratic authority.  
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Question 3: How can we explain the pattern of mobilization in Egypt since the 3 
July 2013 coup? 
The focus of the third and final article shifts to the post-coup period and considers 
the nature and extent of opposition to the 3 July 2013 coup. In the year since the 
military seized power, Muslim Brothers and Mursi supporters in the Egyptian anti-
coup movement have launched daily street protests, which have continued in spite 
of a wave of arrests and the routine use of live ammunition and birdshot to 
disperse protestors (Ketchley 2013). The relationship between repression and 
mobilization – frequently referred to as the repression-mobilization nexus – is an 
enduring puzzle for students of contentious politics, with few robust and 
generalizable findings (Davenport, Johnston and Meuller 2004). This article looks 
to explain how repression has impacted the anti-coup mobilization through its 
effect on the modalities, locations and timings of anti-coup protest. By studying 
shifts along these different axes, we can begin to consider how repression 
conditions both the variability and viability of contentious politics. This argument 
suggests that, far from being defeated, anti-coup protestors have adapted to 
regime repression, but that their contention has become less visible and less 
disruptive as a result.  
In the following sections, I consider several problems of conceptual 
identification related to the 25th January Revolution. I then outline the notion of 
contentious politics pursued in this study, before specifying my methodological 
and substantive contributions in more detail. 
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The 25th January Revolution 
Was the 25th January Revolution a revolution? The answer to this question has 
important implications for how we conceptualize the mobilization of January-
February 2011 and the trajectory of the events that followed. On the one hand, a 
significant number of Egyptians certainly referred to it as such. My informants 
frequently prefaced their recollection of events with “fi ayām al-thawra…” (in the 
days of the revolution) or “fi waqt al-thawra…” (in the time of the revolution). 
Those who had joined the protests in Midan al-Tahrir and elsewhere were 
“thuwār” (revolutionaries).1 Non-participants were members of “hizb al-kanaba” 
(the party of the sofa), while the revolution’s opponents were “al-nizām” (the 
regime) and later “al-filūl” (literally, the remnants [of the regime]). Protestors 
killed during the mobilization were “shuhadāʾ thawrat khamsa wa ʿishrīn yanāyir” 
(martyrs of the 25th January Revolution). This “revolutionary idiom” (Sewell 
1979), replete with a chorus of jokes, put-downs and internet memes, infiltrated 
newspaper coverage, television chat shows and even the press releases issued by 
the SCAF in the year following Mubarak’s departure.2 Such a process of naming and 
narration was undeniably significant, not only in constituting the lived experiences 
of anti-Mubarak protestors, but also in legitimating and authenticating the 
protestors’ demands in light of the country’s revolutionary heritage (Sabaseviciute 
2011; Cole 2013; see also Selbin 2010). 
On the other hand, it seems much harder to justify an analytical 
categorization of ‘revolution’ when reflecting on the trajectory of post-Mubarak 
politics, even given that the scholarly definition of what constitutes a revolution 
                                                          
1 Later, to be a “revolutionary” narrowed considerably and came to be marked by a double rejection 
of the old regime and the Muslim Brothers.  
2 See al-Safha al-Rasmiyya li-l-Majlis al-Aʾla li-l-Quwwat al-Musallaha (2011).  
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has expanded considerably in the past decade. Worth considering here is a new 
literature on contemporary revolutions that argues that the revolutions of the late 
twentieth century onwards differ in several important ways from those that 
preceded them. If the classic model of a “social revolution” (Skocpol 1979) 
involved protracted and frequently violent mobilizations to transform the social 
and economic order of semi-agrarian societies, today’s ‘revolutions’ are found to 
be “negotiated” (Lawson 2005), “electoral” (Bunce and Wolchik 2006), “non-
violent” (Nepstad 2011) and at least nominally “democratic” (Thompson 2004) 3 in 
their ethos. These revolutions are more urban and compact, lasting only weeks or 
months (Beissinger 2013; 2014), while the new measure of revolutionary ‘success’ 
is increasingly the ousting of an incumbent authoritarian leader (Nepstad 2011: 
xiv).4 According to this definition, revolutions are, therefore, more a “mode of 
regime change” (Beissinger 2014), than an outcome-centric characterization of 
state breakdown (e.g. Goldstone 1991: 10-11), or a project of radical – political, 
social or economic – transformation. 
Scholars working in this vein have been quick to adopt the 25th January 
Revolution as evidence of this new modality of revolutionary action (Nepstad 
2011: xv; Beissinger 2013: 574, 2014). But despite several ostensible parallels that 
can be drawn with the 25 January repertoire of contention, political developments 
in Egypt in the three years and more since Mubarak’s demise suggest that this 
designation was premature. Under the SCAF’s guardianship, the Mubarak-era state 
was never upended, and it remains resolutely intact today. Nor, as I will go on to 
argue in chapter 2, did the 2011-2012 parliamentary and 2012 presidential 
                                                          
3 For a careful and thoughtful critique of ‘democratic revolutions,’ see Beissinger (2013).  
4 Accordingly, revolutions are increasingly seen as pathways to political liberalization, which 
strengthen rather than challenge the liberal international order (Lawson 2012: 12). 
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elections result in civilians exercising meaningful democratic control over the 
state. Given all this, it seems clear that no democratic or political revolution, even 
in the expanded analytical sense, can be said to have occurred.  
So what do I mean by the 25th January Revolution? According to my 
analysis, substantiated in greater detail over subsequent chapters, the eighteen 
days of the 25th January Revolution are better captured by the concept of a 
“revolutionary situation” (Tilly 1978: ch.7; El-Ghobashy 2011) in which an 
alternative claim to sovereignty in the name of “the people” (al-shaʿb) formed the 
basis of a countrywide mobilization against the regime of Husni Mubarak (see 
chapter 1).5 That revolutionary situation was never properly established and 
quickly subsided into a conventional democratic transition on 11 February 2011, 
following which constitutional and electoral forums came to structure a formal 
political process that unfolded under the direction of the military. Throughout this 
phase, Egyptians continued to mobilize outside of the transitional process; there 
were even several episodes when the country appeared poised to return to a 
revolutionary situation, for instance during the events of Muhammad Mahmud 
Street in late November 2011, when protestors tried, unsuccessfully, to recreate 
                                                          
5 An alternative perspective argues that a “long-term revolutionary process” (Achcar 2012: 17; see 
also Abdelrahman 2014) is underway in Egypt that will continue so long as the underlying socio-
economic grievances that gave rise to the original mobilization remain unaddressed. Operating in a 
Marxian, historical materialist vein, the longue durée view cautions against prematurely calling 
time on whether the 25th January Revolution was or was not a revolution, deduced from short-
term successes or failures. Unfortunately, it is difficult to see how this analysis survives the events 
of 3 July 2013 and the subsequent crackdown. Revolutions, as “second wave historical sociology” 
(Adams, Clemens and Orloff 2005) has argued (Skocpol 1979; Goldstone 1991; Tilly 1996; Goodwin 
2001; Foran 2005), do not simply flow from the objective contradictions of capitalism and class; 
rather, they unfold via particular pathways of state breakdown and require both coherent 
organizations capable of weathering sustained repression and innovative tactics to broker new 
alliances and mount effective challenges to the regime’s apparatus of coercion. For these reasons, 
revolutionary outcomes, Tilly (1978: ch.7) reminds us, remain extraordinary and exceptional 
events, precisely because most revolutionary situations and revolutionary forces are defeated by 
incumbent powers. 
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the conditions of early 2011 and replace the SCAF with a civilian-led national 
salvation government (see chapter 2).  
Egypt’s democratic transition failed on 3 July 2013 following the military 
coup. In the subsequent period, the revolutionary idiom of 2011 has been 
superseded by an evergreen discourse of haybat al-dawla (awe of the state; see El-
Ghobashy in MERIP 2013; Tripp 2013: 5; Shokr 2014), employed to justify several 
regime-orchestrated massacres of pro-Mursi supporters, the detention of many of 
those who instigated the mobilization against Mubarak, and the new protest law. 
An anti-coup movement led by the Muslim Brothers has launched daily street 
protests using a repertoire of contention evolving out of that employed in the 25th 
January Revolution (see chapter 3). However, their efforts have been blunted by 
unprecedented repression, a fragmented political landscape (a consequence of the 
failed democratic transition), the anti-coup protestors’ refusal to take up arms, the 
tendency of Egypt’s poorest to equate protest with socioeconomic threat (Chalcraft 
2014: 179), and international and regional support for the consolidation of the 
military-backed regime.  
Against this backdrop, thawrat khamsa wa ʿishrīn yanāyir (the 25th of 
January Revolution) remains commonly accepted shorthand in Egypt for referring 
to the eighteen days of popular protest that began on 25 January and which ended 
with the resignation of Hosni Mubarak. It is in this delimited sense that I use it.  
 
Contentious Politics 
Although more substantial reviews of existing approaches will be conducted in the 
articles themselves, it will be useful at this stage to consider the heuristic 
framework adopted in this thesis. The approach pursued here is informed, most 
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obviously, by the contentious politics literature associated with Doug McAdam, 
Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly’s (2001) Dynamics of Contention (DOC). That 
study sought to decompartmentalize the study of revolution, social movements, 
riots and other modes of transgressive collective action, and view them instead as 
belonging to a shared continuum of episodic, public and collective claim making 
between challengers and regimes (Ibid. 5). Viewed in this mode, the 25th January 
Revolution, democratic transition and anti-coup mobilization do not represent 
distinct processes or phenomena but can be usefully understood and illuminated 
by analyzing who is making claims, how those claims are made, the objects of those 
claims and regime responses to claim making.  
 In the analytical argot of the contentious politics literature, the ways in 
which people make claims is constrained by the available “repertoire of 
contention.” Tilly (1977) first introduced the “repertoire” metaphor to describe the 
evolving subset of protest tactics used in France between the seventeenth and 
twentieth centuries. This drew on one of Tilly’s (1978: ch.6) earliest and arguably 
most productive insights: that when people act collectively, they only do so in a 
limited number of ways. Expanding upon this in later works, Tilly argued that: 
The word repertoire helps describe what happens by identifying a limited 
set of routines that are learned, shared and acted out through a relatively 
deliberate process of choice. Repertoires are learned cultural creations, but 
they do not descend from abstract philosophy or take shape as a result of 
political propaganda; they emerge from struggle. People learn to break 
windows in protest, attack pilloried prisoners, tear down dishonoured 
houses, stage public marches, petition, hold formal meetings, organize 
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special-interest associations. At any point in history, however, they learn 
only a rather small number of alternative ways to act collectively. The limits 
of that learning, plus the fact that potential collaborators and antagonists 
likewise have learned a relatively limited set of means, constrain the 
choices available for collective interaction. (1995: 41-42) 
Michael Biggs (2013: 408-409) usefully reformulated Tilly's stance into two 
inter-related propositions: “repetition is far more likely than adoption; adoption is 
far more likely than invention.”  Tilly (2008: 68) suggests that invention usually 
proceeds via a process of incessant, small-scale innovation from existing tactics. 
Once invented, however, innovations can quickly drop out of the repertoire 
entirely and be forgotten (Soule 1999). The conditions under which protest tactics 
are invented ex nihilo and subsequently spread is less well theorized. In chapter 1, 
I will discuss a fraternization repertoire used by anti-Mubarak protestors that 
made claims on the loyalty of regime troops. Tracing the provenance of individual 
contentious performances, I find that fraternization performances adhered to 
Tilly’s claim making model as protestors’ innovated on pre-existing scripts to 
signal their solidarity with police and soldiers. In chapter 3, I use event data to 
consider how the anti-coup movement’s repertoire of contention has been 
transformed by repression.  
Repertoires are, in turn, related to the object of claim making. A powerful 
illustration of this approach is presented in Tilly’s (1995; 1997) work on popular 
contention in Great Britain. Tilly showed that by the late eighteenth century the 
increasingly visible role of elections and parliament in organizing public life led to 
the “parliamentarization of contention”, meaning that parliament became an object 
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of contention. This shift was in turn inflected in the means and timings of 
contention (see Tilly 2005). Marches, demonstrations, petitions and rallies began 
to revolve around single issues and parliamentary debates. Short term objectives 
previously achieved by violent means were replaced by longer-term struggles and 
associational activities structured around the rhythms of parliamentary life. By 
1800, Tilly surmises, the parliamentarization of contention saw “ordinary people 
abandon a whole array of claim making means that had produced substantial 
results in the short run and on the local scale; price-fixing seizures of grain, public 
shaming of workers who accepted less than the going wage, direct attacks on 
poorhouses, and similar enforcing actions that accomplished their objectives in 
many cases” (1997: 268). In chapter 2 we will encounter a process not dissimilar 
to that described here by Tilly, as I consider the demobilizing pressures of 
democratic transitions in which social movements are incentivised to pursue more 
routine, procedural politics as a consequence of a shift in the sites of claim making 
– from the contentious street to the chambers of a parliament – following 
democratic breakthroughs (see also Robertson 2010: ch.5).  
The relational and processual approach of the contentious politics literature 
invites clarification regarding the epistemological status of historical events and 
the narratives and memories of participants. As Tilly (2003: 5-8) notes, the 
conventional explanatory strategy pursued by social scientists has been to 
privilege either the ideas of participants, or their behaviour. It is worth quoting 
Tilly at length. “Ideas people stress consciousness as the basis of human action. 
They generally claim that humans acquire beliefs, concepts, rules, goals, and values 
from their environments, reshape their own (and each other’s) impulses in 
conformity with such ideas, and act out their socially acquired ideas…Behaviour 
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people stress the autonomy of motives, impulses, and opportunities…Behaviour 
people often take a reductionist position, saying that ultimately all collective 
phenomenon sum up nothing but individual behaviours.” (Ibid.: 5) In contrast, 
“Relation people make transactions among persons and groups far more central 
than do idea and behaviour people. They argue that humans develop their 
personalities and practices through interchanges with other humans, and that the 
interchanges themselves always involve a degree of negotiation and creativity.” 
(Ibid. 5-6). Tilly’s “contentious social interactionism,” notes Randall Collins (2010: 
7), strives for a middle ground between phenomenological individualism and a 
holistic analysis of social structures, and thus shares much in common with the 
work of John Dewey and the pragmatist philosophical tradition.6 In subsequent 
chapters, we will encounter episodes in which prior historical events and 
memories might suggest deeper semantic connections than that accounted for in 
Tilly’s framework. For example, the fraternization performances identified in 
chapter 1 may well derive from cognate antecedent imaginaries related to the 
military’s claimed role in the articulation of Egyptian nationhood. While not 
discounting such semantic connections, a relational approach ultimately privileges 
the dynamics of the situations in which protestors and soldiers interacted as being 
ultimately formative in deciding the nature and outcome of those interactions. 
 It is important to note, however, that the present study is not singularly 
structured around a search for “mechanisms” of the kind advocated in DOC and 
Tilly’s (2003; see also Tilly and Tarrow 2007) later work. In DOC, mechanisms are 
presented as the building blocks of social scientific enquiry – the “workhorses of 
                                                          
6 Tilly attributes this aspect of his work to the influence of sociologist Harrison White. See Krinsky 
and Mische (2013).  
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explanation” (McAdam Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 30) – and are defined as, “delimited 
sorts of events that change relations among specified sets of elements in identical 
or closely similar ways over a variety of situations.” (Ibid. 25). Through a series of 
paired comparisons – of imperial breakdown, democratization and revolution – 
twenty two mechanisms are proposed, including category formation, “[the] 
creation of a set of sites sharing a boundary distinguishing all of them and relating 
all of them to at least one set of sites visibly excluded by the boundary” (Ibid. 316); 
scale shift, “a change in the number and level of coordinated contentious actions 
leading to broader contention involving a wider range of actors and bridging their 
claims and identities” (Ibid. 331); and brokerage, “the linking of two or more 
unrelated sites” (Ibid. 333). These mechanisms “seldom operate on their own.” 
Rather, they “typically concatenate with other mechanisms into broader 
processes” such as revolutions (Ibid. 27).   
 The mechanisms and processes of DOC are plagued, however, by conceptual 
vagueness and ambiguities (Chalcraft 2013; Kurzman 2013). “It is arbitrary,” 
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly note, “whether we call brokerage a mechanism, a family 
of mechanisms, or a process” (2001: 27). Several mechanisms appear 
interchangeably as processes over the course of the book. The precise effects and 
status of mechanisms are also wholly underspecified, a criticism acknowledged by 
DOC’s authors (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: xii; McAdam and Tarrow 2011): they 
appear both as explanatory variables and as ad hoc causal statements (see Opp 
2009: ch.10). This has been compounded by a tendency to simply adduce further 
mechanisms, “mechanism talk” as Tarrow (2012: 25) calls it, to account for 
unexplained variance. For all these reasons, mechanisms are perhaps the least 
utilized aspect of the DOC project.  
27 
 
As such, the present study draws on several important insights that have 
emerged from DOC and other cognate work, but sees DOC less as a template to 
follow and implement wholesale, than as a point of departure from which to 
develop a relational, non-hydraulic and agent-centred explanation for the key 
moments and puzzles emerging from the 25th January Revolution.  
 
Methods and Data 
This thesis draws on two years of fieldwork, involving multiple research trips, 
carried out in Egypt between 2011 and 2014. It marshals several different types of 
evidence, including event data, informant testimony, newspaper articles, survey 
data, video footage and still photography. In the following section, I summarize my 
data collection methods, while considering some strategies for combining and 
triangulating different kinds of qualitative data to best address the research 
questions outlined earlier and to avoid the pitfalls arising from conducting 
research on unfolding events.7  
 
                                                          
7
 To avoid potential biases introduced by incomplete or partial information, I followed the approach 
advocated by social movement scholars in privileging “hard” observations (i.e. the who, where and 
when of events and episodes) over “soft” observations (i.e. the opinions and extrapolations of 
informants and journalists) (see Auyero 2007: 21; Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2004: 72). When citing 
testimony from informants with a self-interest in narrating their role in a positive light – for 
example, Muslim Brothers recounting the part played by movement members in defending Midan 
al-Tahrir during the 25 January Revolution – I treated their accounts critically and sought 
alternative sources that could independently confirm their testimony. Of course, this strategy 
cannot mitigate the emergence of new sources that may emerge later on. For example, one striking 
feature of the primary source material that has become available since the 25 January Revolution is 
a dearth of candid memoirs penned by members of the military and security forces reflecting on 
their experiences during the eighteen days of mass mobilization and the subsequent democratic 
transition. If and when such sources do become available, this may lead to the revision, 
reformulation or, indeed, confirmation, of several of the counter-factual scenarios laid out in 
chapters 1 and 2.  
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Semi-Structured Interviews 
In total, I conducted sixty semi-structured interviews in both Arabic and English. 
Since protestors are a relatively closed population, my primary method for 
selecting informants was snowball-based sampling. I aimed to conclude every 
interview by asking my informants whether they could introduce me to anyone 
who they thought could contribute to my research. I also conducted targeted 
interviews in which I approached individuals who had a public biography that 
made them of interest. Interviews were primarily recorded using handwritten 
notes and typically lasted around sixty minutes, although some went on for 
considerably longer. I conducted follow-up interviews on several occasions. 
Sometimes, situation permitting, I took notes on a laptop. I have also drawn on 
personal correspondence with protestors not available for face-to-face interviews.   
With regards citing testimony and considerations of anonymity, I made it 
clear to informants that I would use only their first name. This was due to the risks 
informants face when speaking to foreign researchers on sensitive topics such as 
the military,8 or the anti-coup movement. Because of the frequency of certain 
names, I have used a single digit to distinguish between informants. For example: 
Abdullah1, Abdullah2, Abdullah3, etc. When citing interview testimony with senior 
Muslim Brothers who reside outside of Egypt, I gained consent to use their full 
names. On one occasion when a Muslim Brother asked to be quoted anonymously, I 
have referenced their testimony as “interview with Muslim Brother”. In two cases 
(that I know of), I have included interview testimony with anti-coup organizers 
                                                          
8 I was especially conscious that shortly before I began conducting interviews on the role of the 
army in the 25th January Revolution, the Egyptian activist and blogger Maikel Nabil Sanad had been 
arrested and sentenced to three years in prison by a military court for a blog post (2011) entitled, 
“The army and the people wasn’t ever one hand [Sic]” in which he accused the military of 
conspiring against anti-Mubarak protestors during the eighteen days of mobilization.  
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who are active in Egypt and who used a pseudonym to conceal their identity. These 
and several other interviews were conducted from London using the internet 
client Skype and were facilitated by members of the anti-coup movement who 
were known to me.9  
 
Video and Photographic Evidence 
Within hours of protestors reaching Midan al-Tahrir on 25 January 2011 still 
photographs and video footage uploaded to social media sites had already come to 
constitute a searchable digital archive. The digitization of social processes and the 
ubiquity of camera-equipped mobile phones present new opportunities to study 
contentious politics. For chapters 1 and 3, I assembled an extensive photographic 
and video archive from internet-based searches10 and the personal ‘archives’ that 
informants had saved on mobile phones, memory sticks and hard drives.11 Video 
footage and still photographs uploaded to social media frequently had time 
stamps, or were uploaded shortly after the event that they captured, or included 
captions providing additional context,12 while visual materials obtained from 
informants were accompanied by detailed commentaries of the events in question.  
                                                          
9 I found that Skype-based interviews were quite limiting as a data collection method. Where I had 
no prior relationship with an interviewee, informants tended to be less forthcoming compared to 
in-person interviews. I also found that the snowball method travelled poorly to the medium. I 
attribute this to the lack of visual interaction (internet speeds in Egypt are rarely fast enough to 
support a video feed), which meant that I appeared as an unfamiliar, disembodied voice. Skype-
based interviews did, however, provide me with opportunities to speak to anti-coup protestors 
living outside of Cairo and Egypt’s other major cities, areas that I would have found difficult to visit 
in-person,  
10 I primarily searched Youtube, Bambuser and Flickr – sites that support Arabic-language search 
terms and which are popular in Egypt.  
11 Because I began conducting fieldwork in the months following the 25th January Revolution, 
informants frequently had the same SIM cards and laptops, meaning that the data was to hand 
during interviews. The ubiquity of Bluetooth, a free wireless data transfer technology, meant that I 
could acquire videos and photographs to study later. 
12 Most social media sites provide a function to contact the video uploader. For one video uploaded 
to Youtube, showing protestors attacking army vehicles as they deployed to Midan al-Tahrir on the 
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Of course, video footage and still photographs have limitations. Both show 
events in real time, and thus one never sees the macro context directly.13 Instead, 
the macro is constructed through concepts and metaphors. This requires large 
amounts of data with snippets of micro-interactions sutured together to give a 
sense of the larger pattern. Due to the latent possibilities of misinterpreting the 
significance of events, I used an arbitrary rule of thumb requiring two further 
corroborating sources, either informant testimony or the published journalistic 
record, before citing footage. This also demanded some degree of judgement and 
an intimate knowledge of the case. For example, when studying video or 
photographs of sequences of interactions between protestors and soldiers in 
Midan al-Tahrir, I found that the urban environment, including shop signs, adverts, 
or even the shapes of buildings in the background, provided invaluable clues as to 
where the action was taking place. Other observational data, such as light levels to 
gauge the time of day, the presence or absence or certain actors, and the use of 
certain chants and not others, all helped to situate recordings in their proper 
context. With this kind of detective work, video footage and still photographs allow 
us to view dimensions of contentious episodes that might otherwise fall beneath 
the threshold of historical visibility. We also get a very different perspective on 
how protest unfolds. Captured in real time, contention appears unruly and 
emotional, with micro-interactions appearing to be formative in explaining 
situational outcomes (Collins 2008).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
night of 28 January, the video uploader went on to become a key informant who introduced me to 
other protestors present in Tahrir that night.  
13 I owe this point to Randall Collins (personal correspondence 9 Sept. 2013). 
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Event Catalogue  
An event catalogue is a “set of descriptions of multiple social interactions collected 
from a delimited set of sources according to relatively uniform procedures” (Tilly 
2002: 249). Event catalogues have a long history in the study of contentious 
politics (e.g. Tilly, Tilly and Tilly 1975; Tilly 1995), with data usually drawn from 
newspapers, journals and periodicals (Franzosi 1987; Maney and Oliver 2001; Earl 
et al. 2004). The event catalogue (n=2685) that I draw on in chapter 3, derives 
from protest reports published in the print edition of the Muslim Brothers’ 
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) daily newspaper, al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala.14 
Because of the nature of the source, i.e. a partisan newspaper reporting on its own 
activities, I began by conducting a pilot study, coding all the protests as reported in 
al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala in September 2013. To check for reporting bias, I 
compared the reporting with video footage uploaded to dedicated anti-coup 
channels on Youtube and Bambuser.15 I then took a random sample of protest 
reports (by date and location) between June and February 2014, and conducted a 
further search. In all, I matched protest reports published in al-Hurriyya wa-l-
ʿAdala to over two hundred videos and live streams of anti-coup protests.  
                                                          
14 In the six months following the 3 July coup, al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala was the most reliable source 
for coverage of the anti-coup mobilization. An enforced media blackout meant that the vast 
majority of anti-coup protests went unreported in the Egyptian press. International news media, 
meanwhile, rarely operate outside of Cairo, and foreign correspondents lacked both the resources 
and the editorial inclination to report on the daily anti-coup protests taking place across the 
country. The anti-coup movement has recently begun to publish its own event data, see here: 
http://www.coupmonitor.com/protest-map.html.  
15 Most governorates have a Youtube and Bambuser (for live streaming) account, which act as 
aggregators for anti-coup protest footage and photographs. These accounts are maintained by one 
of several ‘against the coup’ movements (harakāt didd al-inqilāb). One reason for the anti-coup 
movement’s meticulous recording and uploading of protests is to generate video footage for Al 
Jazeera Mubashir Misr, the Egypt-focused channel of the Qatar-based satellite network. Mubashir 
Misr provides anti-coup protestors with pre-paid 3G-enabled smart phones (usually Galaxy 
Samsung S4s), which come with high quality cameras that can be used to record and stream the 
protests (interview Youssef1 6 Feb. 2014; interview Belal 22 Jun. 2014). As I subsequently 
discovered, protest reports carried in the FJP newspaper were simultaneously posted to the FJP’s 
online news website (now defunct), often accompanied with videos or livestreams of the protests, 
making searches of social media unnecessary.   
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One representative protest report reads as follows (see Figure 1): 
The city of Damietta witnessed a march that began in front of al-Matbuli 
mosque following Friday prayer, in which thousands of residents 
participated. The rally toured Abdulrahman Street, arriving at the Nile 
Corniche, where the participants formed a human chain by the side of the 
road, holding photographs and posters denouncing the coup (al-Hurriyya 
wa-l-ʿAdala, 14 Sept. 2013: 1). 
Figure 2 shows how this is coded in the event catalogue. I found video 
footage of the Damietta protest on the Damietta anti-coup movement Youtube 
channel.16  Comparing the article with the video record gives a sense of the 
accuracy of the reporting. The video has been clearly edited for length and lasts for 
eight minutes. In the bottom right-hand corner of the video is a date stamp and a 
banner that reads “Damietta – March al-Matbuli mosque – 13/09/2013.” In the 
video we see protestors assemble outside of a mosque before marching down a 
main road until they reach the Nile Corniche, where the protestors form a human
                                                          
16 See footage: http://youtu.be/Z7KwI1-lk3Q.  
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Figure 1. al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala, 14 Sept. 2013: 1 
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Date Governorate City Protest 
size 
First 
repertoire 
Second 
repertoire 
Protest 
start 
location 
Protest 
end 
location 
After 
Friday 
prayer 
Women Students Against 
the 
coup 
mvmt 
Ultras Repression 
(Deaths, 
wounded, 
arrests) 
13/09/13 Damietta Damietta 1001 Rally Human 
chain 
Mosque Main 
road 
Yes No No No No No 
Figure 2. Anti-coup event catalogue entry #1459. 
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chain, holding banners and chanting anti-coup slogans.17 The number of protestors 
appears consistent with the reporting.18 The most significant discrepancy is a 
failure to note the large number of women in the crowd. Other protest reports do 
record female participation and this is a variable that appears in the event 
catalogue, including for protests in Damietta, suggesting that this is an issue of 
underreporting, but not a systematic reporting bias. Tallied against the video 
footage, the Damietta protest report otherwise appears highly accurate, with date, 
protest location, size and repertoire faithfully relayed.   
There is evidence to suggest a more general underreporting of protests. For 
instance, I found videos of anti-coup protests uploaded to social media sites that 
were not reported in the newspaper. FJP journalists acknowledge this 
underreporting and attribute it to the challenges of obtaining protest reports when 
the paper was being clandestinely produced (personal correspondence Mustafa 28 
Nov. 2013). While there was no apparent geographic bias in report selection, it did 
appear to be the case that larger actions or those that came under attack, or 
involved some innovative tactic, were more likely to be reported on days with high 
numbers of protests.
                                                          
17 The Corniche is coded as a “main road”. As will become apparent in chapter 3, there is an 
important distinction between a “main road” and a “residential street.” This nuance derives from 
protest reports themselves. A main road, such as the Damietta Corniche, is a high-traffic, public 
area. It thus follows that protests in these spaces are more disruptive and more visible than a 
residential street populated by housing and small businesses. In the lexicon of anti-coup protest 
reports, protests that begin or end on main roads, or other high-traffic areas such as a Corniche, are 
referenced as “turuq raʾīsiyya” (main roads). By contrast, anti-coup protests that begin or end in 
residential areas are recorded as occurring in “the local streets of the neighbourhood” (fi shawāriʿa 
al-hayy). 
18 For protest size, I followed the inferential coding convention used in the European Protest and 
Coercion Dataset (Francisco n.d.). Reports frequently described protest size using terms such as 
“thousands,” “tens of thousands,” and “hundreds of thousands,” instead of definite numbers. 
Checked against the video evidence, I decided to use a conservative inference in which “tens” would 
be coded “10;” “hundreds” would be coded “100;” thousands would be coded “1000;” tens of 
thousands” would be coded “10000;” and “hundreds of thousands” would be coded “100000.”  
Following Francisco, to distinguish inferences from reported numbers, I record the inference with a 
final 1, e.g. 11, 101, 1001, and so on.  
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Figure 3. Online survey posted to female student anti-coup movement in Assiut (above) and the 
survey posted to the Facebook page of an anti-coup organizer (below). 
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Online Survey 
In March 2014, I conducted an anonymous 27-question survey (n=287) in the 
closed Facebook groups and social media forums used by the anti-coup movement 
(see appendix).19 I used the survey platform Smart Survey because it supports 
Arabic language formatting and provides enhanced security features. The survey 
had an SSL encryption to prevent eavesdropping and was completely anonymous, 
collecting no IP or Geolocation data on participants. To ensure the integrity of the 
data, I limited the survey to one response per IP address. Because of the method of 
distribution, I insisted that the survey be posted with a standard blurb so as to 
avoid influencing the results (this was not always followed, although I saw no 
deliberate attempt to bias the response). I documented the distribution of the 
survey by taking screenshots as it was posted to the groups and profiles used by 
anti-coup activists (see Figure 3).  
Online surveys suffer from a selection bias towards the most highly 
educated.  Ideally, I would have conducted an in-person survey on anti-coup 
protests in several governorates. However, this proved impossible due to the risks 
posed to both informants and researchers. As such, I use the data tentatively and 
only to illustrate points otherwise supported by informant testimony.  
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
Each chapter is presented as a standalone research article with its own research 
question, literature review, data and methods. As such, I have decided not to 
                                                          
19 I did so with the help of two informants who administrate closed Facebook groups used by the 
‘against the coup’ movements.  
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include a glossary, but instead to reintroduce acronyms and translations in each 
chapter where relevant.  
 Chapter 1 uses video evidence, still photographs, Egyptian newspaper 
reports and informant testimony to explore the micro-interactions between 
protestors, the police and later the Egyptian army. Through a social interactionist 
lens, it argues that the chants, physical embraces, interactions with military 
vehicles, graffiti and more, belonged to an improvised fraternization repertoire 
that made immediate, emotional claims on the loyalty of regime troops. The effects 
of fraternization contained the possibilities of violence and forged a precarious 
solidarity that was co-opted by the military to legitimate its assumption of 
executive powers in the post-Mubarak democratic transition.  
 Turning to the post-Mubarak democratic transition, chapter 2 draws on 
interviews with Muslim Brothers and the movement’s publications. It begins by 
considering the part played by the Muslim Brothers in the 25th January Revolution 
and the nature of the revolutionary coalition that emerged in Egypt’s streets and 
squares. It then spotlights the Brothers’ demobilization and privileging of electoral 
and constitutional forums in the first eighteen months of the transition. The 
chapter argues that the Brothers’ decision to sit out further protests to focus on 
elections facilitated the breakup of the revolutionary coalition that had ousted 
Mubarak and insulated the SCAF from street-level mobilization, leaving bad 
legacies for Mursi’s year in office. 
Chapter 3 begins by situating the Muslim Brothers’ decision to counter-
mobilize in the months before the coup. Drawing on interviews with leading 
Muslim Brothers and anti-coup activists, it traces the origins of the anti-coup 
movement to a decision in December 2012 by the Muslim Brothers to establish a 
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street presence to defend Mursi’s presidency and considers the events leading up 
to the 3 July coup, the Brothers’ strategy of occupying public squares, and the 
formation of new ‘against the coup’ movements. Using event data and informant 
testimony, the chapter then charts how the repertoire, sites and timings of anti-
coup contention were transformed by repression following the killing of over a 
thousand anti-coup protestors of 14 August 2014.  
A concluding chapter summarizes the findings of the three articles and 
considers several unresolved questions, before concluding with some suggestions 
for new avenues for future research in the study of contentious politics and the 
25th January Egyptian Revolution.  
40 
 
Chapter 1 
 
“The army and the people are one hand!” 
Fraternization and the 25th January Egyptian 
Revolution 
 
el-geysh we-l-shaʿb iyd wāhda! (The army and the people are one hand!) 
———Chant first heard in Cairo, 28 Jan. 2011 
 
At 5:00 p.m. on the afternoon of Friday, 28 January 2011, the Egyptian army was 
deployed onto the streets following three days of escalating protests. The order to 
leave barracks coincided with the withdrawal from Alexandria, Cairo, and the Suez 
of Interior Ministry-controlled Central Security Forces (CSF), the shock troops of 
President Hosni Mubarak’s regime, along with all other branches of Egyptian 
police, including prison guards and traffic police. Hours earlier, on this day 
anointed the “Friday of Anger,” columns of protestors from Cairo’s different 
neighborhoods and popular quarters had clashed with CSF units as they struggled 
to converge at Midan al-Tahrir, the locus of the previous days’ protests. A pitched 
battle was fought on the Kasr el-Nil Bridge as CSF troops blocked protestors 
advancing from Giza to downtown Cairo and the road to Tahrir. As elsewhere, the 
battle for Kasr el-Nil lasted most of the afternoon and culminated in the bottom-up 
defeat of the CSF, but only after protestors endured armored vans plowing 
indiscriminately into their ranks and seemingly endless volleys of tear gas, water 
cannon, and shotgun pellets. By early evening, increasing numbers, bloodied from 
the afternoon’s fighting, began arriving in the Midan. Approaching Tahrir, many of 
                                                          
 Adapted from Neil Ketchley, 2014, ““The army and the people are one hand!” Fraternization and 
the 25th January Egyptian Revolution,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 56, 1: 155-186. 
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them, in some cases still pursuing vestiges of the CSF, would encounter newly 
arriving armored units of the Egyptian army.  
How protestors came to terms with the army’s deployment amidst 
unprecedented mobilizations against Mubarak’s seemingly entrenched 
dictatorship has hitherto received little to no attention in either Arabic or English-
language journalistic accounts, or in the emerging academic literature on the 25th 
January Revolution.20 I address this lacuna by drawing on informant testimonies,21 
Arabic and English-language newspapers and blogs,22 and analysis of photographs 
and video footage23 to recount fragmentary micro-histories of these encounters, 
from the first rush to surround newly arriving Egyptian army armored personnel 
carriers (APCs) to sustained protestor-soldier interactions over the course of the 
                                                          
20 One important exception is Atef Said (2012: 405–11), who draws on informant testimony 
detailing protestors’ reactions to the army’s arrival. I thank an anonymous CSSH reviewer for 
bringing this paper to my attention, and Atef Said for sharing his paper prior to its publication. I 
note that our informants highlight many of the same episodes, a point that is especially suggestive 
given the dearth of published accounts. Another relevant study is that published by Jeffrey 
Alexander, who has called the 25th January the “performative revolution” (2011). While I am 
receptive to Alexander’s stress on performance, his list of sacred and profane objects in protestor 
performances omits the Egyptian army entirely, despite the vast array of performances, many of 
which I will discuss here, that include or reference the army (ibid.: 18). Alexander’s omission can 
seem justified if one accepts his claim that to those in Tahrir, “by the evening of 29 January, the side 
that the army was taking had become manifest and clear” (ibid.: 79). In contrast, I aver that the 
army was prominent in protestor’s performances precisely because their position vis-a -vis the 
struggle to oust Mubarak was, to many protestors, manifestly unclear, and these performances 
figured as kinds of claim-making. 
21 I followed the 25th January Revolution on an al-Jazeera live stream ensconced in a French 
research institute in Damascus, Syria. I arrived in Cairo in May 2011, just as Syrians intensified their 
own mobilizations against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Interviews were conducted in both Arabic 
and English. I include on two occasions email correspondence with protestors who were not 
available for face-to-face interviews. I found it impossible to trace soldiers stationed in the Midan—
the Egyptian Central Military Command is not a researcher-friendly institution—while appeals to 
the relatives of these soldiers to forward to me their recollections went largely unanswered. As a 
result, the picture that emerges is an incomplete one, told almost exclusively from the perspective of 
civilian protestors. When citing informant testimony, I use the first name to preserve the condition 
of anonymity under which testimony was gathered. 
22 Newspaper articles were sourced from the newspaper archives at the American University in 
Cairo. I reviewed the print editions of the three major “independent” Arabic-language newspapers 
in Egypt at the time—Al-Dostor, Al-Masry Al-Youm, and Al-Shorouk—and the English-language 
Egyptian Daily Gazette.  
23 I assembled an extensive photographic and video archive from Internet-based searches and 
material shared by protestors. The video footage I reference has been edited and uploaded to my 
Youtube channel: www.youtube.com/user/nfketchley. 
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fifteen days from the army’s initial deployment to Hosni Mubarak’s resignation. 
Drawing on these largely occluded interactions, I address a question that recurs 
both in histories of political struggle and in the ongoing Arab Spring: how did 
protestors succeed in co-opting or neutralizing the threat posed by security forces 
assumed to be loyal to a regime that was determined to end protest? 
With that puzzle in mind, I develop a social interactionist approach to 
explain the prevalence of protestors chanting in the name of the army, graffiting 
and climbing aboard military vehicles, sleeping in tank tracks, and physically 
embracing and posing for photographs with soldiers, in and around Midan al-
Tahrir. I bring these together by excavating a category of action common to 
histories and handbooks of social protest: fraternization. Fraternization is an 
intuitively familiar idiom of contentious street politics that dates back to at least 
the eighteenth century. Then, insurgent Europeans would mount barricades and 
call out to those regime forces sent to put down their insurrection, entreating them 
to listen to their demands, hoping that, “face-to-face contact and a frank sharing of 
perspectives would forge an indissoluble bond capable of overcoming any initial 
antagonism” (Traugott 2010: 209). The effects of fraternization on army discipline 
during the 1848 French Revolution were so disastrous that army officers would 
later order that any approaching fraternizer be shot, lest their soldiers succumb 
(ibid.: 211).  
Leon Trotsky (2003 [1932]: 136–44) became perhaps the most famous 
proponent of fraternization, when, in his history of the Russian Revolution, he 
encouraged future revolutionaries to get physically close so that they might 
provoke that “psychological moment” when soldiers could contemplate to which 
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side they belonged.24 Such was the association between fraternization and 
revolutionary socialism that it was first formally studied by an English aristocrat, 
Katherine Chorley, who, in her bid to combat the “Militant Left,” warned military 
officers of its dangers: “An important method for tampering with the morale of 
troops … used where the soldiers are dispersed in relatively small numbers in such 
a way that there can be personal contact between them and the insurgent 
population … [fraternization] implies any method of winning sympathy, from 
direct argument and persuasion to the generation by one means or another of that 
subtle emotional sense of an underlying community of sentiment and interests 
between troops and people” (1973 [1943]: 158–59). Fraternization continues to be 
prescribed by such luminaries of protest as Gene Sharp (1980: 250; 2005 [1973]: 
146–47), doyen of non-violent direct action and compiler of “how-to” protest 
manuals, as a tactic to usurp the grip of an occupying military power 
In this paper, I build on new theoretical directions and empirical priorities 
in the study of contentious politics (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tilly 2006a; 
2008), and literatures on the micro-interactional aspects of ritual (Goffman 1971; 
1972; Collins 2004) and violence (Collins 2008), to pose fraternization as a 
repertoire of contentious performances that make immediate, situational claims on 
the loyalty of regime security forces. During the 25th January Revolution, 
fraternization performances initially emerged as improvised techniques of micro-
                                                          
24 Lenin (1964 [1917]: 318–20) also conceived a role for fraternizing in the trenches of the eastern 
front. In practice, fraternization between Bolsheviks and Austrian conscripts, as described by Red 
Navy leader F. F. Raskolinikov (1982 [1918]), often meant adhering to what Tony Ashworth (1968; 
2000 [1980]) described as a “live and let live” system. Soldiers from all sides would seek to restrict 
the scope for violence by aiming to miss or by not taking the initiative to open fire. When fire was 
exchanged, its volume timing and deliberate ineffectiveness often revealed it to be ritualistic. 
Perfunctory and routine firing served to sate the demand for aggression by military commanders, 
while communicating a message of non-aggressive intent to the soldiers on the opposing side. The 
reciprocal and micro-interactive aspects of live and let live has led to its being invoked as a prisoner 
dilemma in game theory (see Axelrod 1984).  
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conflict avoidance. This occurred first with CSF troops during protests on 28 
January, and continued later in and around Midan al-Tahrir after protestors 
attacked newly arriving tanks and APCs. During other episodes, fraternizing 
protestors made claims on army units to guarantee their security, especially when 
threatened by other pro-Mubarak forces. Thanks to these and other performances, 
protestors and soldiers developed a polyvalent repertoire that came to 
ritualistically structure protestor-soldier interactions by producing visceral, if 
often contingent feelings and symbols of protestor-soldier solidarity. Here, I 
explore fraternizing and the “generative power of the practices of protest” 
(Dzenovska and Arenas 2012: 675) in constructing a precarious “internal frontier” 
(Laclau 2007), which balanced protestors’ desires for security with their demands 
to bifurcate Mubarak’s governmental apparatus from what would become a re-
aggregated claim to sovereignty in the name of the army and the people.25  
The social interactionist lens through which I marshal instances of 
fraternization in Tahrir can be traced back to Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and 
Charles Tilly’s Dynamics of Contention (2001). That work set out to de-
compartmentalize the study of riots, strikes, revolutions, social movements, and 
other transgressive modes of politics, and view them instead under the common 
rubric of contentious politics, defined as “episodic, public, collective interaction 
                                                          
25 I am indebted to two of the anonymous CSSH reviewers for their detailed comments that helped 
me to develop this point and for the phrasing of a “precarious” solidarity. Parenthetically, it is 
important to note that I refer, rather conveniently, to “protestors” to signify a mobilized bloc 
interacting with the army. This might appear unsatisfactory on two fronts: First, in Arabic-language 
accounts from the 25th January Revolution, this bloc is usually referred to in the plural as 
mutazāhirūn (demonstrators) and only on occasion as muhtajjūn (protestors). I use the latter for 
stylistic purposes. Second, I do not account for the ways in which protestors developed their own 
repertoire to sustain a frontier that overcame social heterogeneity to make claims in the name of 
“the people.” I am, in effect, leaving untold the process of mobilization. This itself is worthy of study, 
and is left unresolved here except in discussing, apropos of fraternizing with the army, how 
fraternization performances coordinated action in the name of “the people” when protestors made 
claims on soldiers.  
45 
 
among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a 
claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if 
realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants” (ibid.: 5).26 My mode 
and manner of analysis, following Tilly and his “recovering structuralist” (Tarrow 
2006) collaborators, is agentic and relational, and treats “social interaction, social 
ties, communication and conversation not merely as expressions of structure, 
rationality, consciousness, or culture but as active sites of creation and change” 
(McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 22).  
“People” Tilly noted, “make claims with words such as condemn, oppose, 
resist, demand, beseech, support, and reward. They also make claims with actions 
such as attacking, expelling, defacing, cursing, cheering, throwing flowers, singing 
songs, and carrying heroes on their shoulders” (2008: 6). In this, Tilly would 
observe that political contention often resembles, “loosely scripted theatre” 
(2006a: 41). By way of two appropriately theatrical metaphors, he suggested that 
“presenting a petition, taking a hostage, or mounting a demonstration constitutes a 
performance linking at least two actors, a claimant and an object of claims … [and] 
performances clump into repertoires of claim-making routines” (ibid.: 35). 
Ultimately, Tilly sets out to show how repertoires of contention delimit the 
possibilities of popular politics, and how this process is shaped by, and in turn 
shapes, political regimes; especially a regime’s degree of democratic participation 
and its capacity to police dissent. I depart from Tilly to travel in the opposite 
direction, toward the micro-interactional dimensions of contentious claim-making 
and the formativeness of contentious performances in shaping situational 
                                                          
26 This revisionist turn has not been universally well received; see Mobilization (2003) and McAdam 
and Tarrow (2011).  
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outcomes.27 In making this move, I take inspiration from Randall Collins (2010) in 
asking how a contentious performance makes claims on regime agents through 
stimulating feelings of solidarity, and comes to figure as an interaction ritual—“a 
mechanism of mutually focused emotion and attention producing a momentarily 
shared reality, which thereby generates solidarity and symbols of group 
membership” (Collins 2004: 7).28 
 
How to Protest Smartly 
During the 25th January Revolution, fraternization performances were not limited 
to coping with the army’s unexpected arrival. Protestors also fraternized with 
black-uniformed CSF troops, although this occurred only sporadically and involved 
a much narrower range of performances. Spectacular video footage exists, for 
example, of protestors fraternizing with a CSF unit in Alexandria on 28 January.29 
As protestors approached a line of truncheon and shield-wielding CSF, there was 
                                                          
27 This compliments Tilly’s (2008: 35) own call for more refined evidence on performances and 
repertories that, “look inside individual episodes to analyze the interplay of actors, interactions, and 
contentious claims.” In this regard, a Tilly-inspired social interactionist account of occupied Midan 
al-Tahrir is implicitly staking a position regarding the sociology of crowds. The study of crowds 
dates to Le Bon (1977 [1896]), who was concerned with supposedly anarchic crowds in the French 
Revolution. Le Bon and his interlocutors would go on to establish crowds as a central concern for 
the new discipline of sociology (see Borch 2012). That early literature has, however, been much 
maligned by social historians for its propensity to pathologize crowds as irrational, threatening, and 
driven by criminal intent (Rude  1959; Lefebvre 1965). In one of Tilly’s (1978) earliest studies he 
explicitly distanced himself from the singular analysis of crowds, pursuing instead a rationalistic 
and structuralist conception of collective action tied to macro-processes of social change. In a later 
work, Tilly (2006b) re-engaged the study of crowds to explore how movement members organize 
themselves in public using the principle of “WUNC”—collective worthiness, unity, numbers, and 
commitment—to legitimize their claim-making. How a sociology of contentious crowds grounded in 
the micro-interactive dimensions of claim-making would relate to Tilly’s goal of a unified theory of 
contentious politics is one of the unfulfilled promises suggested by this and Tilly’s last work (2008) 
on contentious performance. 
28 The study of contentious politics as played out in emotional and ritual-laden fields is not without 
precedent (see, variously, Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2000; 2001; 2007; Collins 2001; Aminzade 
and McAdam 2001). These works, though, tend to remain conceptually and empirically limited to 
what might be thought of as the meso-level of social movement organizations, either in terms of 
framing processes, resource mobilization, or political opportunity structures, and so, therefore, do 
not  account forthe micro-interactive and emotional aspects of contentious performances.  
29 See footage: http://youtu.be/NLTh3HaAEc4. 
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no clash: rather, protestors moved to kiss, hug, and embrace individual soldiers, all 
the while disrupting their formation. While individual troopers attempted to 
maintain their distance, others were physically encircled, remonstrated, and 
pleaded with. In the video, the effects of these interactions are profound: both 
protestors and soldiers visibly moved to tears. 
In and around Tahrir, it is important to note, women were often in the 
vanguard of would-be fraternizers; this suggests that fraternization as contentious 
performance belies the masculine, exclusivist solidarity implied by the word’s 
etymology. In Cairo on the same day, for instance, the image of a woman kissing 
the cheek of a CSF trooper featured in both local and international news coverage 
(see Figure 4).30 In that photograph, the trooper continues to stare straight ahead, 
seemingly unaffected by the kiss; a clue to his emotional detachment? The riot 
helmets of his colleagues are visible over his shoulder, perhaps suggesting a unit 
whose internal discipline and solidarity remains intact. Later that afternoon, near 
the famous Groppi restaurant in downtown Cairo, further incidents of 
fraternization occurred when advancing protestors isolated twenty CSF troopers. 
That unit had exhausted its ammunition and found itself cut off from the main CSF 
lines barring protestors’ advance to Midan al-Tahrir. Surrounded, protestors 
moved to embrace them, chanting, “These are poor men following orders.” They 
then formed a cordon around the riot police and escorted them to safety, while the 
protestors were soon subjected to fresh attacks from CSF units stationed further 
down the road who fired tear gas at them (el-Refai 2011). 
                                                          
30 Likewise, this photograph’s popularity recalls a set of fraternization performances familiar to 
contemporary histories of contentious politics in which both male and female protestors hand out 
flowers, kiss members of security forces, or place flowers in rifle barrels as happened variously 
during anti-Vietnam protests in the United States, the Portuguese “Carnation Revolution” of 1974, 
and the Filipino People Power Revolution.  
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Figure 4. A woman kisses a member of the CSF, Cairo, 28 Jan. 2011 (Lefteris Pikarakis/AP/Press Association 
Images). 
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These instances of fraternizing with the CSF were exceptional, and most CSF 
interactions with protestors were characterized by violence. Informants frequently 
attributed this to an irreconcilable hatred for the CSF, who are frequently brutal in 
their policing of street politics, although as the examples above indicate this does 
not rule out fraternization entirely. Alternatively, we might observe that the CSF 
were trained in crowd control and equipped with ranged weapons including water 
cannon, shotguns, rubber bullets, and tear gas. The tactics they employed leading 
up to the army’s deployment made liberal use of these weapons, the emphasis 
being on controlling space and maintaining distance between the two sides, which 
made fraternization impossible in most cases. Even when protestors encountered 
units of riot police in non-conflict situations, the CSF engaged in techniques of 
intimidation. One observer, during the prelude to the march on Kasr el-Nil, 
recalled, “When the first protestors appeared … the policemen closed ranks. They 
began to stamp the heels of their boots rhythmically on the tarmac, and to let out 
low, guttural sounds. It was meant to be a scary warning. And it worked” 
(Trombetta, 2013: 142).  
This question of distance remains key in many respects. The relative 
absence of fraternization with ranged-weapon wielding CSF troops is broadly 
consistent with micro-sociological studies (Collins 2008), which suggest that the 
frequency and intensity of violence is situationally affected by distance and shared 
emotional moods.31 By intimidating protestors, maintaining distance, and 
attacking with ranged weapons, the CSF increased both the fear of further 
                                                          
31 For further evidence of this dynamic, Khalid Fahmy (2013) details how, on 28 January, after 
setting off on a march from Giza to Tahrir his group unexpectedly encountered a CSF trooper 
wielding a tear gas gun. As the distance between the two sides narrowed and amid salvoes of 
teargas, Khalid recounts, “He shouted at us, ‘Don’t come any closer’ and we responded, ‘So don’t 
shoot at us.’ He shook his head and said in a clear Upper Egyptian accent, ‘This is wrong. There’s 
something wrong here.’ He lowered his gun and collapsed weeping.” 
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confrontations and the situational tension experienced by CSF troops and 
protestors alike, all the while negating the possibility of interactional solidarity and 
making further violence more likely.32 As the examples above suggest, and as we 
will encounter later, fraternization performances were initially used by protestors 
to transform these emotional moods, to try to inculcate feelings of solidarity 
between fraternizer and fraternized in ways that limited the opportunities for 
violence to break out. 
Fraternizing with the CSF and later the army has been claimed as a tactic by 
the “April 6” Movement, a prominent youth activist group that conducted activist 
training focused on protest tactics prior to 25 January. They taught chants and 
embodied actions similar to those that I will identify in the fraternization 
repertoire.33 Similarly, an anonymously authored Arabic-language protest 
handbook entitled, “How to protest smartly” and illustrated by women physically 
embracing and posing for photographs with CSF soldiers (see Figure 5), circulated 
in Cairo days before 28 January, urging activists to, “try to bring individual 
policemen and soldiers to the side of the people” (Kayfa Tathūr bi-Hadāʾa 2011: 3). 
I largely discount the relevance of both of these sources due to my repeated 
inability to locate graduates of protest workshops, or readers of such manuals, 
during the formative moments when protestors began to fraternize. Instead, 
fraternization appears to have emerged, not under the direction of trained 
activists, or from learned maneuvers outlined in handbooks, but rather in a 
                                                          
32 Collins (2008: ch. 2) suggests this is why snipers, fighter pilots, and drone operators tend to inflict 
the highest casualty rates, since distance from those deemed hostile, coupled with greater technical 
competence and ranged weaponry, allows for the overcoming of confrontational tension and fear. 
33 We find here a link with Gene Sharp’s writings on non-violent action. Members of “April 6” have 
known connections with Serbia’s Otpor movement, which was partially inspired by Sharp’s work. 
Arabic-language versions of his The Politics of Nonviolent Action circulated in Egypt prior to 25 
January (Rosenburg 2011). Still, I tend to concur with Asʿad AbuKhalil (2011), who argues that 
Sharp’s influence has been overstated, mostly to sate the desire among commentators to locate a 
Western “guiding hand” behind the 25th January Revolution. 
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Figure 5. “The police and the people together against oppression. Long live Egypt!” (Kayfa Tathūr bi-Hadāʾa: 
Maʿlūmāt wa Taktikāt Hāmma 2011: 22). 
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manner akin to what James C. Scott (1979) has called, “the revolution in the 
revolution.” In other words, there appears to have been a strong element of 
improvisation and innovation in these actions quite independent of any 
orchestrating hand or radical leadership.34 Protestors arriving to Midan al-Tahrir 
responded to the introduction of a new force in Egyptian street politics by 
improvising claim-making performances that sought to establish the “norms of co-
mingling” (Goffman 1971: xi) between protestors and soldiers, ineluctably drawing 
those army units to the revolution’s side.  
 
Fraternizing the Egyptian Army 
At the end of a busy news day, international news media on 28 January showed 
nighttime Cairo, army vehicles passing through the streets. That evening’s 
Associated Press (2011) package was typical of the coverage: it showed footage of 
protestors ostensibly welcoming tanks and APCs, before reporting that the 
headquarters of Mubarak’s NDP party were ablaze, Egyptian Internet service 
providers had cut access, and mobile phone coverage had been similarly disrupted, 
and then concluding with scenes from the monumental battle for the Kasr el-Nil 
bridge.  
In and around Midan al-Tahrir the situation was manifestly more 
complicated. As far as I have been able to establish, the first documented encounter 
between protestors and soldiers occurred around 5:20 p.m.: tanks and APCs were 
reported entering downtown Cairo and heading for the state radio and television 
stations at Maspero, not far from the National Museum’s entrance to Midan al-
                                                          
34 For a discussion on the “leaderful” (as opposed to “leaderless”) character of the 25th January 
Revolution, see Chalcraft 2012. 
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Tahrir.35 The arrival of a lone, Soviet-era, Egyptian Army APC near the 6 October 
bridge was captured by Al-Jazeera English Live.36 In this footage, daylight is giving 
way to dusk as the 5:30 p.m. maghrib (sunset) prayer approaches. A crowd of some 
thirty protestors sights the vehicle and immediately surrounds it, gesticulating, 
beckoning others to join. Young men quickly begin to haul themselves aboard. The 
crowd around the APC increases to eighty or a hundred as more protestors arrive. 
The soldiers atop are largely left undisturbed. Within a few seconds, the APC 
begins to reverse away. Those who had successfully climbed aboard the APC jump 
free. A small number give chase as the vehicle backs away. 
That same, lone APC was caught on camera shortly afterward by Al Jazeera 
Arabic Live, only a few hundred meters from where the first, fleeting interaction 
took place.37 Dusk has not yet arrived, suggesting that little time has passed. The 
APC has broken down and is being pushed by soldiers. In a 50-second clip, seven 
pedestrians walk past the vehicle, paying it no attention. Two young men sit on the 
Nile’s bank looking out away from the stricken APC. Traffic continues to move 
around it.38 The camera pans out to the 6th October Bridge above. Protestors cross 
the bridge from the Giza side, heading toward Maspero and Tahrir, passing 
abandoned cars, the remnants of the afternoon’s traffic.  
                                                          
35 Al-Dostor’s live blog of the day’s events, updated despite limited Internet access in the country, 
gives a good account of the army’s movement as they left barracks and moved into the city (Al-
Dostor 2011a).  
36 See footage: http://youtu.be/CVQce01d6EU. 
37 See footage: http://youtu.be/SWBkJflJd7Y. 
38 This apparent obliviousness to events is a reminder, omitted from breathless accounts of the 25th 
January Revolution, that Cairo did not simply stop functioning with the occupation of Midan al-
Tahrir. For the eighteen days of the revolution, outside of protest hotspots (including pro-Mubarak 
counter-demonstrations), life for the vast majority of the city’s residents continued at varying 
degrees of normality. The main disruption was the withdrawal of police; popular committees were 
established in residential areas that maintained their own patrols and often constructed 
checkpoints limiting the flow of traffic. The city’s unmobilized residents would form a competing 
frontier that spoke in the name of “the people,” the so-called hizb al-kanaba (party of the sofa), a 
term adopted by Egyptian chat shows, newspapers, and social media to signify the millions of 
seemingly apathetic Egyptians who followed the 25th January Revolution on television.  
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It is here we begin to see the incipient contours of the fraternization 
repertoire.39 From that first rush to surround the soon-to-be-broken-down APC, 
we find a fraternization performance that amounts to a ritualized trespassing. The 
juxtaposition above is particularly useful in delineating the emergence of 
trespassing as a contentious performance belonging to the fraternization 
repertoire. This dynamic is rendered all the clearer by understanding the ubiquity 
of the military and its boundaries in Egypt. Any Egyptian taxi driver picking up 
fares in Cairo or one of Egypt’s other cities, either prior to or after the 25th January 
Revolution, would as a matter of routine encounter the army in everyday life. 
Traveling from the outskirts to the center of Cairo, our imaginary taxi driver will 
drive by numerous barracks, administrative buildings, army hotels, and officers’ 
clubs, army-specific bank branches, pharmacies, and sports clubs, and other 
elements of a literal military-industrial complex, which as a percentage of the 
national economy is “too vast and dispersed to estimate with any confidence” 
(Marshall and Stacher 2012: 12). Around sensitive military installations or 
presidential buildings, or when crossing into a different governorate or 
approaching the Suez Canal, our driver must pass through manned military 
checkpoints.  
In this partial cityscape, military space is well organized and respected, with 
clearly defined borders.40 Military installations often have high walls and 
watchtowers, and it is common to see signs around them written in Arabic and 
English announcing that photography is forbidden. As I discovered while 
researching this paper, photographing army vehicles, be the photographer a 
                                                          
39 Here the suggestion is that fraternization began as individual performances that coalesced into a 
repertoire as the days passed. I am grateful to Sidney Tarrow for encouraging me to consider this 
point.  
40 On the micro-interactive aspect of borders, markers, and territories, see Goffman (1971: 40–44). 
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northern European male or his Egyptian brother-in-law, is only possible if done 
surreptitiously. People passing through military checkpoints tend to go to 
extraordinary lengths to observe the boundary markers soldiers place around 
their territory. On my daily walk from Dokki in Giza, I passed through two military 
checkpoints to access a shortcut via the Pakistani and Yemeni embassies and 
arrive at the metro station. Soldiers stationed there had placed crowd-control 
barriers on the corners of both entrances, partially blocking the pavement. 
Pedestrians, I observed, would seldom sidestep the barrier, manned by a soldier 
who was frequently bored; they preferred instead to step down into the road, 
continue there for 20 meters until they passed the second checkpoint, cross 
another small road, and remount the pavement. The pavement on my shortcut had 
effectively become military territory.  
During the fifteen days between the army’s initial deployment and 
Mubarak’s resignation, there emerged a set of performances which through their 
emulation and recursion challenged this “right of separateness” (Goffman 1972: 
69) enjoyed by the army, and came to figure as interaction rituals. The response by 
protestors at first sighting army vehicles was to trespass, first by surrounding the 
vehicle and then by hauling themselves aboard. Pedestrians passing the stricken 
APC otherwise respected the established boundaries of military space. In shaping 
micro-interactions, the mounting of Egyptian army vehicles asserted a right to 
physical co-presence that allowed for other kinds of fraternization later. One 
cannot overstate the importance of trespassing and the demand to share military 
space in literally setting the stage for other fraternization performances. Goffman 
explains, “It is apparent that a precondition for the performance of … rituals is that 
the giver and the receiver be in contact, whether face-to-face or mediated. No 
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contact, no interpersonal ritual” (1971: 71). One of my key arguments here is that 
as physical distance between protestors and security forces decreases, we should 
find an attending increase in ritualized interaction and a decrease in sociological 
distance; that is to say, the embodied representation that “the army and the people 
are one hand” is a plausible performance. If fraternization requires physical co-
presence, it is equally apparent that accessing police, soldiers, or other arms of a 
state’s apparatus of violence is often difficult: security forces jealously guard the 
boundaries of their territories and their right to organize that space. 
Egyptian soldiers did not simply surrender their vehicles in this regard. In 
the first encounter with protestors, the APC reversed away when it seemed about 
to be enveloped by the crowd. As protestors continued along the Nile Corniche, still 
clashing with the rearguard of retreating CSF units, they encountered further APCs 
on the road to Maspero.41 Initially, when approaching the first such army vehicle, 
protestors took shelter behind it from CSF tear gas and rubber bullets. Many more 
stood off the vehicle’s sheltering flank to arc stones at the CSF; the APC marked the 
new frontline of the protestors’ offensive. After the CSF troops retreated, numbers 
remained with the APC. No longer gathered on just one side, they corralled the 
vehicle with their bodies, the most enterprising pulling themselves on board. 
Informants reported soldiers manning the vehicles initially trying to stop this, 
often demanding that the crowd open up so as to allow the vehicle free movement. 
Indeed, this was a common scene in footage from 28 January and into the next 
morning, as soldiers attempted to assert control over their vehicles.42 As will 
                                                          
41 See footage: http://youtu.be/mYYgTohq_YY.  
42 See footage: http://youtu.be/WA55CKbqBo4. This Associated Press video, filmed on the morning 
of 29 January on the road to Tahrir from Maspero, shows a soldier trying to push a protestor off his 
APC. Protestors below hold an Egyptian flag penned with the slogan, “Down with Mubarak” as they 
chant, “The army and the people will complete the task.” After passing the flag to their comrade 
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become apparent, though, protestors could not be deterred in their trespassing, 
and they made continual claims to access military vehicles and their personnel, all 
indicative of a crowd that accepted no boundaries aside from those of its own 
making, especially boundaries that might allow soldiers to remain neutral 
bystanders in the struggle against Mubarak. 
 
The Army and the People Are One Hand! 
As night fell, protestors gathered outside Maspero, near the National Museum 
entrance to Midan al-Tahrir. The situation was in flux, and running battles between 
CSF units and protestors on the road leading to Maspero had been replaced by an 
uneasy calm. Newly arrived Egyptian army units in APCs and battle tanks, some 
identifiable by their claret and blue insignia as belonging to the Republican Guard, 
had taken position outside Maspero. Armed soldiers wearing gas masks—
necessary given the volume of tear gas fired by the recently departed CSF—
manned the windows and entrances to the large, convex building. 
In video recorded by the Egyptian newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm, protestors 
can be seen climbing atop stationed army vehicles, many waving flags and cheering 
on their comrades.43 It is outside Maspero that we hear for the first time protestors 
chanting, “The people and the army are one hand.”44 The footage continues with a 
Republican Guard officer using his signal flag to hit a protestor trying to board an 
APC. In informant testimony, the interactions with the army have been described 
                                                                                                                                                                          
above, he tries to hand it to the soldier and when he refuses to take it, attempts to wrap him in it. 
Clearly exasperated by the persistence of the protestor, the soldier gives up and moves on to remove 
the next trespasser. 
43 See footage: http://youtu.be/FXQzq_y2SDU. 
44 Here the chant takes the form “The people and the army are one hand,” as opposed to “The army 
and the people are one hand.” I came across both instances regularly and interchangeably, both on 
that night and during the 25th January Revolution generally. However, in the formulation adopted 
by the military post-revolution, the army always precedes the people. 
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as a negotiation, in which a shared emotional mood of victory after having defeated 
the hated CSF was tempered by fear of the Guards attacking (interview Youssef2 
13 Aug. 2011; interview Abdullah1 13 Oct. 2011).45 One informant, Khalid, told me 
that ad hoc meetings were held between protestors and army officers to try and 
establish what the army’s role was to be in the unfolding events (interview Khalid 
13 Oct. 2011). From his own ethnographic data, Atef Said speaks of the army’s 
presence as a “black box”—an unknown element that provoked “anxiety and 
uncertainty” (2012: 408). While elated by the unprecedented defeat of the CSF, 
nobody was sure what would happen next.  
The army had only twice before been deployed onto Egyptian streets: once 
in 1977 during the Bread Uprising (Intifādat al-Khubz; alternatively Thawrat al-
Harāmiyya, “the Thieves’ Revolution”), and again in 1986 to put down a revolt by 
CSF officers. On the evening of 28 January, these previous interventions were 
referenced to highlight the potential threat of soldiers attacking protestors. One 
activist who arrived in Midan al-Tahrir after setting off on a march from a 
populous district in eastern Cairo recounts:  
Rumours ran in Tahrir that Mubarak ordered the army to descend in the 
streets. How did the protesters feel towards the army? On several occasions 
since I joined the march in Nasr City, and till we reached Tahrir, some 
protesters were calling on the army to intervene and “protect them from the 
police” like what happened in Tunisia. And when tanks showed up in Tahrir 
speeding towards Garden City to protect the U.S. and U.K. embassies, many 
protesters cheered their arrival. But at the same time, I also witnessed 
                                                          
45 The protestors had good reason to suspect the Republican Guard. Egyptian press would report 
their facilitating pro-Mubarak rallies outside the presidential palace, and even distributing posters 
of the President to his supporters (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 3 Feb. 2011: 6). 
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several occasions where the protesters intervened with anger against those 
who were chanting for the army, shouting: “Well, hasn’t the army been 
ruling now since 1952? Aren’t they responsible for the Egypt we have 
today? Didn’t they kill protesters in 1977? Who gave them the orders to 
intervene, Mubarak, right?” All those were questions and arguments that 
broke out on several occasions (el-Hamalawy 2011).  
There is no sense that such historical episodes provided any interaction 
rituals or repertoire of contention for protestors to draw on when dealing with the 
army; these had to be improvised. 46 Outside of Maspero, nobody, least of all the 
newly deployed soldiers, seemed to know what part the army was to play in 
events. In response to the ambiguity of the situation, the crowd began to chant 
anew, demanding that Mubarak issue a statement.  
At 10:50 p.m., a column of battle tanks and APCs departed from Maspero 
and approached Tahrir. Meanwhile, some remaining units of the CSF continued to 
fire tear gas and live ammunition into Tahrir from roads leading to the Interior 
Ministry. A rumor quickly spread that the army were coming to reinforce the CSF. 
As the column of army vehicles entered the Midan in single file, protestors chanted, 
“Are you with us, or are you with them?” Hazem, a veteran of the pitched battles 
fought that day on Kasr el-Nil bridge, describes the protestors’ reaction to the 
army’s arrival: “In general, as the army came into the square that night there was a 
very mixed mood—not just between protesters, but within them. It was a mix of 
fear and joy—as in ‘Yay, the army is here boys,’ to ‘Shit, they’re sending the army to 
attack us.’ I myself felt a lot like this. Rumors were erupting constantly. On the one 
                                                          
46 For an historical overview of the Egyptian army in state-society relations see, variously, Abdel 
Malik (1968); Fahmy (1997); Ramadan (1977); Springborg (1987); Kandil (2012).  
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hand, there was an initial belief that the army was here to take on the remaining 
police units guarding the Ministry of Interior. Then there was the rumor that they 
came to join forces with the police and would begin to attack us once they took 
hold of the square” (interview Hazem 9 Nov. 2011). To expand briefly on the 
content of the rumors: earlier in the afternoon during the battle for Kasr el-Nil, 
military police jeeps were reportedly seen re-supplying CSF units with tear gas and 
live ammunition as a military helicopter hovered over Tahrir. After the protestors 
had broken through CSF lines, a lone APC entered the Midan at speed, heading for 
the remnants of the CSF near the Interior Ministry. Protestors threw stones at it 
with little effect before it sped off.  
Whether the rumors of the military rearming the CSF were true is not so 
important as that they sowed fear of further confrontations and situational tension 
in Tahrir when the army arrived. About 30 minutes after the column of army 
vehicles began to enter Tahrir a tank sat isolated in front of the Egyptian National 
Museum, some 400 meters from the center of Tahrir, its path blocked by 
protestors.47 The remaining vehicles continue on. A crowd of about a hundred 
people surrounded the tank and five young men climbed onto the turret to douse 
the tank with petrol before setting it alight. Stones were thrown at the vehicle, 
their ricochets audible in the video footage recorded by protestors. When the 
petrol proved ineffective, the young men poured it on rags, set them alight, and 
posted them in the tank’s vents. The vehicle “smoked-out,” the soldiers scrambled 
free, only to be attacked by members of the crowd. 
Closer to the epicenter of Tahrir, more army vehicles were being attacked. 
One dramatic video captured on a mobile phone shows an APC entering the Midan 
                                                          
47 See footage: http://youtu.be/pjx_0YXs_Hw.  
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and skirting the western edge of Tahrir.48 Approximately twenty protestors run 
towards the APC, throwing stones. A second APC approaches, roof ablaze. The 
protestors who had been throwing stones stop and watch the vehicle. The second 
APC then wheels towards the protestors, mounting the pavement and scattering 
the stone throwers. The APC stops. Stone throwing reaches a new intensity as 
protestors surge towards the army vehicle chanting, “God is Great!” The number of 
protestors swells to about fifty. The fire on top of the APC goes out. Since the first 
APC’s appearance, less than a minute has elapsed: the second APC sits motionless. 
A voice (the cameraman?) shouts, “Set it on fire, set it on fire!” and the crowd takes 
up this chant. The stone throwing intensifies, and another voice shouts, “Stop, 
stop!” and now this chant is taken up, seemingly by the same voice previously 
calling for the fire. The crowd swells further. A man shouts, “Stop hitting them.” An 
element of the crowd begins to chant for the soldiers to surrender and this 
continues and develops in intensity as more voices join. A small group of 
protestors climbs on top of the APC, a fire is lit at the back of the vehicle. 
Somebody, possibly one of the fire lighters, exclaims, “There’s somebody inside, get 
him out!” The crowd around the burning APC thins out, and the protestors come to 
resemble spectators.49  
Aside from some surviving photographs (see Figure 6), this episode of 
protestors attacking army units in Tahrir is completely absent from any 
journalistic account of the 25th January Revolution.50 While I will not sustain this 
                                                          
48 See footage: http://youtu.be/nyi5lxLu7TE.  
49 Alisdare, who arrived minutes after the initial attack, recalled metal poles being placed in the 
APC’s tracks to immobilize it (personal correspondence Alisdare 13 Jun. 2013). 
50 I have been otherwise unable to establish the fate of those soldiers attacked; the Egyptian 
military has, however, acknowledged the deaths and injury of soldiers during the 25th January 
Revolution (Al-Dostor 2011c). 
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detailed narrative to cover the full period for which soldiers and protestors shared 
Tahrir, these few hours on the night of 28 January seem especially important. Here, 
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Figure 6. An Egyptian army APC on fire in Midan al-Tahrir, 28 Jan. 2011 (Goran Tomasevic/Reuters). 
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the action appears “eventful” (Sewell 2005) rather than following any structural, 
cultural, or ideological logics linked to the historical position of the Egyptian army 
in society, or to the fact that, its being a conscript army, most households have a 
male relative completing or having completed military service. Informants like 
Khalid, who had completed military service and, outside of the situation at hand, 
held a positive view of the Egyptian military, told me they felt threatened by the 
army’s presence during this and many of the other episodes I will discuss here. 
This is not to overstate or stylize the argument—several informants were equally 
insistent that Egyptian soldiers were irrevocably on the side of protestors, and 
celebrated their arrival. Here, an understanding rooted in the situational dynamics 
in which soldiers and protestors found themselves interacting explains these 
contradictory positions.  
While the available chronology of events is partial, what we do know 
happened before, during, and after the attack maps well onto Randall Collins’s 
ideal-type of a “forward panic”:  
A forward panic starts with tension and fear in a conflict situation. This is 
the normal condition of violent conflict, but here the tension is prolonged 
and built up; it has a dramatic shape of increasing tension, striving towards 
a climax.… There is a shift from relatively passive—waiting, holding back 
until one is in a position to bring a conflict to a head—to be fully active. 
When the opportunity finally arrives, the tension/fear comes out in an 
emotional rush…. Running forward or backward, in either case they are in 
an overpowering emotional rhythm, carrying them on to actions that they 
would normally not approve of in calm, reflective moments (2008: 85). 
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Upon the army’s arrival in Midan al-Tahrir a similar emotional release is 
observed, and then swiftly reined in. In the second attack, a voice is heard 
encouraging protestors to set the APC on fire, which is then echoed by other 
protestors who rush to attack the vehicle. Almost immediately the same voice calls 
for restraint. These contradictions, or reassessments, Collins argues, accompany 
the building up and release of emotional energy. In this sequence of events, what 
appears formative are the features of the situation—the buildup of tension, the 
existing situation of violence and continued presence of the CSF, the role played by 
rumors, and the point at which tension spilled over into a forward panic. For my 
discussion, what is key are the next moves that protestors make after exiting the 
emotional tunnel of attack. 
Returning to the Midan, a military truck had followed the column of tanks 
and APCs and was similarly surrounded by protestors. The soldiers in the cab were 
pulled out and attacked, and informants reported ransacking of the truck’s cargo 
and the discovery of food rations. Soldiers manning nearby tanks then moved to 
intervene, and a protestor was pushed to the ground. While this drama unfolded, 
protestors commandeered the smoked-out tank, and even managed to pilot it 
forward a few meters (Shalaby 2011). A search of the tank discovered boxes of 
ammunition, tear gas canisters and grenades and, like the food, these were 
distributed to protestors in the Midan. Other army vehicles and soldiers were 
likewise attacked with two smoldering military jeeps littering Tahrir the next 
morning. One had been stopped and commandeered earlier in the evening as it 
entered Tahrir and found to contain live ammunition before being set ablaze (El-
Hamalawy 2011). 
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When it appeared the situation would deteriorate further, informants recall, 
a group of protestors crowded round the remaining parked tanks chanting, “The 
army and the people are one hand” (interview Abdullah2 21 Jul. 2011). In an act of 
micro-conflict avoidance, I would suggest, protestors chanted for the army as a 
means to dissipate fear of further confrontations and bring under control the 
situational anxiety felt by both sides.51 Fraternization techniques superseded any 
prolonging of attacks on soldiers, despite protestors being armed with weapons 
seized from the army, weapons many suspected had been intended for the CSF. 
That protestors did not, in effect, militarize the revolution, speaks to the 
constraints of the broader 25th January repertoire of contention, which cautioned 
against militarization through the chanting of silmiyya (peaceful) protest.  
Significantly, it is here and elsewhere that we find the nascent formation of 
a new frontier in the struggle against Mubarak through the articulation of the 
collective subject of “the people.” Particularly cogent is Ernesto Laclau’s (2007) 
argument that the emergence of “the people” as a collective actor exists not as an a 
priori category, but proceeds instead through the formation of an antagonistic 
internal frontier, differentiating “the people” from power via the naming of 
demands. One chant from the broader 25th January repertoire that we will 
encounter below illustrates this well: al-shaʿb yurīd isqāt al-nizām (the people want 
the overthrow of the regime). In chanting “The army and the people are one hand” 
protestors would extend this frontier to include newly deployed soldiers, with the 
                                                          
51 It has been suggested to me that the chant, “The army and the people are one hand” owes its 
origins to the slogan, “Muslims and Christians are one hand” (alternatively, “The people of the Book 
are one hand”). Just weeks before 28 January, this version of the “one hand” metaphor was invoked 
by activists looking to rally inter-communal support following the much publicized bombing of the 
Two Saints Church in Alexandria on 1 January (Colla 2012: 12). If this was indeed the origin of the 
chant, protestors chanting, “The army and the people are one hand” adhered to Tilly’s contentious 
claim-making model by innovating on a publicly available, shared script to signal a non-sectarian 
solidarity.  
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Mubarak regime present as the silent Other: the army and the people were one 
hand in their struggle to overthrow the regime.  
To grasp how a political frontier forms we must, as Dzenovska and Arenas 
(2012: 645) have insisted, account for the concrete political practices that made it 
possible. One protestor, Alia, describes the chant’s emergence thusly: “‘The army 
and people are one hand’ was certainly a strategy for non-violence in the 
beginning—it wasn’t a statement—we weren’t welcoming the army. For some it 
was more like ‘You, we have nothing against’ [or] ‘You we won’t attack,’ and for 
others it was ‘Let’s be one hand,’ [but] it certainly wasn’t an announcement of the 
status.” (personal correspondence Alia 27 Sept. 2011) Accordingly, this was, then, 
a precarious and incomplete solidarity, an act of micro-conflict avoidance, rather 
than the formation of a new collective actor. 
When explaining the de-escalation, informants also attest to a protracted 
lull in fighting with the CSF on the eastern side of Tahrir, which contributed to a 
temporary abatement of the shared mood of impending violence. Protestors, for 
their part, immediately sought to establish face-to-face contact with soldiers. One 
informant spoke of protestors—who had minutes before been throwing stones—
embracing soldiers whose tanks were by then parked in the Midan. Protestors 
posed for photographs with soldiers; others hugged them, shook their hands and 
kissed their cheeks. 
Recounts Hazem, “Eventually … once the tanks had all parked, protesters 
began to join them on top of the tanks and talk to them…. Conversation and 
laughter soon broke out and protestors began taking pictures with their phones 
standing next to military personnel and their tank. Food was shared between 
protester and soldier” (interview Hazem 9 Nov. 2011). Above all, in the wider 
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context of the army’s deployment, this episode provides an important backdrop to 
explaining the confrontational fear and tension that surrounded the army’s 
presence and the mechanisms that protestors adopted to avoid the outbreak of 
further violence. 
While some protestors attacked newly arriving army vehicles, others set 
about establishing their own system of markers on them. Graffiti on tanks and 
APCs represented a new way to contest the army’s claim to organize its own 
territory. The graffiti tended to draw on chants and slogans from the larger 25th 
January repertoire: often variations on a theme of “The people want the overthrow 
of the regime” and “Leave, Mubarak”. What Mona el-Ghobashy (2011: 13) has 
described as the “branding of public goods” is illustrative of how fraternizing 
protestors could enact a symbolic trespassing that broke down the distinction 
between a military space and a public space claimed by the protestors. Army 
vehicles became canvases, encoded with the protestors’ contestation announcing 
the protestors’ shared focus of occupying Tahrir until Mubarak was deposed. 
The graffiti itself was almost completely anti-Mubarak in content. From my 
review of photographs, I found no explicitly pro-army slogans graffitied on 
vehicles. When graffiti did mention the army it tended to highlight its ties to the 
Mubarak regime, while drawing it into the wider symbolic field of protestors’ 
contention. The graffiti on one APC read, “This is Egypt’s army, not Mubarak’s 
army.”52 Another piece of graffiti from the same vehicle proclaimed: “We were 
betting on the Egyptian army, that it would not sell its children; but we found out 
the truth, that it had sold the Egyptian people for its president.” As a fraternization 
performance, graffiting tanks and APCs further challenged the army’s claims to 
                                                          
52 I am grateful to Mariam Aboelezz for sharing this photograph with me.  
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ownership of that space, in turn placing those vehicles on the side of the 
protestors. Protestors arriving in the Midan over the following days would report 
feeling reassured by the graffiti, emboldening them to approach the vehicles, a 
logic related by one informant, Ahmad, as, “If the army has let us [the protestors] 
do this, they must be on our side” (interview Ahmad 10 Jul. 2011). 
 
One, Two, Where Is the Egyptian Army?  
I have suggested that the chant, “The army and the people are one hand” was a 
contentious performance that protestors employed situationally when they felt 
threatened by the army units in their midst, or when trying to de-escalate 
protestor-soldier violence. This was almost always face-to-face action, which 
through its recursion became an interaction ritual invoked, if not always 
successfully, in situations when protestor-soldier coexistence was threatened. Even 
in response to threatening actions by military units some distance away (including 
episodes of fighter jets over-flying the Midan, unsettling protestors with their sonic 
booms), or the presence of a military helicopter hovering overhead, protestors 
directed their chants at army units closer at hand.53 
A second use of chanting occurred when protestors were, while in the 
presence of army units, either threatened or under attack by remnants of the CSF 
or pro-regime loyalists. The first instance of this that I have been able to identify 
comes on the morning of 29 January. Video shows three APCs maneuvering their 
vehicles between protestors and shotgun-wielding CSF units on a road leading to 
                                                          
53 In episodes of low-flying F-16s on 30 January, informants reported a mood of impending attack, 
to which they responded with chants of, “The army and the people are one hand.” This is captured 
on footage: http://youtu.be/FQhy3c3cRN0 and http://youtu.be/UQWVMyBTPLA. Atef Said (2012: 
408) corroborates this fear of attack, reporting that his informants considered such episodes “an 
attempt to terrorize protesters and disperse them.” 
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the Interior Ministry.54 The intervention is not totally on the side of the protestors. 
As protestors threw stones at CSF troops, individual soldiers tried to restrain them, 
and minor scuffling broke out. Nevertheless, the protestors persisted. A gunshot 
then rang out, fired from the CSF side. The crowd started to chant, “One, two, 
where is the Egyptian army?” The footage cuts to the APCs aligned on the street, 
offering maximum shielding to the protestors who continue their skirmish with the 
CSF. 
Another example is that of Captain Maged Boules, or the “Lion of Tahrir.” 
Boules became a hero to those occupying Tahrir after he confronted pro-regime 
baltagiyya (approximately, thugs) approaching the Midan from the Talaat Harb 
entrance on 2 February (Al-Shorouk 2011: 5; Al-Ahram 6 Oct. 2011). In video 
footage, we see Boules confronting the approaching thugs before retreating 
towards his APC at the entrance to Tahrir.55 Brandishing his pistol, Boules 
repeatedly fires in the air. As the column continues to advance, more soldiers 
appear, heading to collect their weapons from the hatch of the APC. As one soldier 
kneels to load his rifle, protestors begin to chant, “The people and the army are one 
hand.” The chant quickly spreads. The footage ends with protestors jumping up 
and down, the column of advancing thugs halted, protestors and soldiers buzzing 
with the emotional energy of averting attack. A weeping Boules is then embraced 
by protestors after mounting the APC to be cheered by the crowd and proclaimed 
with further chants of, “The people and the army are one hand” (see Image 4). 
Chanting at the army took on particular significance during the Battle of the 
Camel on 2 February, so-called after pro-regime elements, thugs, and plainclothes 
                                                          
54 See footage: http://youtu.be/AwPUJnymqVM. 
55 See footage: http://youtu.be/Av4gwKjjgSc.  
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police attacked Tahrir, many riding horses or camels. For a full day and night, the 
two sides exchanged stones and Molotov cocktails. During lulls in the fighting, 
protestors approached army units, entreating them to intervene, chanting, “Where 
is the Egyptian army?” During one episode when a tank at the National Museum 
entrance did intervene, with soldiers firing guns above the heads of regime thugs 
and driving their vehicle forwards, protestors chanted, “The army and the people 
are one hand.” Meanwhile, according to one informant, Ahmad, those in the center 
of the Midan misunderstood the situational context and panicked, thinking the 
army had opened fire on protestors (interview Ahmad 10 Jul. 2011).  
The Battle of the Camel was doubly important not only as the last serious 
attempt by the Mubarak regime to displace the occupation of Tahrir, but also for 
reminding protestors of the ambiguous position of the army. This is borne out 
through the situational analyses protestors themselves developed through their 
interactions with soldiers. Informants frequently identified army units positioned 
at both the Kasr el-Nil and National Museum entrances to Tahrir as actively 
collaborating with the Mubarak regime. It was at Kasr el-Nil that regime elements 
successfully entered the Midan and it was outside the National Museum that the 
fiercest fighting continued into the next day. Informants explicitly accused those 
soldiers of being complicit in the attack or of not intervening to protect the 
protestors when asked.56 When implored to intercede to stop the advance of 
regime supporters after fighting initially broke out in front of the National 
Museum, soldiers refused, insisting their duty was simply to secure the area (Al-
                                                          
56 This was a view shared by military personnel, too. One soldier who had been deployed days 
earlier remembered, “One of my friends in Tahrir called. He was hysterical, crying and screaming: 
‘Where is the army, where were you? Nobody intervened, they left us.’ … It was one of the most 
difficult moments of my life. It was clear that the army was complicit one way or another: either it 
was indirectly supporting what was happening, or refusing to intervene, which is the same” (Ahram 
Online 2013).  
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Masry Al-Youm, 3 Feb. 2011: 5). Later, as regime thugs broke onto the roofs of 
buildings opposite the National Museum to rain Molotov cocktails down onto 
protestors sheltering behind impromptu barricades below, the army again ignored 
calls to step in (Egypt Gazette 2011b: 2). As the battle raged, one eyewitness 
described how “Egyptian soldiers looked on, lined up motionless in their armored 
vehicles in the middle of the two opposing sides” (Trombetta 2013: 143).  
After the Battle of the Camel a series of confrontations broke out between 
units of the Egyptian army and protestors. These centered on burnt-out trucks 
improvised into barricades outside the National Museum. The following morning 
tanks attempted to tow these away and protestors, fearing the loss of their 
fortifications, immediately moved to block the army, physically surrounding their 
vehicles. In several instances scuffles broke out between protestors and soldiers 
only to be defused, with protestors physically restraining their comrades and 
chanting pro-army slogans (interview Ahmad 10 Jul. 2011; interview Alaa 13 Nov. 
2011). In this and other instances, we find small numbers of violent protestors 
brought under control by members of their own side via fraternization 
performances. These confrontations, informants feared, were provoked by regime 
agents provocateurs whose goal was to draw the army into attacking the 
protestors. Fraternizing was thus utilized on two fronts: first, to constrain the 
behavior of the violent minority by setting an alternative mode of interaction with 
soldiers, and second, to signal to army units a pacific intent by returning to now 
familiar interaction rituals signaling protestor-soldier solidarity. The barricades 
were otherwise left untouched. 
A further point of contention arose from the handing over to the army of 
tens of thugs and undercover policemen detained by protestors after the attack. 
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These detention practices continued until Mubarak’s resignation, with suspected 
agents provocateurs kept in the “people’s prison”—the stairway to the closed Sadat 
metro station that services the Midan (Al-Shorouk 2011: 5; Al-Masry Al-Youm, 7 
Feb. 2011: 5). Many believed that, once handed over, these pro-regime elements 
were simply set free by the army so they could again terrorize the protestors. 
Despite their sharing the Midan for nearly a week, the actions of the army 
remained for many a constant source of distrust and suspected malfeasance. The 
army would declare on 31 January, three days after their initial deployment, that 
they would not use force to put down the mobilizations, but not until 3 February, 
after the Battle of the Camel had been lost by the regime, did the military offer to 
guarantee the security of protestors in the Midan, and it was all the while calling on 
them to demobilize and vacate Tahrir (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 3 Feb. 2011: 7). This 
commitment soon took the form of stop and search checkpoints at the Midan’s 
entrances (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 5 Feb. 2011: 6). Informants, however, complained of 
soldiers stopping the flow of food and medicine, and protestors continued to 
maintain their own cordon around the Midan, checking identity cards and 
searching newcomers. When explaining this duplication to me, Alaa, who had 
manned a checkpoint, insisted the protestors’ cordon was there both to assert 
their control of the Midan and because, “We didn’t trust the army.” (interview Alaa 
13 Nov. 2011) 
 
What Is the Love Story with the Tanks? 
What is the love story with the tanks? So reads the title of an Al-Masry Al-Youm 
article of 2 February 2011 (p. 12), seemingly one of the few Egyptian journalistic 
accounts published during the revolution that focused specifically on protestor-
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soldier interactions. The title echoed a question posed by an Egyptian army officer 
stationed in Tahrir whose tank was surrounded by men and women taking 
photographs of their friends atop the vehicle. In Tahrir, the article noted, tanks had 
been transformed into sites for taking photographs. Those being pictured often 
made victory signs and waved Egyptian flags. Soldiers had tried to stop the 
climbing on the tanks, but were overrun by the large number of photograph 
hunters. “Please cooperate with us and stay away” the army officer implores, “and 
make our job easier.” 
Posing for photographs was one of a set of fraternization performances that 
involved trespassing upon army vehicles in non-violent situations, performances 
we first encountered on the night of 28 January and which quickly became an 
emergent symbol of army-protestor solidarity, to be emulated as long as 
protestors and soldiers were physically co-present.57 I have already catalogued 
how, in fighting the CSF, protestors used newly deployed APCs as physical cover. In 
other instances, tanks at the Kasr el-Nil entrance to Midan al-Tahrir were literally 
incorporated into protestors’ barricades. All these performances made immediate 
claims on the soldiers manning those vehicles to give security to the protestors, or 
to neutralize any future threat those units posed. Posing for photographs 
underlines a further dimension to the fraternizing of soldiers in Midan al-Tahrir 
comparable to what Dzenovska and Arenas (2012) have called a, “barricade 
sociality.” In this, posing for photographs was one of many embodied 
fraternization performances that both reflected and made possible a protestor-
                                                          
57 So synonymous did this act become with being in Tahrir during the 25th January Revolution that 
it gave rise to the popular (and characteristically sarcastic) Egyptian Facebook meme, “I didn’t take 
a photograph next to the tank” (ana matsawartish ganb al-dabāba). Walking through Midan al-
Tahrir in the summer of 2011, it was commonplace to see visitors to the Midan recreate such 
images, suggesting that to do so had come to be seen as a politically contentious act. 
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soldier solidarity. These interpersonal rituals, designated by Goffman (1971: 194–
99) as “tie-signs”—hugging, kissing, shaking hands, a protestor’s arms around the 
shoulders of a soldiers, a soldier hoisted on the shoulders of protestors—all 
enacted a political frontier: the army and the people together in occupied Tahrir in 
the face of regime oppression. These tie-signs took on a particular 
consequentiality, for instance with the “Lion of Tahrir,” after soldiers committed to 
intervene on behalf of protestors, or when protestors attempted to diminish the 
risk of protestor-soldier violence as occurred on the night of 28 January, and, 
indeed, on the few occasions protestors fraternized with the CSF.  
Tie-signs were key to sustaining this frontier: they communicated 
information regarding intentions and the nature of relationships, both to those 
interacting and to wider audiences. If everyday tie-signs inform third parties as to 
the nature of the relationship, these tend to map to degrees of familiarity. 
Fraternization tie-signs are in this sense exceptional, since the usual rules of 
embodied action are suspended. In a successful fraternization performance 
protestors and security forces, people almost always unconnected outside of the 
situation at hand, sign highly-intimate relations that collapse everyday social 
heterogeneity, such as gender, class, or other group membership.  
The ritualistic mounting of army vehicles was not exclusively the domain of 
protestors. Army officers used tanks and APCs as platforms from which to address 
those occupying the Midan. Upon the army’s deployment on 28 January, officers 
commanding army units in the Midan delivering such speeches would be 
interrupted and interrogated, with questions shouted at them demanding to know 
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whether they were with or against Mubarak.58 Speeches took a somewhat different 
form after 4 February when senior military officers, surrounded by bodyguards, 
began to take tours of Tahrir. These included Field Marshal Tantawi, Mubarak’s 
then Minister of Defence and head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF), who visited the Midan to be greeted by chants of, “O Field Marshal, O Field 
Marshal, we are your children in Tahrir” (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 5 Feb. 2011: 5). These 
addresses were received with a greater degree of reverence, and when assurances 
were offered as to the army’s loyalty to the protestors’ cause, rewarded with 
chants of, “The army and the people are one hand.” Still, despite the invoked 
paternalism of protestors’ chants and the frequency of these speeches, informants 
who were present later reported officers who walked through the Midan being 
accosted by protestors demanding to know if the army would attack them 
(interview Khalid 13 Oct. 2011).  
This was symptomatic of the lingering uncertainty and anxiety many 
retained concerning the army’s presence, a point well illustrated by a further 
addition to the fraternization repertoire: sleeping in the tracks of tanks and APCs. 
The first instance of this was reported on 5 February after tanks stationed in 
Tahrir started their engines (Egyptian Gazette 2011a: 1).59 Just as in the earlier, 28 
January episode in which protestors attacked newly arriving army units, a rumor 
                                                          
58 See el-Amrani’s (2011) account of a speech by a one-star general in Tahrir on 29 January, in which 
he describes “an amazing moment when a charismatic one-star general addressed the public.… 
People kept shouting, are you with or against Mubarak? He answered that his mission is making 
sure the looting stops, and that the issue of who governs is the people’s decision, not the army’s, and 
that government should be civilian. Of course there is mounting tension and uncertainty about 
where the army stands. There are so few tanks (maybe twenty to thirty) and personnel around 
Midan Tahrir that I feel they could easily be overwhelmed.”  
59 An earlier version of this performance came on 30 January as eight tanks entered Tahrir. 
Journalists reported protestors rushing up to the tanks shouting, “God is great!” before lying in their 
path. Their advance blocked, soldiers and protestors engaged in a tense standoff lasting several 
hours. Eventually, an army officer mounted one of the tanks and addressed the crowd, assuring 
them that the tanks would not encroach any further into the Midan (Star 2011; Guardian 2011). 
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preceded this action, this time suggesting the tanks planned to withdraw from the 
Midan in anticipation of a renewed attack by regime loyalists. Records of the 
rumor are unclear as to whether the army was supposed to be participating in the 
attack, or else complicit in coordinating it.60 In response to the tanks’ engines 
starting, protestors quickly surrounded tanks and APCs in Tahrir. The logic of this 
performance was seemingly that, following the corporeal surrounding of army 
vehicles individual units could be isolated and made responsible for the protestors’ 
security. If graffiti made military vehicles in Tahrir symbolically compromised, the 
sleeping in vehicle tracks made them operationally so. Physically encircled and 
unable to move, the Egyptian army had effectively lost these vehicles and their 
crews by 6 February, along with any semblance of a military order organizing a 
contiguous territory. Protestors would remain encamped there until Mubarak’s 
resignation on 11 February, as physical and symbolic forms of defense against the 
predations of the Mubarak regime.  
 
Conclusions 
To mark the first anniversary of the 25th January Revolution, a convoy of Egyptian 
army APCs drove through central Cairo. Each vehicle flew a national flag and had 
emblazoned on its side, “The army and the people are one hand.” Commercial 
billboards on Cairo’s main thoroughfares were rented, proclaiming, “The 25th 
January Revolution—the army protected it. The army and the people … are one 
hand,” accompanied by images of children posing for photographs on tanks 
                                                          
60 This fear of attack may have been exacerbated by the visit on 5 February of army general Hassan 
Ruweini. Flanked by soldiers, he approached the protestor’s fortifications, which led protestors to 
link arms to block his entry into the Midan. Journalists present reported protestors preparing for an 
attack after Ruweini’s bodyguard partially dismantled a barricade, prompting protestors to chant 
“We will die here!” While no attack materialized, protestors voiced their suspicions of the army to 
journalists present (Atlantic 2011).  
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stationed in Midan al-Tahrir. Similar posters appeared outside the many army 
barracks and military administration buildings located in and around the city (see 
Figure 7). 
In post-Mubarak Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces have used 
the residual symbols of fraternization performances as a source of political capital, 
employed to legitimate their assuming executive control at Mubarak’s departure. 
Those symbols of fraternization, the storage vessels for the ephemeral feelings of 
protestor-soldier solidarity, have been detached from the wider symbolic universe 
of revolutionary Tahrir and put to work elsewhere.61 In SCAF’s narrative, the 
army’s role during those fifteen days is to be fêted as one intended to safeguard 
peaceful protest against the Mubarak regime.62 That the SCAF was able to plausibly 
draw on these symbols of fraternization speaks to the deep re-imagination of 
politics that fraternizing protestors and their contentious performances made 
possible in re-aggregating a claim to sovereignty in the name of “the people” in 
opposition to the increasingly desperate and violent actions undertaken by the 
Mubarak regime. This bifurcation of governance from sovereignty was not missed 
by the regime, as epitomized by its announcement on 7 February, and later relayed 
via a Greater Cairo-wide SMS message, that the police force would be returning to 
the streets under its pre-Mubarak motto, “The police are in the service of the 
                                                          
61 See Collins (2004: 81–101) on the way symbols act as containers for the emotions produced by 
interaction rituals.  
62 Nowhere is this more evident than in the “messages” through which SCAF communicated with the 
Egyptian citizenry, and specifically its 2011 messages, many of which invoke SCAF’s claims to a 
stake in the post-Mubarak order on the basis of defending the 25th January Revolution and not 
using force against protestors. The messages are available at: 
https://www.facebook.com/Egyptian.Armed.Forces. 
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Figure 7. “The army and the people are one hand.” Poster outside Egyptian military checkpoint on Suez Road, 
Cairo. Feb. 2012 (author’s photo). 
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people” (Al-Dostor 2011b: 6; Al-Masry Al-Youm, 10 Feb. 2011: 3).63 This was 
followed, shortly after Mubarak’s resignation, with posters plastered around the  
city declaring, “For Egypt: The army, the police and the people are one hand,” 
dubiously signed-off by the “Youth of Egypt” (see Figure 8). 
As this paper has argued, and contrary to SCAF’s posturing, it is wrong to 
assume that protestors singularly embraced the army’s new role in street politics, 
or that protestor-solider solidarity was unequivocal. I have suggested instead that 
protestors surrounding and hauling themselves aboard army vehicles, chanting for 
the army, graffiting tanks and APCs, and tie-signing with soldiers, constituted 
instances of claim-making. These protestor-soldier interactions were in 
themselves sites of action, sites at which protestors and soldiers forged a new 
political frontier through their performances. Theoretically, this has involved a 
conception of contentious performance that captures ritualistic claim-making at 
the micro-interactive level. Exploring the micro-interactive dimensions to one 
episode of contention reveals a good degree of improvisation and innovation on 
scripted performances in response to situational dynamics. Key here is taking 
seriously the capacity for claims made on the agents of regime power to decide 
situational outcomes, primarily by affecting emotional moods and stimulating 
feelings of solidarity. In Tahrir, that solidarity was at once fragile and contingent, 
having constantly to be remade as protestors fraternized with army units stationed 
in their midst in an attempt to both neutralize any potential threat they posed and 
sway their loyalty by forging common bonds and a shared political horizon. This 
dissonance and an attending polyvalence in performances was acknowledged by 
                                                          
63 Under Mubarak, the motto had been changed to, “The police and the people in the service of the 
nation.” 
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Figure 8. “For Egypt: The army, the police and the people are one hand.” Poster on wall in downtown Cairo. 
May 2011 (author’s photo). 
82 
 
protestors themselves, one of whom described a “mix of feelings/actions toward 
the army … on the one hand we have chanted the people and the army are one 
hand, and on the other, protestors decided to sleep under tanks and block them 
from encroaching on the square or dispersing the Tahrir sit-in” (quoted in Said 
2012: 409). As a political frontier borne of the practices of street politics, this 
frontier was for many protestors only ever actualized situationally, by what 
became ritualized fraternization performances, and by interventions by brave 
soldiers such as Maged Boules, or the sixteen army officers who reportedly came to 
the Midan to declare solidarity with the protestors (Reuters 2011). Many of them 
were later prosecuted in military courts for this.64 
Preliminary comparative studies of the 2011 Arab revolts have tended to 
reproduce SCAF’s narrative, taking as their point of departure the decision by 
Egypt’s generals not to intervene as having decided the course of the 25th January 
Revolution (see Barany 2011). This, even though the military leadership only cut 
Mubarak loose on 10 February, which triggered his resignation the following day. 
In the absence of reliable accounts from Egypt’s military command concerning the 
fifteen days the army were deployed, we can only speculate on the formativeness 
of fraternization in shaping the trajectory of the revolution. The question remains 
whether an order for the army to attack protestors was ever issued. The SCAF 
themselves have released a series of contradictory statements, claiming they 
refused an order to fire on protestors in Tahrir, only to later retract the claim 
(Egypt Independent 2011). The trial of Mubarak and others implicated in the killing 
                                                          
64 See the case of Major Ahmad Shuman who appeared in the Midan wearing a uniform to call for 
Mubarak’s dismissal. Despite being initially pardoned, Shuman was later rearrested and sentenced 
to six years in prison by a military court (Al-Shorouk 2012). 
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of protestors has otherwise failed to resolve this question with testimony given by 
Field Marshal Tantawi and Sami Anan (then army chief of staff), heard in camera.65  
There is a counterfactual argument to be made that hangs on the reliability 
of army units in Tahrir to follow orders, as perceived by their officers. In Tahrir at 
least, there was a breakdown of all semblance of a separate military discipline and 
authority structure standing apart from protestors’ claims to control the Midan. In 
response, red-bereted military police were later drafted into Tahrir in an attempt 
to bolster the discipline of the army units stationed there. In issuing any order to 
attack those occupying the Midan, senior army officers would have been forced to 
question the reliability of troops in Tahrir and their solidarity with those who had 
for days been embracing them, posing for photographs atop their vehicles, and 
chanting in their name.66 
If fraternization succeeded in separating the army units in Tahrir from 
military command and control structures, the Egyptian military soon developed 
countermeasures. On 9 March 2011, during one of the army’s periodic “clearings” 
of Tahrir, protestors hastily linked arms and chanted to a column of approaching 
soldiers, “The people and the army are one hand.”67 Others attempted to tie-sign 
with soldiers, all the while imploring them not to destroy the protestors’ 
encampment. Faced with overwhelming odds and the threat of violence, these 
protestors fell back on a fraternization repertoire that communicated their 
                                                          
65 While we do not have an official court transcript of these exchanges, it is commonly understood 
that Tantawi denied receiving an order to fire. This is contradicted by video footage that shows a 
soldier in the Midan telling protestors that his unit had disobeyed an order to attack on 7 February, 
although I could not otherwise corroborate this. See footage at: http://youtu.be/hRHnX6CcbAw. 
66 To develop this argument one would have to account for how protestors outside of Cairo received 
the army’s deployment. Newspaper reports record, for example, the army “intervening” in street 
battles between protestors and pro-regime forces in the port city of Damietta and in Ismailia on 2 
February (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 3 Feb. 2011: 4). Which side these interventions benefited, and what if 
any role fraternization performances played in provoking those interventions are just a few of the 
questions for further research.  
67 See footage at: http://youtu.be/JY2mU-Drmx8. 
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solidarity with the army. But here their performances fell flat—the column, 
marshaled at a distance by military police and kept in tight discipline at a running 
pace, followed orders. The tents in the Midan were dismantled and protestors 
beaten by gangs of thugs. 
After this and other episodes of contentious street politics, new 
performances quickly supplanted fraternization when interacting with the army. 
Peaceful protestors were killed by soldiers at Maspero in October 2011, and then 
on Muhammad Mahmud Street in late November 2011 and outside the Defence 
Ministry in Abbasiyya in May 2012. These events occurred alongside allegations of 
torture, forced virginity testing, and the army’s repressive policing of street politics 
and labor agitation. By the revolution’s first anniversary, new chants had 
innovated on the old: “The people and the people are one hand!” and “The army 
and the police are one dirty hand!”
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Chapter 2 
 
“Elections are the solution!” Muslim Brothers, 
Mass Mobilization and Egypt’s Failed Democratic 
Transition 
 
al-intikhābāt hiyya al-hall! (Elections are the solution!) 
——— al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala, 22 Nov. 2011 
 
On 22 November 2012, Egyptian President Muhammad Mursi issued a 
constitutional declaration retroactively placing his presidential decrees beyond the 
purview of Egypt’s courts. The declaration came just weeks before the country’s 
Supreme Constitutional Court was due to rule on the legitimacy of Egypt’s latest 
constituent assembly, which had been tasked by Mursi with drafting a new 
constitution. In April, the Higher Administrative Court had dissolved the 
assembly’s first incarnation, citing membership irregularities. This was followed in 
June by an expedited ruling from Egypt’s infamously dilatory Supreme 
Constitutional Court, annulling the election results for parliament’s lower house – 
the first freely elected parliament since the Free Officers seized power in 1952 – on 
a technicality. Mursi and his supporters insisted that these judicial interventions 
amounted to a conspiracy between Egypt’s judges and Mubarak-era regime figures 
known as filūl (literally, remnants) to eviscerate the institutions newly elected 
after the 25th January Revolution. Judicial oversight could therefore only return 
when a new constitution was passed by a national referendum. In a sound bite that 
featured prominently in both domestic and international news coverage, liberal 
                                                          
 Adapted from Neil Ketchley, 2013, “Transitioning to Counter-Revolution: The Muslim Brothers, 
the Military and the ‘Deep State,’” presented at the 2013 annual conference of the American 
Political Science Association. 
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politician Mohammad ElBaradei denounced Mursi, accusing him of acting like 
“Egypt’s new pharaoh” (cited in BBC 22 Nov. 2012). 
 While Mursi’s ostensible power grab persuaded an already ambivalent 
international audience that he and his movement, the Muslim Brothers, had only a 
weak commitment to the constitutional niceties required for a successful 
transition away from authoritarian rule, the Brothers’ high-minded, dismissive 
attitude to the objections of Egypt’s largely secular opposition triggered a new 
cycle of protests demanding Mursi’s resignation. Organized under the banner of 
the National Salvation Front and galvanized by the Tamarrod (rebellion) petition 
campaign, these protests reached their apogee outside of the Presidential Palace 
and in the streets of downtown Cairo on 30 June 2013.68 On 3 July 2013, the 
military seized upon these protests to stage a coup. Since then, a military-backed 
government has imposed a bloody crackdown not only on supporters of the 
Muslim Brothers, but also on many of the secular and liberal activists and 
movements who participated in the 25th January Revolution and later mobilized 
against Mursi. According to one widely-cited estimate, over three thousand 
opponents of the new military regime have been killed and up to forty thousand 
arrested (WikiThawra 2014a; 2014b). A ‘counter-revolution’ has seen the 
coronation of a field marshal as president, the restoration of Mubarak-era figures 
to public office and a near-total retrenchment of the civic and political freedoms 
enjoyed since Mubarak’s downfall.  
                                                          
68 The number of anti-Mursi protestors on 30 June has been a matter of some debate. While 
supporters of Tamarrod cite figures ranging from fourteen to thirty million protestors, subsequent 
analysis by journalists using aerial photographs of protests has suggested a more plausible upper 
threshold of three million protestors countrywide (see BBC 16 Jul. 2013; Brown 18 Jul. 2013; al-
Jazeera 19 Jul. 2013). 
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How can we explain the derailing of democratic transition in Egypt? If the 
modal outcome of post-Cold War democratic transitions is to produce ‘hybrid 
regimes’ (Diamond 2002; Schedler 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010) in which 
military powers and former regime prerogatives largely remain intact while newly 
elected civilian authorities consolidate only a limited degree of democratic 
authority, then the full-blown return to military rule in Egypt in less than three 
years presents a puzzle. This article addresses the role played by elections and 
protests in contributing to the failure of the transition. More specifically, I examine 
the consequences of the Muslim Brothers’ demobilization following the 25th 
January Revolution and the movement’s decision to put its faith in a transition 
administered by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), electoral 
mechanisms and the authority of a new parliament and president. In doing so, my 
argument  looks to build upon – but also departs from – an emerging literature 
according to which Mursi’s auto-golpe (Brownlee 2013), the Muslim Brothers’ 
organizational introversion (El-Sherif 2014), and the movement’s Islamist identity 
(Lust, Soltan and Wichman n.d.) fatally, and all too predictably, undermined the 
democratic transition. Such a singular focus on movement attributes and the 
indubitable failures of Mursi’s tenure in office, neglects broader structural and 
processual dynamics that predate Mursi’s election and relate to the nature of the 
revolutionary coalition that ousted Husni Mubarak, the traditions and legacies of 
Mubarak-era machine politics, regional and international opposition to Egyptian 
democracy, and concerted efforts by entrenched powers and old regime holdovers 
to subvert attempts to open up the state to democratic control.  
Though the article’s empirical terrain is mainly focused on the eighteen 
months following Mubarak’s ousting, the argument has broader implications for 
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how we understand the trajectory of Mursi’s brief tenure in office, future 
democratization and mobilization in Egypt, as well as how we account for the 
relationship between elections and protests during episodes of democratic 
transition away from authoritarian rule in late Third Wave democratization.  
Demobilization and ‘mere electioneering’ are typically seen as 
unproblematic, if not desirable, in extant theories of democratic transition. Such is 
the legacy of a ‘top down’ transitology approach that views mobilization and 
popular politics as exogenous to the unfolding of a successful transition 
(Huntington 1991; Przeworski 1991; for overviews and critique see Collier 1999: 
ch.1; Bermeo 2003: ch.1). Social movements and mass protest, this literature 
acknowledges, are frequently harbingers of democratization and key elements in 
bringing about democratic breakthroughs (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986: 53–54; 
Linz and Stepan 1996: ch.4). However, once a regime has been toppled, the tactical 
imperative for a successful democratic transition, if it is to avoid alienating the 
middle classes, business elite, military and reformist factions within authoritarian 
regimes, must be to moderate the “threat from below” (Bermeo 1997) pushing for 
social justice and other forms of redress. Accordingly, a transition is most likely to 
succeed if it is guided into a sequence of elite-level strategic interactions involving 
regime reformers and the leaders of a centrist opposition (O’Donnell & Schmitter 
1986). Even studies that emphasise the positive role played by ‘civil society’ in 
democratization processes have argued that for transitions to be successful – that 
is, for democracy to be consolidated – civil society, and by implication 
transgressive contention, must quickly be subordinated to the norms and 
procedures of ‘political society’ (Linz and Stepan 1996: 10).  
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This conclusion finds support in scholarly accounts of democratization in 
Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, Central America, Latin America, and Southeast 
Asia, which have found that transitions away from authoritarian rule frequently 
coincide with the demobilization of social movements and a decline in 
transgressive contentious politics – even if many of those same scholars lament the 
passing of popular forces capable of deepening the democratization process (Canel 
1992; Oxhorn 1994; 1996; Hipsher 1996, 1998; Sandoval 1998; Pickvance 1999; 
Sidel 2014; Trejo 2014).69 Accounting for the demobilizing pressures of 
democratization, these studies stress developments in the political process: as 
polities transition away from authoritarian rule following democratic 
breakthroughs, movements demobilize, shifting their focus from the street to 
securing a foothold in formerly closed state institutions via elections. Anticipated 
electoral success further incentivises demobilization, with movement leaders 
looking to pursue their agendas in the chambers of parliaments and in the 
corridors of executive power (Robertson 2010: ch.5).  Benedict Anderson (1998: 
266) calls this the “Janus-face of electoralism”: the promise of electoral authority 
and access to state power and patronage also commands the domestication and 
pacification of more popular modes of politics.   
In the subsequent discussion, I find that the Muslim Brothers’ 
demobilization following the 25th January Revolution confirms the political 
process thesis outlined above. However, rather than produce the kind of 
conservative and constrained consolidation typical of post-Cold War 
                                                          
69 This is not to suggest a deterministic relationship. As Ekiert and Kubik (1999) have chronicled, 
democratic transitions in Poland, Hungary, East Germany and Slovakia saw increased protest 
resulting from the ineffectiveness of political parties and the paucity of official channels for 
participation. Nancy Bermeo (1997) has also shown that mobilization continued throughout 
transition periods in Spain and Portugal in ways that actually strengthened democratization efforts.  
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democratization, I will argue that the Brothers’ attempts to restrict a democratic 
transition to a process of negotiation, transaction and electioneering, actually 
worked against the post-Mubarak democratic project. In this, to echo Adrienne 
LeBas (2011: 7), democratization in Egypt proved to be “considerably more 
contentious than the transitions that have served as the empirical base for the 
transitology theory of past decades.”  
Making use of the Muslim Brothers’ publications,70 interviews with 
movement members71 and Arabic and English language newspaper accounts, I 
begin by considering the Muslim Brothers’ role in the 25th January Revolution and 
the nature of the coalition that emerged in Midan al-Tahrir and elsewhere. 72 I then 
explore how the Brothers’ decision to privilege electoral politics and their 
commitment to sit out months of protests against military rule was 
problematically enhanced by the evaporation of Mubarak’s National Democratic 
Party (NDP), and the inability, or unwillingness (Abdelrahman 2013; Gerbaudo 
2013), of Egypt’s other revolutionary actors to develop a competitive electoral 
infrastructure of their own, precipitating the break-up of the revolutionary 
coalition that had removed a well-fortified dictator a year earlier. Finally, I return 
                                                          
70 In particular, I draw on the daily print edition of the “Freedom and Justice” (al-Hurriyya wa-l-
ʿAdala) newspaper published by the Muslim Brothers’ political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party. 
The Brothers’ daily newspaper carried interviews with parliamentary candidates, op-eds by the 
movement’s leading thinkers and press releases issued by the Brothers’ leadership, as well as 
articles reflecting on the transition and the Brothers’ role in the 25th January Revolution. While the 
first edition featured an article by Muhammad Mursi, then Chairman of the FJP, proclaiming that 
“this is the paper for the people, not for a political party” (al-Hurriyya w-al-ʿAdala, 28 Oct. 2011: 3) 
in reality, it was paid for indirectly by the Brothers and drew its content from a readership 
composed almost exclusively of the Brothers' membership (interview Mustafa 9 Jun. 2013). As 
such, it can be read as a conversation between the Brothers’ leadership and its membership at a 
time of intensifying protest throughout the country and amid calls to abandon SCAF’s transition and 
return to Midan al-Tahrir. 
71 Interviews were conducted between July 2011 and April 2014. Unless citing the Muslim Brothers’ 
spokespeople, I use first names only, in order to preserve the condition of anonymity under which 
testimony was gathered. 
72 By revolutionary coalition, I mean the forces, parties and actors who mobilized against the 
Mubarak regime and who shared a minimal commitment to the opening up of the Egyptian state to 
democratic control. 
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to the circumstances surrounding Mursi’s ousting and suggest that the 
infrastructure of elections and the Brothers’ demobilization undermined a more 
coalitional approach to the transition, leaving the movement catastrophically 
isolated later to confront a ‘deep state’73 determined to roll back Mursi’s 
democratic authority. 
 
The 25th January Revolution 
As Lucan Way (2011: 24) noted just after Mubarak’s downfall, an absence of 
international support for democratization in Egypt – Jason Brownlee (2012) 
subsequently described US policy regarding Egypt as amounting to “democracy 
prevention” 74 – meant that the transition’s success hinged “almost entirely 
on…[the] domestic balance of power between pro-and anti-democratic forces.”75 
The coalition that cohered in Midan al-Tahrir and elsewhere during the 25th 
                                                          
73 The term ‘deep state’ (al-dawla al-ʿamīqa) consciously borrows from the Turkish context, in 
which a state within a state – composed of senior military officers, members of the judiciary, media 
and security services – is said to exercise power outside of formal democratic controls (see Ünver 
2009). Hesham Sallam (2012) offers a useful definition of the Egyptian deep state: “The ‘deep state,’ 
broadly speaking, refers to a diverse set of longstanding, powerful bureaucratic interests 
entrenched inside the Egyptian state and inherited from the previous political order, including, but 
not limited to, military institutions and domestic security agencies. While these various 
bureaucratic interests do not exhibit any ideological or political cohesion, they are all unified by a 
commitment to resisting any attempts by outside political forces, particularly elected officials, to 
undermine the financial and institutional autonomy that these organizations have garnered over 
the course of decades. In some sectors of this deep state, this autonomy is reflected through the 
prevalence of “special private funds” and off-budget spending that are subject to minimal oversight, 
and that afford these agencies a great deal of discretion in running their own affairs away from 
formal lines of accountability.”  
74 We should also consider the implacable opposition to democratization in Egypt from Saudi 
Arabia and members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. After leading a military intervention into 
Bahrain in early 2011 to crush a pro-democracy uprising, Saudi Arabia has gone on to play a key 
role in propping up Egypt’s economy, providing aid in the form of financial deposits and petroleum 
products totalling several billion dollars following the 3 July coup. Following the massacre of anti-
coup protestors at two protest camps on 14 August 2013, the Saudi government even committed to 
meeting any financial shortfall should Western governments cancel aid in protest at the military-
backed government’s brutal tactics (Washington Post 19 Aug. 2013).  
75 Instances of demobilization during successful democratic transitions in Southeast Asia, Latin 
America, Eastern Europe and elsewhere might even appear over-determined given that 
demobilization in those cases was offset by strong regional and international support for 
democratization, which significantly raised the costs of backsliding by old regime holdovers (see 
Levitsky and Way 2010). 
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January Revolution enjoyed few natural advantages in this regard. The years 
before Mubarak’s ousting had seen new connections made between the Muslim 
Brothers, liberals in the form of ElBaradei’s National Association for Change and 
Ayman Nour’s al-Ghad party, leftists and Nasserites (El-Hamalawy 2007; 
Abdelrahman 2009; Hamid 2014: 144-145). These followed several protest 
initiatives and petitions in which the Brothers joined with the anti-war (and later 
anti-Mubarak) Kifaya movement, the Revolutionary Socialists and several others to 
coordinate protest activities (Gunning and Baron 2013: chs.1-3). But these 
intersections – while marking an important departure from the mutual suspicion 
and antagonism of previous decades – were tentative and never properly 
institutionalized. The Brothers’ youth members were usually the leading edge in 
brokering these relationships, with the Brothers’ leadership, which saw the 
parliament, not the street, as “the engine for political reform in Egypt” (Shehata 
and Stacher 2012: 162), acting as a brake on deeper collaborations. 
Against this backdrop, the Muslim Brothers failed to fully mobilize on the 
first day of protests of the 25th January Revolution; irrevocably undermining 
Mursi and the Brothers’ claims later to exercise their democratic authority in the 
name of the revolution. Both scholarly and journalistic accounts of the revolution 
frequently reference this failure to commit to 25 January as evidence that the 
Muslim Brothers were opportunistic latecomers, or even as entirely absent from 
the action (for a review, see Mellor 2014; Hellyer 2014). According to the Brothers, 
the decision not to mobilize can be traced back to an extraordinary meeting held 
on 24 January between the movement’s leadership in Cairo and Egyptian State 
Security, who threatened to suppress the movement if it called its members out 
into the streets (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala, 17 Nov. 2011: 10). The Brothers, reluctant 
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to risk the movement’s sizeable social welfare infrastructure on a protest that 
could claim only indeterminable support, heeded the warning. Still, a handful of 
the Brothers’ branches did mobilize on 25 January, as did large numbers of the 
movement’s youth, many of whom had helped plan the protests in coordination 
with the April 6 youth movement, elements from the National Association for 
Change, and the Democratic Front Party (Wickham 2013: ch.7; see also Gunning 
and Baron 2013: 168-175). As a pre-condition of their participation on 25 January 
and in a bid to limit any backlash should the protests flop, the Brothers’ leaders 
demanded that members not chant Brothers slogans like “Islam is the Solution” 
while protesting, and forbade them from self-identifying as movement members if 
speaking to news media (interview Sara 14 Mar. 2014).  
On 27 January, demonstrators having reached Midan al-Tahrir on 25 
January and well-attended protests having been held in Alexandria, Gharbiyya, 
Ismailia, Suez and Aswan, the Brothers’ leadership abandoned its initial hesitancy 
and instructed its branches to mobilize for the “Friday of Anger” protests planned 
for the next day (interview Mona 30 Apr. 2014). In an attempt to decapitate the 
movement and force it to demobilize, State Security made good on its earlier 
threat, detaining 500 leading Brothers in Cairo on 28 January (al-Hurriyya wa-l-
ʿAdala 17 Nov. 2011: 10).76 The move failed. According to one estimate produced 
shortly after Mubarak’s ousting, over one hundred thousand Brothers took to the 
                                                          
76 Those arrests led to a now infamous episode in which Muhammad Mursi, along with members of 
the Guidance Bureau, was imprisoned in the Nile Delta city of Wadi al-Natrun, only to escape on 29 
January when the Interior Ministry opened Egypt’s prisons in a bid to destabilize the country (al-
Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 26 Jun. 2013: 5). The circumstances of Mursi’s escape went on to form the 
basis of a conspiracy theory (and later a court case) promulgated in Egyptian media in the year 
before the coup that he had been freed by Hamas, the Gaza-based offshoot of the Muslim Brothers – 
a narrative that attempts to discredit the 25th January Revolution as a foreign plot to weaken Egypt 
(see Ahram Online 12 May 2013).   
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streets on 28 January (al-Ahram Weekly Online 2011a).77 For many Muslim 
Brothers this was their first opportunity to strike back against a security state at 
whose hands they had suffered decades of arbitrary detention and harassment. By 
way of illustration, when I visited the Suez Canal city of Ismailia in the autumn of 
2011, local Brothers proudly showed off the gutted State Security office as 
evidence of their part in inflicting a defeat on the Interior Ministry-controlled 
security forces. 
With Midan al-Tahrir occupied and anti-regime protests breaking out 
across the country, the Brothers were playing an as yet largely unacknowledged 
role in sustaining the mobilization. In Tahrir, their presence was co-ordinated by 
Osama Yassin (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 10 Nov. 2011: 10), who would go on to 
become Youth Minister in Mursi’s cabinet. In interviews with Egypt’s secular 
activists, the Brothers’ efforts, marshalled through their superior organizational 
structure, are credited with sourcing many of the supplies vital to maintaining the 
occupation during its early days (cited in Gunning and Baron 2013: 179-180). The 
Brothers likewise played a pivotal role in defending Tahrir against attack, 
including during the ‘Camel Battle’ of 2 February, when pro-regime thugs 
threatened to overrun the protestors’ barricades at the National Museum entrance 
to the Midan (interview Abdullah3 20 Aug. 2011). “They [the Muslim Brothers] 
were at the forefront,” reported one Coptic protestor, “They defended all of us. This 
is a fact” (cited in al-Ahram Weekly Online 2011b). 
That the principal actors of Egypt’s democratic breakthrough are frequently 
portrayed as having emerged from outside Egypt’s defined oppositional 
                                                          
77 Both Carrie Wickham (2013: 162) and Gunning and Baron (2013: 175) have previously cited this 
number as a credible estimate.  
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hierarchies is partly due to the Muslim Brothers, wary of overshadowing the 
secular face of the protests and so provoking an ‘American veto’ fearful of an 
Islamist revolution (Hamid 2014: 140-141; Wickham 2013: 169), did not publicize 
their presence in Midan al-Tahrir and elsewhere. The Brothers instead deferred to 
the “horizontalist” (Chalcraft 2012) spirit that characterised the mobilization, 
taking a back seat to a broader conception of ‘the People’ opposing the regime. Of 
course, this was also a matter of expediency: the Brothers were impressed by the 
scale and success of the mobilization, and fully aware that “Egyptians were not 
protesting for the Muslim Brothers. If it had been just us [the Brothers] taking to 
the streets, then there wouldn’t have been a revolution” (interview Mona 30 Apr. 
2014).   
 
Electoral Alliances and Machine Politics 
After Mubarak’s resignation on 11 February, the SCAF looked to foreclose eighteen 
days of unruly contention by calling on Egyptians to abandon protest, while 
seeking a political dialogue with Egypt’s Mubarak-era opposition in general and 
the Muslim Brothers in particular.78 In its early embrace of the Brothers, the SCAF 
invited the movement to play a leading role in a democratic transition. The first 
actualization of this commitment came on 15 February, when the SCAF appointed 
                                                          
78 Hazem Kandil (2014: 15) has claimed that leading Brothers Mursi and Saad al-Katatni met with 
head of Egyptian General Intelligence Omar Suleiman on 1 February 2011 to “enter into secret 
negotiations…for a larger share of power in return for stopping the revolt.” The available record 
does not support this. Pro-SCAF news websites (e.g. albawabhnews 2014) have made similar claims 
of a meeting on 1 February in which Suleiman offered to release imprisoned senior Brothers in 
return for the movement vacating Tahrir, but note that the Brothers refused any deal. Speaking on 
al-Jazeera on 3 February, Mursi denied that the movement had met with Suleiman (see 
http://youtu.be/xW6d9-2pJBE). What is clear is that Suleiman publicly called for a dialogue with 
the Brothers on 5 February, following which the movement attended a meeting along with fifty 
other representatives of the Tahrir occupation (Al-Masry Al-Youm 5 Feb. 2011: 1). Whatever the 
inducements to demobilize offered were, they clearly failed: the Brothers left the meeting publicly 
committing to continue the protests until Mubarak was removed (New York Times 6 Feb. 2011). 
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an eight-member committee to propose constitutional amendments to the 1971 
constitution in preparation for fresh parliamentary and presidential elections. 
Subhi Salih, a Muslim Brother and former Member of Parliament, was the 
committee’s sole representative of Egypt’s Mubarak-era opposition movements.  
Two weeks after Mubarak’s ousting, the Muslim Brothers announced the 
formation of the Freedom and Justice Party to compete in future elections (Al-
Masry Al-Youm 22 Feb. 2011). The Muslim Brothers had long cultivated electoral 
ambitions. In 1942, Brothers founder Hassan al-Banna and several of the 
movement’s candidates were forced to withdraw from the parliamentary elections 
under threat of internment (Lia 1998: 256-268; Heyworth-Dunne 1950: 39-40). 
The Wafd’s rigging of the elections in 1945 denied the Brothers access to 
parliamentary representation for a second time, leading to a split in the 
movement’s leadership and the rise of the Special Section, an underground 
paramilitary unit that brought the Brothers into violent confrontation with 
successive governments (Lia 1998: 270-271). These confrontations culminated in 
the movement’s suppression by the Palace in 1948 and again in 1954 by Gamal 
Abdel Nasser (Mitchell [1969] 1993). Following the Brothers’ partial rehabilitation 
by Anwar al-Sadat in the 1970s, the movement renounced violence and turned 
instead to Egypt’s parliament and syndicates to advance its religiously inspired 
social reform agenda (Wickham 2002). Later, in the 1980s, the Brothers’ 
candidates began running on electoral lists with the Wafd and later the Labor party 
and in spite of routine electoral fraud formed the main opposition to the NDP in 
parliament (El-Ghobashy 2005; Shehata and Stacher 2012).  
The Brothers’ parliamentary activities were abruptly curtailed in late 2010 
when a nakedly fraudulent election contrived to wipe out the Brothers’ 
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representation once and for all. With Mubarak gone, the Brothers’ embeddedness 
in Islamic associational life, along with its national network of branches, charities 
and grassroots activities, ensured that the movement possessed the experience 
and the infrastructure to perform well in elections (see Blaydes 2011: ch.8; 
Masoud 2014).79 Conscious that no other party or actor from the 25th January 
Revolution coalition possessed a comparable political machine, the Muslim 
Brothers, Shadi Hamid (2014: ch.6) argues in his book-length study of the 
Brothers’ role in the transition, initially tried to appear magnanimous in offering 
concessions to other opposition groups. To offset any latent suspicions of 
impending Muslim Brother electoral domination, Hamid notes, the Brothers 
committed to contesting a plurality and not a majority of seats, while spearheading 
the formation of the Democratic Alliance, an electoral coalition of pro-25th January 
Revolution parties that would run under a single national electoral list and aim to 
produce a “national revolutionary majority” (Ahram Online 23 Mar. 2011).80 
According to this reading of the movement’s intentions at this stage of the 
transition, the Muslim Brothers were aware that the rapidly convened “negative 
coalition” (Beissinger 2013) of the 25th January Revolution, united primarily in its 
opposition to the Mubarak regime, had to be reconfigured into a positive electoral 
one.  
                                                          
79 In the run-up to the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, Essam el-Erian would boast, “We will 
reach voters in their homes and places of gathering and talk to them directly about the nation and 
its future and about the FJP and its program… This will have the greatest impact on voting, and no 
competitor can compete with us in this domain. You [Muslim Brothers] are, thank God, the most 
organized and present in all areas of society” (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 12 Nov. 2011: 16). 
80 The Muslim Brothers initially restated their adherence to al-mushāraka wa laysa al-mughālaba 
(participation and not domination) in the political process, a position first adopted in the years 
following the 1992 Algerian elections when an Islamist victory provoked a military coup (see 
Brown 2012a). As the transition progressed, however, the number of seats the FJP planned to 
contest began to change, with FJP candidates going on to contest half of all the seats in the 2011-
2012 parliamentary elections. The Brothers’ decision to put forward a presidential candidate only 
served to deepen misgivings about the movement’s domination of post-Mubarak politics.  
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However, the Democratic Alliance, as Nathan Brown (2011) noted at the 
time, was a strange and imperfect vehicle for such an avuncular enterprise, one 
that effectively sought to “divvy up the seats in advance”. Still, insists Hamid, this 
was “the centerpiece of its [the Brothers’] efforts to essentially allow weaker 
parties to ride the coattails of its electoral success” ( 2014: 144). The telos of this 
initiative, the Brothers publicly insisted, would be a competitive parliamentary 
system. “Everyone must act,” explained Mohamed el-Beltagy, a leading Brother and 
former MP, “so we can reach the point where we become like the rest of the 
countries in the world, with three or four strong parties. We [the Brothers] will not 
forever remain in the position of not seeking power, the majority or the 
presidency. This is a temporary position until the time there are forces that can 
compete” (cited in Ahram Online 23 Mar. 2011). However, more critical accounts of 
the Brothers’ role in the transition (e.g. Kandil 2014: ch.4) have questioned the 
movement’s commitment to coalition building, pointing to the insular structure of 
the movement and its religious mission. This fear was certainly shared by many 
non-Islamist members of the revolutionary coalition, who believed that the Muslim 
Brothers’ commitment to political pluralism would not survive the movement 
taking power, a fear that the Brothers did too little to assuage. 
What is not in dispute is that shortly after its founding in the summer of 
2011, the Democratic Alliance could claim over thirty members, including the 
liberal Wafd, the Nasserite Karama party, and the leftist Tagammu party.81 This, 
however, proved to be one of several short-lived examples of post-Mubarak 
revolutionary cooperation. By autumn, parties began to break away from the 
Democratic Alliance to form their own electoral blocs, many complaining of the 
                                                          
81 For a history of the Democratic Alliance, see Ahram Online (2011).  
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Muslim Brothers’ domineering leadership and its insistence on controlling seat 
allocations on the electoral list (e.g. Masrawy 3 Sept. 2011; al-Jazeera 7 Oct.2011; 
al-Masriyyun 14 Oct. 2011). With the onset of the first round of the 2011-2012 
parliamentary elections, the Democratic Alliance had been reduced to a core of 
several fairly minor parties, encompassing Islamists, centrists, liberals and 
Nasserites, and headed by the FJP (Figure 9).  
While the weight of scholarly and journalistic attention has rightly focused 
on the Brothers’ inattentiveness to maintaining good relations with other 
members of the revolutionary coalition, the failure of liberal and secular forces 
outside of the Democratic Alliance to build political parties with meaningful links 
to Egypt’s electoral constituencies remains one of the frequently elided dynamics 
undermining the transition.82 As Nathan Brown remarked on the eve of the 2011-
2012 parliamentary elections, “When such movements had a political demand, 
they resorted to the device that worked so well earlier [in 2011] – the public 
demonstration – and avoided the long task of party building” (Brown 2011). This, 
despite the emergence of new secular opposition groups competing in elections as 
early as the mid-2000s, including the aforementioned Kifaya movement, as well as 
Ayman Nour’s failed presidential campaign in 2005 (see Oweidat et al 2008; El-
Mahdi 2009). Having provided the catalyst for the 25th January Revolution, Egypt’s 
non-Islamist ‘revolutionaries’ instead came to claim a moral authority to dictate 
the trajectory of post-Mubarak politics that was disproportionate to any 
democratic representation they could muster at the ballot box. Indeed, many of 
these figures came to reject SCAF’s role and the democratic transition in toto as a 
                                                          
82 This is not to suggest that they were simply feckless. Rather, as Tarek Masoud (2008; 2014) has 
catalogued, they were struggling to negotiate Egypt’s “electoral ecology”, which places high entry 
barriers to newcomers due to the centrality of patronage in swaying electoral loyalty and the 
propensity for voters to support those already embedded within their social networks.  
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parting imposition by the Mubarak regime designed to short circuit a mass 
mobilization that still retained much of its energy. With few illusions of an electoral 
breakthrough, anti-SCAF (and later anti-Mursi) protestors were immunized from 
the domesticating imperatives of democratic procedures and electoralization. This 
‘gap’ between the political demands of a cohort of protestors and activists, 
energized by the momentous events of the 25th January Revolution, and the 
possible spectrum of representation that could be produced by the infrastructure 
of elections, meant that large tranches of the revolutionary coalition pursued a 
parallel political track, mobilizing pressure from the street as a means of 
intervening into the formal transitional process.  
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Figure 9. “Map of Egyptian political parties: First phase of 2011 Parliamentary Elections” (Jacob Carbonari in The Arabist 17 Nov. 2011). 
102 
 
This electoral landscape was made all the more uneven by the evaporation 
of the NDP as an electoral vehicle for old regime interests (see Blaydes 2008; 
Menza 2012). Speaking in the spring of 2011, Hazim Kandil (2011) predicted that 
NDP politicians would win at least a third of seats in any new parliament, whether 
running under the NDP banner or as independents in the event that the party was 
banned. A forty per cent share of the vote, he suggested, could not be ruled out. 
Such a scenario remained eminently plausible when the Higher Administrative 
Court dissolved the NDP in April 2011, but placed no embargo on former members 
standing for election. The prospect of a reconstituted NDP certainly preoccupied 
the Muslim Brothers: they spent the transition lobbying the SCAF for a ‘Political 
Isolation Law’ disbarring former NDP members from standing for parliament and 
the presidency for five years.83 As it subsequently transpired, the NDP machine 
was only reactivated in June 2012 for the nearly triumphant presidential campaign 
of the Mubarak-era Prime Minister Ahmad Shafiq (Masoud 2014: 205).  
In its absence, conservative forces associated with the Mubarak regime 
secured only a handful of seats in the parliamentary elections. This, in turn, had 
unforeseen consequences for the trajectory of the transition. If, in most democratic 
transitions, the first competitive parliamentary elections following a democratic 
breakthrough reveals the residual strengths and continuing entrenchment of local 
bosses and old regime figures (Hagopian 1996; Hite and Cesarini 2004; Robison 
and Hadiz 2004; Hedman 2006; Magaloni 2006), and thus compels compromises, 
backroom deals and coalition-building on behalf of the pro-democratic forces, this 
did not occur in the Egyptian case. Instead the formal, electoral realignment that  
                                                          
83 When this was not forthcoming, the Brothers championed measures to expose former regime 
candidates, including defacing election posters and publishing lists of filūl running as independent 
parliamentary candidates or on party lists, and running “catch a filūl” campaigns on social media 
(al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 3 Nov. 2011: 5; al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 11 Nov. 2011: 2).  
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Figure 10. Results of al-Majlis al-Shaʿb elections, Nov. 2011-Jan. 2012. 
 
emerged following the 25th January Revolution clustered around a series of 
alliances in which no grouping outside of organized political Islam commanded an 
electoral infrastructure capable of delivering votes nationwide. It was in this 
context that the Muslim Brothers became the largest party in the 2011-2012 
parliament (Figure 10), followed, more unexpectedly, by the ultra-religious Salafi 
Nour Party (see Lacroix 2012). This left the Muslim Brothers with an unusual, even 
excessive, level of electoral success and parliamentary (and later presidential) 
representation, out of sync with the political spectrum of forces that had cohered 
in Midan al-Tahrir. Such a result ultimately proved beyond what the revolutionary 
coalition could sustain, as the Brothers’ claims to be countering the old regime 
through the ballot box quickly began to appear far more like indefinite electoral 
dominion and irrelevancy for the rest of Egypt’s reinvigorated political scene.  
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Mobilization and Demobilization 
Prior to holding parliamentary and presidential elections, a timetable for the 
transition and several amendments to the 1971 constitution, including 
amendments stipulating presidential term limits and restrictions over the 
executive’s ability to impose a state of emergency, had to be voted on in a national 
referendum. The Brothers campaigned for a “yes” vote, arguing that a fixed 
schedule for the transfer of power from the SCAF to an elected civilian government 
was vital to the success of the transition. The “no” vote was led by Egypt’s secular 
revolutionaries and established liberals, who argued that a constitution should be 
codified before elections were held to avoid a document written by a parliament 
dominated by narrow party interests – a pre-emptive move that tacitly 
acknowledged the Brothers’ electoral advantage. The tone and manner in which 
the referendum campaign played out has been characterized as one of the 
transition’s “original sins…pitting Islamists and non-Islamists against each other 
for the first time…[meaning] debates that were really about the sequencing of the 
transition became, at least publicly, about religion” (Hamid 2014: 145). The 18 
March referendum passed with seventy-seven percent approval on a forty-one 
percent turnout. This process saw the evaporation of much of the goodwill that 
had characterized relations between the different elements of the revolutionary 
coalition up to that point.  
While the decision was never explicitly announced, for the Brothers the 
passing of the referendum meant that the political focus should shift from 
maintaining a presence in Tahrir to seeing the transition’s timetable of elections 
and constitutional reform implemented. As one Brother recalls: 
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With Mubarak gone, we faced a choice: we could stay in Midan al-Tahrir and 
continue protesting, keep the military out of politics and start the transition 
later, led by the revolutionaries. But who would lead it? And how would 
they be chosen? And would Egyptians accept that figure as legitimate? We 
did not believe that Tahrir alone had sufficient legitimacy to dictate the 
country’s will. That’s why we supported the March referendum. When the 
people voted “yes” and gave the transition legitimacy, we focused on the 
process of change: the elections and the new constitution… we thought that 
step-by-step reform was preferable to a more revolutionary path. 
(interview Abdullah al-Haddad 20 Feb. 2014) 
Thus, the Brothers’ gradualist approach was sutured to a narrow, 
procedural conception of democratization that the movement adhered to following 
the 13 March referendum. In this, there was a clear pact with the military, whether 
implicit or otherwise, in which the Brothers would acquiesce to the SCAF’s 
oversight of the transitional period and a continuation of the military’s Mubarak-
era prerogatives in return for the ‘normalization’ of the movement and a 
commitment to transfer power to an elected civilian government according to the 
timetable set out in the 19 March referendum. If this appears unremarkable in 
context of other Third Wave transitions, the Brothers’ decision to demobilize did 
not produce the kind of conservative consolidation seen elsewhere. 
By the summer of 2011 the Muslim Brothers were conspicuously absent 
from the milyūniyya (million-person) protests that were agitating for justice for the 
martyrs of the revolution, the reform of Egypt’s Interior Ministry and security 
services, the prosecution of Mubarak-era regime figures, and, ultimately, the end of 
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military rule itself. Midan al-Tahrir was intermittently reoccupied. Egypt’s activists 
called for a second revolution against the SCAF. Demonstrations agitating for social 
justice were also held, as well as strike actions by a newly emerging trade union 
scene. The SCAF dismissed these as feʾawi (factional) demands and, on occasion, 
brutally policed the protests (Sallam 2011). In early July 2011, a milyūniyya 
planned by April 6 did elicit some concessions: elections were delayed until 
November to allow Egypt’s new political forces to consolidate; several ministers in 
the transitional government were dismissed for their links to the Mubarak regime; 
and most spectacularly, Mubarak finally appeared in court on corruption charges 
and for ordering the killing of protestors during the 25th January Revolution (see 
Cole 2012: 490-493).  
The Muslim Brothers remained aloof from the protests, arguing that further 
protest would drain popular support for the 25th January Revolution and lead to 
an electoral surge for old regime figures who promised a return to the relative 
stability and security of the Mubarak era (e.g. al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 31 Oct. 2011: 
3).84 Disruptive protest, the Brothers insisted, also threatened the transition 
timetable and thus could prolong military rule. As one FJP editorial explained:  
The people must protect the revolution by policing the political 
process and ceasing unnecessary protests and strikes that can create 
the conditions for a counter-revolution…Some people are expecting a 
crisis to occur before or during the elections; the results might be 
manipulated, or an incident like Maspero [when soldiers attacked a 
Coptic protest, killing twenty eight] will happen, or the filūl will return. 
                                                          
84 This is a sentiment that echoes the logic of the transitology literature. 
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Everything is possible, which is why all efforts must be directed 
towards securing the elections…This way, the people can visualize a 
safe and secure exit from the transitional period. We were capable of a 
revolution and deposing a dictator who ruled for thirty years, we must 
now protect the elections…The revolution must carry forward its 
thoughts and protect its demands and gains, which is the role of the 
new parliament. (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 30 Oct. 2011: 10) 
To the Brothers, protestors resembled “football hooligans…ready to destroy 
the transition because their team didn’t win [the 18 March referendum]. These 
hooligans would only recognize the referendum if the result was “no”, but since the 
people said “yes” now all they want to do is protest about poverty, unemployment 
and illiteracy” (al-Hurriyya wa al-ʿAdala 2 Nov. 2011: 4). Tahrir’s crowd of 
disorganized revolutionaries, would be best served by acting analogously to the 
Brothers: demobilizing and forming their own party (interview Mustafa 9 Jun. 
2013). Failure to heed this advice, the Brothers’ newspaper opined, would prevent 
the youth movements propelled to prominence during the 25th January Revolution 
from capitalizing on the elections; instead of occupying Tahrir and holding 
milyūniyyāt, they were better off knocking on doors and canvassing the electorate 
(al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 30 Oct. 2011: 5). People power should be reserved for 
securing the ballot.85 The case for demobilization was further strengthened by the 
calculation that Egypt’s looming balance of payments crisis, lack of investor 
confidence, failing tourism industry and high inflation – all problems that the 
                                                          
85 One FJP proposal that was met with limited enthusiasm was the use of ‘popular committees’ of 
the type formed during the 25th January Revolution; staffed by revolutionaries from across the 
political spectrum, they would be responsible for policing polling stations (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 
30 Oct. 2011: 5; al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 2 Nov. 2011: 5; al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 4 Nov. 2011: 7).  
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Brothers looked set to inherit – were exacerbated by protests and the political 
vacuum created by the transition (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 9 Nov. 2011: 7). 
Economic immiseration could therefore only be alleviated by “the parliament of 
the revolution” (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 2 Nov. 2011: 6). In a speech to FJP 
members in July 2011, Mursi made the link, frequently asserted elsewhere, 
between the parliamentarization of politics and a return to economic growth. FJP 
members must ‘bring politics indoors’: competitive elections and increased 
productivity would solve the country’s problems, not further protest 
(IkhwanOnline 17 Jul. 2011). Or, as one FJP mantra daubed on the walls of Cairo’s 
popular quarters had it: “A true revolutionary rebels against corruption, and once 
he removes it, calms down to build and prosper” (cited in Youssef 3 Mar. 2013).  
In the search for explanations of the Muslim Brothers’ decision to 
demobilize, a common trope portrays the Brothers as almost congenitally risk-
averse, with no stomach for chaotic street politics (e.g. al-Arian 2013). An 
alternative reading paints the Brothers as a “counter-movement” (Alexander 2011; 
see also Kandil 2014) whose demobilization was evidence of their co-optation by 
the SCAF. My argument, by contrast, avers that the Brothers used protest 
strategically, depending on their reading of the political process. Accordingly, this 
did not preclude the movement from mobilizing. On 29 July and 18 November 
2011 the Brothers went en masse to Egypt’s squares in protest against what Linz 
and Stepan (1996: 82) call “reserve domains”: conditions unilaterally imposed (or 
threatened) by the SCAF on the post-Mubarak constitutional order. In many ways, 
these mobilizations underline the limits of any deal between the Brothers and the 
military. The July mobilization followed several statements from the Brothers 
threatening to stage protests if the timetable mandated by the 19 March 
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referendum was not adhered to (Egypt Independent 27 Jun. 2011). When the SCAF 
publicly entertained a proposal to have binding supra-constitutional principles tie 
the hands of any future parliament, the Brothers made good on their threat, 
mobilizing for the Friday protest in Midan al-Tahrir of 29 July in a show of force. 
For many Brothers this constituted their first return to Tahrir since the revolution. 
Marshalled by FJP members in high-vis jackets, the hundred thousand or so 
assembled protestors conveyed a simple message: the Brothers’ demobilization 
was a matter of tactical restraint only, and was subject to review.86  The Brothers 
were ostensibly behaving just as the democratization literature counsels: 
demobilizing to pursue their electoral ambitions, but retaining the option to 
protest in the event of backsliding (see Linz and Stepan 1996: 9-10).  
After the supra-constitutional principles – commonly referred to as the 
Silmi document after its author, Deputy Prime Minister Ali El-Silmi – were 
belatedly published in November 2011, the Muslim Brothers again descended 
upon Tahrir for a milyūniyya, titled the “Friday of One Demand”. Their grievance 
was Article 9, which stated that “The SCAF is the sole actor on all matters related to 
the SCAF and its budget and the president shall be the supreme head of the armed 
forces and the defence minister is the general leader of the armed forces. The 
president can declare war after obtaining approval from the armed forces and 
parliament” (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 2 Nov. 2011: 5). The Brothers' stance 
remained unchanged: any attempt to undermine the omnicompetence of the post-
                                                          
86 The 29 July protests spectacularly backfired on the Brothers, provoking the first split in the 
Democratic Alliance when the Tagammu party withdrew to form a new electoral bloc after the 
Brothers failed to endorse the party’s demand of an end to military trials for civilians (Jadaliyya 
2011). The fallout did not end there. Thousands of Nour Party Salafis defied an agreement to 
abstain from religious slogans by chanting for an Islamic state, leading to the protest pejoratively 
being known as “Kandahar Friday”. As Stéfan Lacroix (2012: 4) notes, the 29 July protests presaged 
a growing rift between the Brothers and the Nour party, with the Brothers publicly distancing 
themselves from the Salafis after the event.  
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Mubarak parliament or the autonomy of the executive branch, and any restrictions 
imposed on the constitution writing process by the military-backed transitional 
government, would be countered with street protests.  
Speaking in early November, Mursi had warned that the Silmi document 
could provoke a second revolution if it was not withdrawn, and the Brothers’ 
leadership committed to a programme of rolling protests that would continue “no 
matter the consequences” until the initiative was abandoned (al-Hurriyya w-al-
ʿAdala 3 Nov. 2011: 1; 7). In an increasingly rare instance of coordination with 
Egypt’s other revolutionary groups, the Brothers planned the protests with April 6 
and other members of the Revolutionary Youth Coalition. When the day of protest 
arrived on 18 November, the FJP newspaper ran the headline: “Egyptians return to 
Tahrir to defend the gains of the revolution,” pledging that: “The Muslim Brothers 
and its allies will engage in street protests to protect the transition and demand 
that the SCAF transfer power to a civilian government and cancel the supra-
constitutional principles” (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 18 Nov. 2011: 1). 
Following the milyūniyya, the Brothers continued to put pressure on the 
SCAF, the Brothers' usually laconic Deputy Supreme Guide and political 
powerhouse Khairat al-Shater threatening an escalation in protest if the military 
did not rescind the Silmi document (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 20 Nov. 2011: 1). 
“Protest,” the FJP newspaper concluded, “are the only message that the military 
understands” (Ibid.: 7). However, an unanticipated consequence of the Brothers’ 
mobilization was soon to test the movement’s resolve to pursue a confrontational 
path with the military. When the Brothers vacated the Midan after the conclusion 
of the milyūniyya, families of the martyrs killed during the 25th January Revolution 
re-occupied Tahrir. In the early hours of Saturday morning, Interior Ministry-
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controlled security forces attacked the encampment. Within hours, protestors had 
returned to the Midan in greater numbers, provoking further clashes with police 
who responded with shotgun pellets, tear gas and rubber bullets. 
Finally, it seemed, Egypt's revolutionaries had the chance to bring about the 
second stage of the revolution that they had been agitating for since the summer 
(see Ryzova 2011). By 20 November, protestors in Tahrir were attempting to 
break through police lines on Muhammad Mahmud Street to reach the Interior 
Ministry, demanding the return of the military to its barracks and the formation of 
a civilian national salvation government. Amid the violence, video footage 
circulated of Egyptian soldiers and policemen casually piling up the bodies of dead 
protestors. The images swelled the ranks of the protestors, leading to a series of 
pitched street battles known as the “Events of Muhammad Mahmud Street”, in 
which the momentum, for the first time since Mubarak’s ousting, seemed to rest 
with the reinvigorated protestors. As protests spread to the governorates of 
Alexandria, Beheira, Daqahliyya, Fayyum, Gharbiyya, Ismailia, Port Said, Sharqiyya 
and Sohag, the Brothers’ Guidance Bureau convened on 21 November to formulate 
a response (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 22 Nov. 2011: 1; 4). At that meeting, it appears, 
the Brothers’ leadership resolved to gain assurances from the SCAF that the 
elections would be held on time before committing to going to Tahrir or not. In 
communicating the rationale behind this decision, Essam el-Erian, a senior Brother 
and FJP official insisted:  
The Brothers are caught between two choices, neither of them easy: either 
the Brothers go down to the Midan and so risk widening the scope of the 
conflict and delay the elections, or we hold back and abstain from 
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mobilizing our members while inevitably facing accusations from other 
political parties and the revolutionary youth that we have abandoned the 
revolution. (Ibid.: 1)  
 El-Erian’s anticipation of the opprobrium of the revolutionary coalition was 
to prove prescient. In a fateful decision that would cost the movement the amity 
and trust of many, the Brothers concluded that “Elections are the solution!” (Ibid.: 
1) At the height of the most serious and sustained challenge to military rule 
following Mubarak’s ouster, the Brothers met with SCAF and used their street 
presence as leverage to gain three major concessions: the rescinding of the Silmi 
document; a law to bar the filūl from competing in future elections; and a 
commitment that the elections would be held on time and power transferred to an 
elected civilian government by July 2012 (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 23 Nov. 2011: 1). 
Having secured the SCAF’s assurances that the transitional timetable would be 
adhered to, the Brothers committed to staying out of Tahrir. In an editorial titled 
“Why we went and why we didn’t go” the FJP’s newspaper explained:  
The Brothers went to protest on 18 November to ensure the integrity of the 
transitional process and continue the fight against the filūl…However, we 
will refrain from returning to the Midan as our presence will push the 
country into further bloody violence and delay the elections, which are the 
real goal of the revolution. (Ibid.: 13)  
Shortly thereafter, the Brothers went further, publicly turning on the 
protestors. The violence in Tahrir was the work of thugs – “their goal: delay the 
elections” (al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 24 Nov. 2011: 2). The filūl were singled out as 
instigators of the violence; they were “exploiting the situation to spread chaos in 
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the country” (Ibid. 3). The Brothers’ message was monotone and predictable: 
“Delay the election: revolutionaries beware, we will go backwards.” (Ibid. 8-9) A 
minority of Brothers under the direction of Mohamed el-Beltagy did defy the 
leadership, calling on the membership to mobilize to Muhammad Mahmud Street 
and continue the revolution against the SCAF (Al-Masry Al-Youm 23 Nov. 2011). 
Upon entering Tahrir, el-Beltagy was confronted by anti-SCAF protestors who 
accused the Brothers of selling out their fellow revolutionaries for electoral gain. 
Under pressure, he withdrew from the Midan.  
When the parliamentary elections went ahead as scheduled, the Brothers 
welcomed the first round of voting, proclaiming that: “Egyptians have finally 
moved legitimacy from the streets to the elected institutions!” (al-Hurriyya wa-l-
ʿAdala 30 Nov. 2011: 9) Egypt’s youth activists, meanwhile, finding their path to 
the Interior Ministry blocked, decamped from Muhammad Mahmud Street to hold 
a sit-in in front of the prime minister’s office. Again, violent clashes broke out 
between protestors and soldiers. The Brothers stayed away. The movement’s 
leadership, one senior Brother confided, feared that if the protests escalated, the 
SCAF might use this as a pretext to annul the election results (cited in El-Amrani 
2012). In response to the violence, the Brothers adopted a more critical line, 
publicly condemning the SCAF for their heavy-handed policing of protest (e.g. al-
Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala 19 Dec. 2011: 1). But this appeared almost as an afterthought, 
noncommittal and non-heroic.  
  “It was at this point,” observes Chayma Hassabo, “that the revolutionaries’ 
opposition to the Islamists, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, transcended mere 
ideological differences” (cited in Ahram Online 21 Nov. 2012). In the eyes of many, 
the Brothers had revealed themselves as unprincipled opportunists. “They only 
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care about their own self-interest as a party,” concluded one protestor in the run-
up to the 2012 presidential elections, “They were not with us in any of our battles. 
They left us by ourselves in the square.” (cited in New York Times 9. Jun. 2012). 
Activists who had rallied in defence of the Brothers prior to the 25th January 
Revolution now saw the movement as willing to sacrifice them in the pursuit of 
their political ambitions (see Ali 2014). The Events of Muhammad Mahmud Street, 
synonymous with the Muslim Brothers’ betrayal, became a fixture in the 
revolutionary calendar, eclipsed only by 25 January itself. As one youth activist 
related shortly before the first anniversary of the protests: 
While the military were discarding our brothers’ bodies in the trash, and the 
police were draining their eyes [a reference to police aiming birdshot at 
protestors’ eyes], the Brothers were preparing for parliament. While the 
revolutionaries were chanting “ya Tantawi [the head of SCAF], tomorrow 
your fate will be Gaddafi’s,” the Brothers were knocking on doors urging 
people to vote. Muhammad Mahmud will remain a black mark in the history 
of the Muslim Brothers. It was a shame that history will never forget and 
time will not erase…That is why we won’t stand with them in future 
protests. (cited in Masrawy 14 Nov. 2012) 
 The Muslim Brothers’ demobilization was particularly damaging for the 
clear implication that by staying away, the Brothers had insulated the SCAF from 
the protestors’ demands to reset the transition and have the military relinquish 
power there and then. Symbolically, this failure to come to the defence of Tahrir 
and instead privilege partisan electioneering took on an exaggerated importance in 
the revolutionary narrative; it was on Muhammad Mahmud Street that the first 
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anti-Brother chants were heard, presaging future confrontations between the 
movement and other members of the revolutionary coalition. Taken together, the 
fallout from the Brothers’ failure to mobilize during this and other episodes is 
evidence of the “deeper effects” (LeBas 2011: 15) of protest during late Third 
Wave democratization: namely, in sustaining or undermining broad democratic 
fronts during parlous and prolonged transitions. The Muslim Brothers 
“uncoordinated demobilization” (Tarrow 1995), a product of their strategic 
reading of the transition and relentless electoralism, undermined the efficacy of 
protest in deepening the democratization process, while facilitating the division of 
the revolutionary coalition along unequal electoral lines. Notwithstanding one final 
act of cooperation – when many of Egypt’s youth and protest movements rallied 
behind Mursi’s candidacy as the lesser of two evils in the second round of the 
presidential elections to defeat the old regime candidate Ahmad Shafiq – the 
coalition that had ousted Mubarak was irrevocably split (see Elgindy 2012; Alim 
2013). 
 
Political Isolation 
The Muslim Brothers’ failure to maintain good relations, memories and linkages 
with other political forces in the eighteen months following the 25th January 
Revolution left bad legacies for Mursi’s year in office. Repeated overtures to 
prominent liberal and secular figures, such as the Nasserist and presidential 
candidate Hamdeen Sabahi, to fill the position of Vice-President, and the liberal 
figures of Ayman Noor and Muhammad Elbaradei to head the new cabinet as Prime 
Minister, were rebuffed (see Daily News Egypt 26. Jun. 2012). Egypt’s youth 
activists, including Ahmad Maher, one of the founders of April 6, likewise turned 
116 
 
down positions in Mursi’s government. Mursi’s failure to attract a more inclusive 
government at this early stage ensured that he quickly became reliant on a narrow 
band of Islamist fellow travellers, giving succour to his opponents later on who 
claimed that the office of the presidency was subordinated to the Muslim Brothers’ 
leadership. 
Mursi’s isolation was compounded by the Supreme Constitutional Court’s 
dissolution of the lower house of parliament days just before the presidential run-
off in a “judicial coup” (Brown 2012b), designed, so one of the court’s Mubarak-
appointed judges boasted, to leave only the shell of a presidency and have SCAF 
assume legislative powers and thereby have full control of the constitution writing 
process (cited in New York Times 3 Jul. 2012). The ‘parliament of the revolution’ 
had lasted just six months. Having performed poorly in the elections, non-Islamist 
forces protested against SCAF’s power grab, but did not mourn the passing of the 
legislature, reflecting a growing ambivalence felt by many in the revolutionary 
coalition towards the newly elected institutions.  
This also marked a new and unanticipated development in the transition: 
the judicialization of post-SCAF politics. When Mursi wrestled legislative power 
from the SCAF in August 2012, judicial interventions against the legal basis of the 
country’s newly elected institutions continued. It is against this backdrop that 
Mursi issued the poorly conceived 22 November 2012 constitutional declaration; a 
maladroit manoeuvre that the Brothers insisted was necessary to outflank further 
judicial action against the constituent assembly and the upper house of parliament 
(see Hamid 2014: 157). The constitutional declaration, though rescinded following 
the passing of the constitution in a referendum weeks later, provoked a new cycle 
of protest, led by many of the leading figures of the 25th January Revolution who 
117 
 
accused Mursi of dictatorial intent. In stark contrast then to the Muslim Brothers’ 
expectations that political contestation would telescope into democratically 
elected forms of civilian authority following parliamentary and presidential 
elections, Mursi’s presidency was, instead, swiftly defined by the 
‘deparliamentarization’ of politics, the result of repeated judicial interventions into 
the political process and escalating protest against his rule. Having come to 
underestimate the power and significance of mass mobilization during the 
transition, Mursi and the Muslim Brothers proved to be particularly vulnerable and 
spectacularly inept at responding to the challenges that their erstwhile 
revolutionary allies mounted from Egypt’s squares and streets. As Nathan Brown 
(2013a: 50) has argued, the Supreme Constitutional Court’s refusal to ratify an 
electoral law for a new parliament ensured that the opposition’s energies were 
channelled not into an electoral campaign, but rather further mobilization.  
Journalistic accounts of Mursi’s brief presidential tenure and the 
circumstances of his ousting suggest that, far from being endowed with pharaoh-
like powers, there were very real limitations on the authority of his elected office 
vis-à-vis a ‘deep state,’ comprising members of the judiciary, state media, military 
and Interior Ministry-controlled police and security services, that had spent two 
years consolidating its position following the 25th January Revolution (El-Amrani 
2012; Sallam 2012; Brown 2013b). Despite efforts to appease these entrenched 
powers, Mursi’s former ministers claim that he only ever enjoyed titular control 
over the state apparatus (al-Jazeera 22 Jul. 2013; Mada Masr 8 Sept. 2013). As 
several scholars and journalists have argued, this deep state was instrumental in 
creating the conditions for Mursi’s removal; it is alleged to have withheld key 
public services in a destabilization campaign designed to erode public confidence 
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in his already divisive and unpopular presidency (see Brown 2013a, 2013b; New 
York Times 10 Jul. 2013; Le Monde diplomatique Aug. 2013; New York Times 30 Oct. 
2013; Pioppi 2013; Roberts 2013). In particular, these accounts call attention to 
the decision by the police to withdraw completely from their duties in the months 
leading up to the 30 June 2013 protests. In the resulting security vacuum, a run on 
petrol stations, combined with prolonged power cuts and water shortages during 
high summer and a violent insurgency led by Islamic militants in the Sinai, served 
to exacerbate the sense of crisis gripping the country. All this would play out in 
tandem with a sustained media campaign that sought to delegitimize the Muslim 
Brothers as a ‘terrorist’ organization, and the democratic project as a foreign 
conspiracy (El-Amrani 30 Jun. 2013; Elmasry 2013, 2014; Wall Street Journal 28 
May 2014).87 
Journalists have also begun to document the role of the Egyptian military 
and security services in funnelling material and logistical support to the Tamarrod 
movement that spearheaded calls for Mursi to step down. These reports, which 
cite senior members of Egypt’s Interior Ministry and state bureaucracy, suggest 
that Tamarrod’s leadership enjoyed substantive, clandestine links with the 
Egyptian General Intelligence Service, who saw the movement as an opportunity to 
redeploy ‘People power’ against Mursi’s democratically elected government 
(Reuters 10 Oct. 2013; Reuters 20 Feb. 2014). These claims have been repeated in 
interviews and statements given by several former Tamarrod members, including 
two of the movement’s founders; they recall regular meetings with retired army 
officers and former regime figures acting as intermediaries for Egyptian state 
                                                          
87 In the post-coup period, this media campaign has gone on to advance an eliminationist discourse, 
justifying the routine use of live ammunition and other repressive measures against the Muslim 
Brothers and anti-coup protestors.   
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security and the military leadership (Naguib 2013; Giglio 7 Dec. 2013; Frenkel and 
Atef 15 Apr. 2014) to co-ordinate protest activities in the months leading up to 30 
June. 88 Ahmed Maher (2014) of April 6 has claimed that in February 2013, he was 
approached by State Security to lead protests against Mursi. When he declined, the 
Interior Ministry, he suggests, began to cultivate Tamarrod. While ultimately 
reserving judgement as to the extent and formativeness of these connections as we 
await further scholarly investigations into this important dimension of Egypt’s 
failed transition, there is good reason to suspect that anti-democratic forces 
bearing the imprimatur of the deep state, in ways reminiscent of ‘elite-
orchestrated’ protest in Central Asia (Radnitz 2010), South Asia (Brass 1997), 
Southeast Asia (Hedman 2006) and Latin America (Auyero 2007), exploited the 
divisions between the Brothers and other members of the 25th January coalition 
by facilitating and then co-opting the 30 June protests that would pave the way for 
Mursi’s removal and a return to military rule.   
 
Conclusions 
As I have argued, the post-Mubarak democratic project failed not because the 
Muslim Brothers eschewed procedural democracy, but because they eschewed 
mass mobilization and a more broadly coalitional approach to the transition. Here, 
a series of provisional and contingent factors – the evaporation of the NDP, the 
failure of Egypt’s liberal and secular forces to develop a competitive political 
machine of their own, and the particular pathways of regime breakdown – ensured 
                                                          
88 Tamarrod received significant financial backing from the Mubarak-era business elite and in 
particular from the billionaire Naguib Sawiris, whose business interests had been pursued by 
Mursi’s government for tax evasion totalling over one billion dollars (New York Times 10 Jul. 2013; 
Kenner 10 Jul. 2013). In the months after the coup, it was announced that Sawiris had stopped 
paying the fines imposed by the Mursi government and was appealing the original settlement 
(Washington Post 18 Jan. 2014). 
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that the Brothers’ electoralism and demobilization, a common theme of other 
Third Wave democratic transitions, magnified and exaggerated divisions within 
the revolutionary coalition, without ever producing a definitive outcome that could 
bind those who appear to have held real power: the deep state (see Brown 2013).  
Revisiting the transitional period through the Muslim Brothers’ writings, 
the conviction that if competitive elections were held, the will of the new 
parliament and the new president could not be usurped appears axiomatic in the 
movement’s thinking. As a result, any initial constraint or attempts at coalition 
building soon gave way to electoral hubris and a sense of entitlement, premised on 
the disastrous miscalculation that democratically elected forms of civilian 
authority alone were sufficient both to legitimize the Brothers’ corporate agenda 
and to reduce the power and insulation of old regime holdovers. As one Brother 
later conceded, “We thought that once we had the legitimacy to write a new 
constitution, backed up by a new parliament and new democratic institutions, any 
counter-revolution could be defeated” (interview Abdullah al-Haddad 20 Feb. 
2014). This retreat from mass mobilization and privileging of electoral and 
constitutional forums is a prominent feature of Brothers’ critical reappraisals of 
the movement’s missteps following the 25th January Revolution, beginning with 
the movement’s demobilization following the 18 March referendum. “The 
revolution,” reflects Abdel Mawgoud al-Dardery, a leading FJP figure, “should have 
continued” (cited in Jadaliyya 15 Aug. 2013).89  
                                                          
89 Amr Darrag, one of Mursi’s ministers echoes al-Dardery’s assessment: “We underestimated the 
power of the deep state. We thought that just having the revolution and elections, the deep state 
would diminish automatically or gradually. When parliamentary elections took place and only 13 
members from feloul parties made it, we thought it was a strong indication that they don’t have 
much influence. But maybe at that time they were still gathering themselves. As time passed, we 
found that they have much more influence. They managed to have their candidate be the second top 
presidential candidate. If you go through the government, as I did as minister, you find out that they 
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For all the reasons outlined above – electoral ambitions, status as a 
privileged transitional partner, a commitment to gradualism – it nevertheless 
remains  difficult to envisage a counterfactual scenario in which the Brothers 
continued to mobilize in early 2011 and force the military to cede power to an 
unelected civilian set of authorities. Somewhat easier to imagine is some 
combination of the Democratic Alliance staying together, or Egypt’s non-Islamist 
revolutionary parties performing better at the ballot box, or the Brothers not 
fading out of street politics to focus on elections and mobilizing in support of a 
national salvation government after the SCAF, with the publication of the Selmi 
declaration, signalled its intentions to remain a state within a state. In that case, 
the Brothers would have become a senior partner in a coalition of forces, with a 
presence in parliament and Midan al-Tahrir, bound by power-sharing and 
compromise, instead of being left with few allies to defend an isolated and 
unpopular president against the predations of old regime forces opposed to the 
democratic project launched by the 25th January Revolution.  
Since the coup, the Muslim Brothers have regrouped to launch almost daily 
protests across the country (Ketchley 2013). But they have done so without the 
support of Egypt’s other revolutionaries, though many of the secular and liberal 
activists and movements who participated in the 25th January Revolution have 
found themselves subject to the same repression. In November 2013, the Brothers 
issued the first of several invitations to those activists to put aside their differences 
and reunite against the military and the counter-revolution (al-Shorouk 27 Nov. 
2013). The offer has not been taken up. To mark the second anniversary of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
are really deeply rooted everywhere. A more revolutionary path would have been necessary to 
expedite reform” (Mada Masr 8 Sept. 2013). 
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Events of Muhammad Mahmud Street, the Brothers declared their solidarity with 
the planned commemorative protests in Midan al-Tahrir, but elected to stay away 
fearing a confrontation (Al-Hurriyya wa al-‘Adala 15 Nov. 2013: 1). Above 
Muhammad Mahmoud Street protestors hung a banner that read: “No filūl, no 
military, no Brothers.”
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Chapter 3 
  
The How, Where and When of Repression and 
Mobilization: The Muslim Brothers and the 
Egyptian Anti-Coup Movement 
 
On 28 June 2013, members of the Muslim Brothers and supporters of Egyptian 
president Muhammad Mursi occupied Midan Rabaʿa al-Adawiyya, a public square 
in eastern Cairo, in anticipation of street protests calling for Mursi’s resignation 
scheduled for 30 June. The choice of Rabaʿa was not coincidental. The Muslim 
Brothers have a long association, dating back to the Sadat era (interview Ibrahim 
Munir 19 Jun. 2014), with the Rabaʿa al-Adawiyya mosque, which gives its name to 
the Midan. A week earlier, on 21 June, there had been a dress rehearsal for the 
occupation: supporters of President Mursi held a large demonstration in Rabaʿa 
anointed the “Friday of Rejecting Violence.”90 In the days and weeks following 
Mursi’s removal by a military coup on 3 July, pro-Mursi occupations were 
established in public squares in Alexandria, Assiut, Aswan, al-Bahr al-Ahmar, Beni 
Suef, Daqahliyya, Giza, Minya, North Sinai, Suhag and Qina.91 In governorates 
without an occupation, hastily assembled convoys of cars, buses and coaches, from 
                                                          
 Adapted from Neil Ketchley, 2014, “The State, Mobilization and Repression: Evidence from Post-
Coup Egypt,” presented to Social Mobilization Seminar Series, Nuffield College, University of Oxford 
and Neil Ketchley, 2013, “The Muslim Brothers Take to the Streets,” Middle East Report 269 
(Winter): 12-17. 
90 The Muslim Brothers had previously staged other protests in Rabaʿa: on 4 and 6 June 2013, for 
instance, they held demonstrations in the Midan in solidarity with Syrian opposition to the regime 
of Bashar al-Assad.  
91 Occupations were established in Midan al-Qaʾid Ibrahim in Alexandria, Midan Omar Makram in 
Assiut, Midan al-Shuhadaʾ in Aswan, Midan al-Mudiriyya in Beni Suef, Midan al-Nahda in Giza, 
Midan al-Dahar in Hurghada, outside the Olympic Stadium in Mansoura, Midan al-Balas in Minya, 
Midan Masjid al-Nasr in North Sinai, Midan al-Thaqafa in Suhag, and Midan al-Saʿa in Qina.  
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as far away as Gharbiyya, Menoufia, Port Said, Suez, and Wadi al-Jadid, ferried 
several hundred protestors at a time to reinforce the Rabaʿa occupation.  
 Thus began a countrywide mobilization that has seen daily protests against 
the coup continue in the face of what Amnesty and Human Rights Watch (2014a) 
have described as “repression on a scale unprecedented in Egypt’s modern 
history”. Figure 11 shows the extent of anti-coup protests during the first six 
months of the mobilization. Two trends are immediately discernible: protests 
became markedly smaller, but no less frequent over time.  Repression peaked on 
14 August 2013, when several anti-coup occupations, including the occupation at 
Rabaʿa al-Adawiyya, were violently dispersed by the new military-backed 
government: at least a thousand anti-coup protestors were killed (EIPR 2014; 
Human Rights Watch 2014b). The 14 August massacres would establish a 
precedent whereby soldiers and Interior Ministry-controlled security forces 
routinely used live ammunition, tear gas and birdshot to disperse anti-coup 
protests. According to one widely cited estimate, in the year following the coup 
over three thousand anti-coup protestors have been killed and nearly forty 
thousand regime opponents arrested by the military-backed government 
(WikiThawra 2014a; 2014b). 
How can we explain the pattern of mobilization in Egypt since the coup? 
The effects of repression on protest – what the contentious politics literature 
refers to as the repression-mobilization nexus – are notoriously capricious 
(Davenport, Johnston and Meuller 2004). Studies have found that repression leads 
to a decline in protest because of the additional ‘costs’ of repression (Olzak, 
Beasley and Olivier 2003; Tilly 1978: 100). Alternatively, repression has been 
shown to generate an increased incidence of post-repression protest, known as
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Figure 11. Anti-coup protest participation and protest frequency. Data missing 13-18 Oct. Peak mobilization came on 19 Jul. 2013 when over seven hundred 
thousand anti-coup protestors mobilized in thirteen governorates for the “Friday of the People Break the Coup.” 
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 “backlash” (Francisco 1995, 1996, 2004a, 2004b). Particularly violent repression 
can figure as a “transformative event” in the life story of a mobilization, leading to a 
higher incidence of backlash over time (Hess and Martin 2006; Martin 2007). 
Others have argued that there is no linear relationship between repression and 
mobilization at all. Rasler’s (1996) study found that mobilization resembles a U 
shape, in which repression has a short-term negative effect and a long-term 
positive effect on protest participation (see also Opp and Roehl 1990). Brockett 
(1995; 2005), meanwhile, has argued that the relationship between repression and 
protest participation takes on an inverted U shape: limited repression incentivises 
protest, while higher levels encourage demobilization. As David Cunningham 
concludes, “the most notable finding has been the fact that seemingly all possible 
relationships have been supported by empirical work in this area” (2003: 47).  
Faced with this indeterminacy, scholars have started to look beyond protest 
quantity as the dependent variable, instead asking a very different set of questions 
about the qualitative impact of repression on the dynamics of contentious politics 
(Davenport and Eads 2001; Chang and Kim 2007; Chang 2008; Moss 2014; for a 
review see Earl 2011). This article contributes to this literature by considering 
how repression has influenced the timings, sites and modalities of anti-coup 
mobilization.92 By shifting the locus of enquiry from the quantity of protest to its 
qualities, we can better understand how the social coordinates of action condition 
the variability and viability of transgressive contention during episodes of 
repression. Such is the premise of this study.  
                                                          
92 The definition of ‘repression’ requires some preliminary remarks. I adopt a fairly conventional 
measure of state-centric repression as including overt, coercive measures (e.g. violence, killings, 
and arrests). There are other kinds of repression (e.g. sexual harassment, surveillance, repression 
by private individuals, etc.) that certainly apply in the Egyptian case, but which I do not properly 
consider for lack of data (see Earl 2011: 265-266). 
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In outline, I argue that anti-coup protests ‘moved’ in response to state 
violence during the first six months of the anti-coup mobilization. Following the 
clearing of the anti-coup occupations on 14 August, protestors relocated: from 
squares, outside government buildings and main arterial roads, to side streets and 
university campuses.93 As repression continued, the horizontal linkages between 
associational spaces and sites of protest became harder to sustain, contributing to 
the parochialization of contention. Coeval to this shift in the sites of contentious 
claim making was a corresponding change in the repertoire of contention. Protest 
became mobile, more ephemeral and less disruptive. Static occupations and 
demonstrations outside government buildings were superseded by farāsha 
(butterfly) sit-ins and human chains. Repression dictated the timings of protest, 
too. Anti-coup protestors became familiar with police shift patterns; they began 
mobilizing early in the morning and late at night, allowing them to mount longer 
actions in high-traffic areas unavailable to them during the daytime. This was not 
without consequence. Night-time protests were safer, but less conspicuous; early 
morning protests increased visibility, but limited participation.   
Taken together, the relationship between repression and anti-coup 
mobilization followed a process of “tactical interaction and innovation” (McAdam 
1983; 2013). Absent a hydraulic relationship between episodes of state violence 
and incidents of protest, anti-coup protestors and the military-backed government 
interacted through an iterative and dialogic process of move and countermove, 
which power disparities between challenger and regime prevented from achieving 
equilibrium. In this, anti-coup protestors were able to sustain their high risk 
                                                          
93 Here, I am expanding the repression-mobilization debate to address questions of concern to a 
literature on space and contentious politics (for a review, see Tilly 2000).  
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activism by mobilizing at the interstices of regime power – in mosques, side streets 
and universities – but the form and quality of their contention was impaired as a 
result. Protest became shorter, localized and more nimble; thus we might conclude, 
contention’s ability to inspire and encourage was diminished as protest became 
less visible and “positive feedback” (Biggs 2003; 2005) was inhibited. Repression 
does not just raise the ‘costs’ for individuals engaging in collective action, this 
argument suggests, but may also shape the locations and trajectories of ‘how,’ 
‘where’ and ‘when’ contention can and cannot emerge and unfold in authoritarian 
contexts. 
I use an original event catalogue (n=2685) of anti-coup protests94 and semi-
structured interviews with anti-coup protestors95 to chart the evolving dynamics 
of the anti-coup mobilization. I begin by positioning the decision by the Muslim 
Brothers and pro-Mursi supporters to mobilize in the run-up to the 3 July coup and 
consider some of the organizational features of the anti-coup movement.  I then 
use event data and informant testimony to analyse the effects of repression on the 
modalities, sites and timings of anti-coup protest. Finally, I address the 
implications for the anti-coup movement and suggest how the findings of this 
                                                          
94 An event catalogue is a, “set of descriptions of multiple social interactions collected from a 
delimited set of sources according to relatively uniform procedures.” (Tilly 2002: 249). This anti-
coup event catalogue is compiled from protest reports published in the Muslim Brothers’ Freedom 
and Justice Party (FJP) newspaper, al-Hurriyya wa al-‘Adala. Each entry records the date of a 
protest, governorate, village/town/city, repertoire, protest start location, protest end location, time 
of day, whether the protest began following prayer, crowd composition, description of repression, 
and protestors’ chants and slogans. To check for reporting bias, a random sample of stories was 
checked against videos uploaded to Youtube and the live streams of protests updated daily to the 
anti-coup movement’s social media pages. Tallied against the video evidence, reports proved highly 
accurate, though, there is sufficient evidence of underreporting to conclude that protest frequency 
is likely to be higher still. When examples of protest and repression between 1 May and 31 January 
2014 are given without citation, the data comes from the event catalogue.  
95 Interviews were conducted between February and July 2014. Unless citing the Muslim Brothers’ 
spokespeople, I use the first name to preserve the condition of anonymity under which testimony 
was gathered. 
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study might offer a basis for better understanding the legacies of the 25th January 
Revolution.  
 
Returning to the Streets 
To explain the origins of the 2013 anti-coup mobilization, it is necessary to go back 
two years, to crucial decisions made by the Muslim Brothers following the 25th 
January Revolution that removed Husni Mubarak. With the departure of Mubarak, 
the Muslim Brothers demobilized, boycotting further protests calling for social 
justice and an end to military rule, equating the revolution’s goals rather with 
constitutional reform and democratic authority achieved through the ballot box. 
That first protest cycle culminated in the “Friday of the Last Change” and the 
events of Muhammad Mahmoud Street in November 2011. On the streets, 
Egyptians were calling upon the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to 
relinquish executive authority to a civilian-led, national salvation government. But 
the Brothers decided to sit out these and other contentious episodes, insisting that 
further protest would destabilize the country and that “elections are the solution.” 
(al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAdala, 22 Nov. 2011: 1; see Chapter two) 
The Muslim Brothers endorsed the SCAF’s rule during the first year of the 
transitional period; their victories in parliamentary and presidential elections 
paved the way for the second protest cycle of the post-Mubarak era in which they 
found themselves the objects of protest. The Brothers’ decision to mobilize dates 
back to violent clashes outside the Ittihadiyya presidential palace in early 
December 2013, when pro-Mursi supporters, led by Muslim Brothers, confronted a 
sit-in calling for his resignation organized by the National Salvation Front. Amid 
scenes of hand-to-hand fighting and accusations of both sides torturing detained 
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protestors, eleven died, eight of them Muslim Brothers. “Following Ittihadiyya,” 
one Muslim Brother recalls, “whenever there was an anti-Mursi protest, we aimed 
to hold a counter-demonstration. We decided that we had to show Egyptians, the 
army and the media, that there was support for Mursi in the streets” (interview 
Abdullah al-Haddad 20 Feb. 2014).  
With anti-Mursi sentiment growing throughout the country, the Muslim 
Brothers found themselves defending their network of headquarters, offices and 
charities from attack. One of the first assaults on the Brothers’ infrastructure came 
in December 2012 when their headquarters in Ismailia, the Suez Canal city where 
the movement was founded in 1928, was set on fire. Further attacks followed. On 
the second anniversary of the 25th January Revolution, two FJP offices in the Nile 
Delta cities of Mansoura and Damanhour were burnt down. It is unclear who was 
behind these attacks, although there is evidence to suggest local residents angry 
with what many saw as Mursi’s autocratic and ineffectual presidency played a 
role.96 The Brothers, meanwhile, were convinced that the attacks formed part of a 
destabilization campaign carried out by filūl (literally, remnants) – former 
members of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party. The Interior Ministry-
controlled police, they noted, rarely intervened to protect the buildings and their 
occupants.  
Such attacks escalated in the weeks leading up to the 30 June protests. 
Between 18 June and 3 July 2013, thirty eight regional headquarters and offices 
were gutted, most during a three day period from 28 June to 1 July (see Table 1). 
Meanwhile, the 30 June protests called for by the Tamarrod (rebellion) petition  
                                                          
96 In Ismailia, for example, opposition to the Brothers grew throughout early 2013 to culminate in 
residents parading through the centre of the city bearing effigies of Mursi and other leading Muslim 
Brothers during their Spring Festival (Al-Masry Al-Youm 4 May 2013). This tradition of effigy 
burning dates back to the British occupation.  
131 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Pre-3 July coup attacks on Muslim Brother and FJP offices. 
 
campaign were gathering momentum, encouraged by statements from the military 
calling on Mursi to make concessions. The Brothers, who had long threatened to 
mobilize their supporters if the movement’s electoral authority was threatened, 
fell back on a repertoire pioneered during the 25th January Revolution, 
formulating plans to occupy public squares across the country and forming units of 
“ultras” to lead street protests should the military intervene.97 On 30 June 2013 the 
twenty-fifth milyūniyya (million-person protest) in eight months saw 
unprecedented numbers gather outside the Presidential Palace and on the streets 
                                                          
97 Launched in May 2013, pro-Mursi ultras mimic the hyper-masculine, high-octane performances 
of Egypt’s football firms and are tasked with leading chants and motivating the crowd. The original 
ultras, the Ultras Nahdawi, have since spawned several regional spinoffs, whose members wear 
specially printed T-shirts, play drums and let off fireworks during protests. 
Date Location (governorate, town/city, office) 
18 June al-Gharbiyya, Tanta  (FJP office) 
19 June  Kafr el-Sheikh, Madinat Dessouq, (FJP office) 
25 June al-Sharqiyya, (FJP office) 
28 June al-Sharqiyya, Zagazig, (MB office); al-Daqahliyya (MB 
office); Fayoum (MB office); Alexandria, Semouha (MB 
office); Kafr el-Sheikh, Baltim (FJP office); Kafr el-Sheikh, 
Baltim (FJP office) 
29 June  al-Beheira, Housh Eissa (FJP office); al-Beheira, Shubra Khit 
(MB office); al-Daqahliyya, Aga (FJP office); al-Gharbiyya, 
Madinat Basyoun (FJP office); Port Said, Port Said (FJP 
office); Beni Suef, Madinat Beni Suef (MB & FJP offices); 
Port Said, Port Fuad (FJP office) 
30 June Fayoum, Fayoum (FJP office); Cairo, al-Muqattam (MB HQ); 
al-Gharbiyya (FJP office); al-Daqahliyya, al-Sinbelawin (MB 
& FJP offices); Alexandria, Mintaqat al-Hadara al-Jadida 
(FJP office) 
1 July al-Gharbiyya (MB office); al-Gharbiyya, Madinat Basyoun 
(MB office); al-Qalyubiyya, Madinat al-Qanatir (FJP office); 
al-Sharqiyya, Zagazig (MB office); al-Sharqiyya, Faqus (FJP 
office); al-Sharqiyya, Abu Hamad (MB office); al-Sharqiyya, 
Qaryat al-Azaziyya (FJP office); al-Sharqiyya, Markaz Dirb 
Najm (FJP office); al-Menoufia (FJP office); Assiut (FJP 
office); Kafr el-Sheikh, Baltim (FJP office); Kafr el-Sheikh, 
Madinat Bila (FJP office);  
2 July Beni Suef, Madinat Beni Suef (MB school); al-Qalyubiyya, 
Madinat Banha (FJP office) 
3 July al-Menoufia, Markaz Ashmun (FJP office) 
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of downtown Cairo demanding early elections to end the presidency of Muhammad 
Mursi. The military, led by then Defence Minister (now president) Field Marshall 
‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, seized the protests as a pretext to launch a coup on 3 July.  
Despite these setbacks, Muslim Brothers were initially optimistic that the 
coup could be reversed through protest. One informant recalls Brothers watching 
the documentary film The Revolution Will not be Televised (2002) in the days 
following the coup (interview Abdullah4 10 Jun. 2014). The documentary, which 
recounts how a military coup against Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez was 
defeated by a combination of people power and a loyal presidential guard, was 
shared on the Brothers’ closed social media pages, complete with Arabic subtitles. 
With Rabaʿa occupied, a document circulated among senior Brothers and pro-
Mursi supporters outlining several possible scenarios (interview Mona 30 Apr. 
2014). Included in the analysis were lessons to be drawn from previous coups, 
including case studies of coups in Chile, Spain, Turkey and Venezuela. The 
Brothers’ strategy of rolling protests was premised on a best case scenario in 
which Mursi could be returned to the presidential palace if elements within the 
military aligned with anti-coup protestors on the street. This scenario also 
anticipated pressure from the United States and the European Union on the 
military leadership to respect the democratic process. An alternative scenario 
envisaged Mursi being reinstated on an interim basis pending fresh presidential 
elections.98 The most pessimistic scenario, and one that the Brothers increasingly 
                                                          
98 The interim reinstatement of Muhammad Mursi was the primary demand of the anti-coup 
movement in the period addressed by the present study. This was dropped in May 2014 when the 
National Alliance to Support Legitimacy endorsed the ‘Brussels declaration’ – a ten-point political 
programme seeking to build a broad front against the military-backed government (see IkhwanWeb 
2014).  
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prepared for, was of a violent crackdown comparable to that suffered in 1954 
when Gamal Abdel Nasser suppressed the movement.  
 This early period was characterized by intense organization. That the anti-
coup movement has been able to sustain a daily protest presence is thanks in large 
part to a series of organizational innovations enacted by the Muslim Brothers and 
other members of the anti-coup movement (under the umbrella of the National 
Alliance to Support Legitimacy) at this stage of the mobilization.99 Historically a 
highly centralized, cadre-based social movement organization par excellence (Lia 
1998; Wickham 2013), the Brothers’ response to the arrest of large numbers of the 
movement’s leadership immediately following the military’s seizure of power was 
to adopt a greatly decentralized structure in which Brothers and non-Brothers 
organized alongside one another in anti-coup occupations, and later, in several 
‘against the coup’ movements (harakāt didd al-inqilāb).100 The formation of these 
movements – Youth Against the Coup, Students Against the Coup, Women Against 
the Coup, and others – in Rabaʿa in early July 2013 amounted to a kind of ‘strategic 
prepositioning’ of what Dieter Rucht (2014) has classified as “action groups”: 
small, informal movements that rely on face-to-face interaction and that are 
capable of organizing autonomously at the local level whilst simultaneously 
                                                          
99 The National Alliance to Support legitimacy officially comprises fifteen Islamist parties, including 
the Muslim Brothers’ political wing, the FJP. However, informants insist that the Alliance exists in 
name only, issuing press releases and statements, but having little to no role in organizing protests 
(interview Belal 22 Jun. 2014).  
100 With Mursi detained, the new government set about rounding up the Muslim Brothers’ 
leadership. By 5 August, two hundred and twenty eight Muslim Brothers had been arrested, many 
of them senior and mid-ranking members. They included Saad al-Katatni, the chairman of FJP; the 
Deputy Supreme Guide, Khairat al-Shatir; and several members of the Guidance Bureau, the 
movement’s executive decision making body. On 20 August, General Guide Muhammad Badie was 
detained. Several of the prominent Brothers who remained at large took refuge in Midan Rabaʿa al-
Adawiyya and Midan al-Nahda, while others fled the country for exile in London, Doha and Istanbul.  
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operating as components in a larger network.101 By September, these ‘against the 
coup’ movements had become semi-independent of the Muslim Brothers’ 
organizational hierarchy, even if their core memberships were young Muslim 
Brothers and Muslim Sisters.102 For example, in the first months of the 
mobilization local branches of Students Against the Coup were assigned a senior 
Muslim Brother supervisor (mushrif) to coordinate protest actions. This system of 
formal oversight was, however, almost immediately abandoned due to youth 
members rebelling against a controlling hand that they saw as out of touch with 
the realities on the ground (interview Belal 22 Jun. 2014).103 Informants suggest 
that the Brothers’ formal organizational role in the ‘against the coup’ movements 
quickly became financial – putting up bail money for detained anti-coup protestors 
and providing financial support to the families of ‘martyred’ protestors – though 
                                                          
101 The first ‘against the coup’ movement was Youth Against the Coup. Formed on 5 July following 
an onstage conference at Rabaʿa, its organizational model called for flat networks of activists each 
working in one of three areas: media (to publicize the protests); political (to organize the protests); 
and social work (al-Hurriyya wa al-‘Adala 22 Jul. 2013: 7). Social work was subsequently dropped 
to focus on protest activities. Addressing the crowd at Rabaʿa, Emad Shahin, a professor of political 
science at the American University in Cairo, outlined the rationale for these new protest 
movements: “The coup is still in a fluid state. It has not been consolidated. This conflict will be 
resolved on several fronts – the most important of which will be protest from the street. For this, 
we need to build new movements that can overcome the violence of the police and their thugs.” (al-
Hurriyya wa al-‘Adala 21 Jul. 2013: 7)  
102 An online survey (n=287) I conducted in April 2014 and posted in the closed Facebook groups 
and social media forums used by ‘against the coup’ movements to coordinate protest strategy, 
found that over a third (thirty seven per cent) of survey participants who had taken part in an anti-
coup protest self-identified as a Muslim Brother or Muslim Sister (see Ketchley and Biggs 2014). 
This number is slightly higher than the modal estimate given by non-Brother informants of Muslim 
Brother participation in anti-coup protests. Respondents were also asked which party they 
supported in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections. Ninety four per cent of respondents indicated 
support for an Islamist party. 
103 This system also extended to coordinating protests with Muslim Sisters. If Muslim Brother 
members of Students Against the Coup wanted to coordinate university campus protests with 
Muslim Sisters, they had to do so via their respective supervisors. This system proved so unwieldy 
that it was quickly replaced by male and female members organizing together (interview Sarah 20 
Feb. 2014; interview Belal 22 Jun. 2014). 
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they also took charge of publicizing protests through the movement’s various 
media platforms (Ibid.).104  
 
Repertoire of contention 
How the anti-coup movement mobilized has changed over time in response to 
repression. Figure 12 shows the frequency of marches (masīrāt), sit-ins (waqafāt), 
human chains (salāsil bashariyya), occupations (iʾtisāmāt) and demonstrations 
(muthāharāt) as a percentage of anti-coup protests between June and November 
2013. Demonstrations and marches were both kinetic and disruptive modes of 
contention and may appear indistinguishable but for their focus. Demonstrations 
made direct claims on regime power and either began or concluded outside of 
government buildings; marches, meanwhile, moved from point A to point B and 
aimed to mobilize anti-coup sentiment while contesting the government’s control 
over the streets.105 A sub-type of march not shown in Figure 11 is a masīra hāshida 
(gathering march). This was a protest that visited several mosques, ‘gathering’ the 
faithful and passers-by, before moving on to a pre-agreed destination. Sit-ins, 
human chains and occupations were all static forms of protest that varied in terms 
of timing and size. Sit-ins were temporary, lasting at most a few hours. Occupations 
were more permanent and required an infrastructure to support them. Human 
chains were the smallest and least disruptive mode of protest, typically involving 
around ten protestors who stood by the side of a high traffic road or major 
building, chanting anti-coup slogans and holding posters and banners.106 
                                                          
104 The Brothers’ local branches (maktab idārat al-shuʿab) continued to play a key role in organizing 
non-‘against the coup’ movement protests, especially Friday protests.   
105 In rural areas, marches frequently involve participants riding motorcycles or tuk-tuks. 
106 Outside of major cities, human chains differ considerably. Planned at a village-level, often a week 
in advance (interview Youssef1 20 Apr. 2014), they tend to be much larger, attracting participants 
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Figure 12. Anti-coup repertoire, 28 Jun.-30 Nov. 2013. 
 
What is immediately striking about the anti-coup mobilization is how 
recursive the repertoire is; providing empirical confirmation for Charles Tilly’s 
(1978, 1995, 2008) insight that when people protest, they do so in only a limited 
number of ways. The only period where we find significant deviation away from 
these five tactics is in August.107 This was primarily due to the high number of 
funeral processions resulting from the 14 August killings that simultaneously 
                                                                                                                                                                          
from several villages who line the sides of one of the major highways connecting Cairo with 
Alexandria, Upper Egypt and the Nile Delta cities. Because the state’s coercive apparatus is 
concentrated in urban areas, participants face little threat of punitive action.  
107 Other limited tactical innovations included a call in August to boycott household products 
produced in military-owned factories in addition to brands, companies and media outlets operated 
by pro-coup figures. The boycott never gained traction and was quietly dropped. Another failed 
innovation was a “petrol protest” which called on drivers to fill up their tanks at government-
owned petrol stations, before turning off their engines and abandoning their vehicles, effectively 
blockading the forecourt. More successful, albeit little-used, innovations included a petition 
campaign, blockading roads, ‘protest marathons’ in which young men run through major 
thoroughfares, theatrical retellings of the coup and its aftermath, and ‘data shows’ – projecting 
images or video footage of regime violence on the sides of public buildings. 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
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137 
 
served as anti-coup protests. There is also little evidence to support a mechanical 
relationship between repression and ‘radicalization’. Beginning with Lichbach’s 
(1987) essay on the subject, several scholars have argued that the violent 
repression of nonviolent protest will cause a movement to adopt more violent 
tactics. This thesis has been applied to the study of Islamist mobilization in 
Mohammed Hafez’s (2003) Why Muslims Rebel. Hafez theorizes that Islamist 
movements pursue violence when they are subject to reactive, indiscriminate 
repression, while simultaneously being excluded from the political process. A 
corollary claim is that under these conditions we should expect to see the adoption 
of highly centralized, exclusivist organizational structures (see also della Porta 
1995). Given the scope parameters of the theory, the Egyptian anti-coup 
movement should be an exemplar of these dynamics. However, as I have discussed 
elsewhere (Ketchley 2013, 2014b), isolated episodes of violence attributed to pro-
Mursi supporters notwithstanding – including attacks on police stations, 
government buildings and churches in the aftermath of the 14 August massacres 
(EIPR 2013), as well as the use of Molotov cocktails and improvised weapons on 
protests108 – the anti-coup movement did not morph into a violent Islamist 
insurgency. 
 Instead, repression came to reconfigure a repertoire of non-violent 
contention. The 14 August massacres therefore represent a clear discontinuity, 
both in terms of the unprecedented scale of the killing, and also in their bringing to 
a close a phase of the mobilization in which large occupations and demonstrations 
featured prominently. By occupying squares in thirteen governorates, the anti-
                                                          
108 In December anti-coup protestors began to bring fireworks, powerful gas-powered potato guns 
and Molotov cocktails on marches, either to confront the police (firebombing empty police cars was 
a popular tactic), or to form a rearguard should the protest be attacked.  
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coup movement drew on a modality of protest pioneered during the 25th January 
Revolution. The occupation of Midan al-Tahrir, David Patel (2014) has argued, 
solved a fundamental problem of mass mobilization by communicating to would-
be protestors how, where and when people were protesting. This model, Patel 
suggests, is especially effective in making public and conspicuous the scale of 
contention in authoritarian contexts where information is otherwise tightly 
controlled and disinformation rife.109  
 As in the 25th January occupations, anti-coup protestors, often 
accompanied by their families, continuously occupied squares, with other 
protestors reinforcing the occupations on coordinated days of protest and the 
largest protests held after Friday prayers or during specially-called milyūniyya 
(million-person) protests.110 These occupations also provided important logistical 
functions in towns and neighbourhoods where the Muslim Brothers’ network of 
offices and headquarters had been attacked. In this sense, an anti-coup occupation 
operated in the tradition of a long history of protest camps, keeping protestors fed 
and cared for by a well-staffed infrastructure of workshops, kitchens, pharmacies, 
and field hospitals (see Feigenbaum, Frenzel and McCurdy 2013). Occupations 
were also spaces in which previously unconnected people could come together and 
plan ways to challenge the coup, for instance with the formation of the ‘against the 
coup’ movements. The Rabaʿa occupation even had its own FM radio station, 
followed on 15 July by a television station, 25 Ahrar, broadcasting from the Midan. 
Despite the arrest of the Brothers’ leadership and several attacks on anti-coup 
                                                          
109 This argument draws on preference falsification models in which would-be protestors calculate 
the risk of protesting as a function of the size of the crowd (Kuran 1991; Lohmann 1994). 
110 And like the largest protests of the 25th January Revolution, these were given names: the 5 July 
‘Friday of Yes to Legitimacy, No to the Military Coup’; the 12 July ‘Friday of Marching’; the 19 July 
‘Friday of the People will  Break the Coup’; the 2 August ‘Friday of Egypt Against the Coup’; and so 
on. 
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protests,111 the anti-coup movement began life as a well-resourced and 
sophisticated mobilization, capable of sending hundreds of thousands of protestors 
onto the streets. 
When it was attacked on the morning of 14 August, the Rabaʿa occupation 
had lasted forty seven days, longer than any previous occupation of Midan al-
Tahrir. Occupations in Alexandria, Giza, Beni Suef, Qina, Aswan and Assiut were 
also cleared. The immediate effect of the crackdown was to further decentralize 
the mobilization. This saw local branches of ‘against the coup’ movements take on 
an increasingly important role in organizing protests as coordination moved online 
and into offline associational spaces such as university dorms, mosques and 
private households.112 Following 14 August, anti-coup protestors adopted a four-
fingered salute on a yellow background – a gesture deriving from Rabiʿa (fourth), 
the first name of the female Sufi saint who is the Midan’s namesake. It quickly 
became synonymous with opposition to the military-backed government. 
                                                          
111 The first instance of regime forces using live ammunition against anti-coup protestors came on 8 
July when Republican Guard units attacked a pro-Mursi sit-in outside the Republican Guard 
Officers’ Club where it was believed Mursi was being held: sixty seven anti-coup protestors were 
killed.  Several anti-coup protestors were also killed on 19 July when police opened fire on an anti-
coup occupation in Mansoura and on 27 July police and soldiers attacked a march that had departed 
from the Rabaʿa al-Adawiyya occupation as it was passing the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier 
(known locally as al-Manassa) on its way towards downtown Cairo, killing over a hundred 
protestors. Though serious and tragic, these episodes look to have had little effect on the 
mobilization as a whole. Protestors continued to mobilize outside the Republican Guard building, 
the anti-coup occupation in Mansoura still attracted tens of thousands of participants during Friday 
protests, and marches left Rabaʿa al-Adawiyya for downtown Cairo with the same frequency. In fact, 
in informant testimony, these early instances of regime violence are highlighted as formative 
episodes in the forging of an activist mentality, with greater consideration given to the provision of 
first aid and to new techniques to deal with tear gas and shotgun pellets (interview Belal 22 Jun. 
2014).  
112 In early August, around ten per cent of all anti-coup protests were organized under the banner 
of an ‘against the coup’ movement. By mid-September, these groups were responsible for over half 
of all anti-coup protests. Anti-coup activists relied heavily on closed social media groups, some of 
which, informants suggest, had several thousand members, to share tactics and coordinate national 
days of protest. To avoid detection (when anti-coup protestors are arrested police often search 
their mobile phone or laptop for evidence of protest activity [interview Sara 15 Mar. 2014]) these 
groups were given innocuous names. One example of a now defunct group used to plan marches in 
Cairo was, “I love Cristiano Ronaldo” (interview with Muslim Brother 20 Mar. 2014). 
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Static occupations fell out of the repertoire entirely when security forces 
began routinely using live ammunition against large crowds.113 Demonstrations 
outside of heavily-defended government buildings also became too dangerous. 
Demonstrations began to be held with greater frequency in October. However, as I 
show in the subsequent section, these were primarily held outside administrative 
and security offices on public university campuses. Almost immediately, then, the 
effects of repression following the 14 August killings can be seen to have made 
contention less disruptive. Marches, protestors’ favoured tactic for their 
manoeuvrability and impact, continued to be launched, but their form was altered 
in response to the threat of regime attack. Gathering marches became impossible 
as large numbers of protestors drew the attention of security forces. Marches also 
sped up. Informants recall that anti-coup marches prior to the 14 August typically 
lasted for several hours, travelling long distances to reach a pre-agreed terminus. 
By November, marches in most Cairo neighbourhoods frequently dispersed after 
twenty minutes in anticipation of regime violence (interview Sarah and Hoda 26 
Feb. 2014).  
The frequency of sit-ins and human chains increased after the clearing of 
the anti-coup occupations. Human chains became the default tactic on weekdays 
when there was a low turnout. The high frequency of human chains after 
September thus reflected and reproduced declining protest numbers, as local 
iterations of the anti-coup movement struggled to sustain a daily protest presence 
in the face of a wave of targeted arrests. Sit-ins were held primarily in university 
faculty buildings and on the roads in front of mosques. A more risky form of sit-in, 
                                                          
113 There were several attempts to re-establish an occupation, beginning on 16 August in Midan 
Ramses in downtown Cairo. All were thwarted by security forces using live ammunition and 
birdshot. 
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pioneered in Assiut in September and quickly adopted elsewhere, was the waqfat 
al-farāsha (butterfly sit-in). Combining a sit-in with a flash mob, butterfly sit-ins 
allowed protestors to temporarily take over highly symbolic spaces, such as main 
roads or public squares, assemble long enough to record the protestors chanting 
against the military and the Interior Ministry, and then move on (see al-Jazeera 10 
Sept. 2013). One anti-coup protestor explained the butterfly sit-in’s popularity: 
“The farāsha pisses off the police. You go to a place and stay there for ten minutes 
or just long enough that the security forces are alerted, and then you leave for 
another location” (interview Muhammad 26 Feb. 2014). But these insurgent tactics 
had an impact on the efficacy of anti-coup protest. Given their speed, necessary to 
outmanoeuvre the authorities, protestors were only visible momentarily and were 
afforded few opportunities to interact with people on the street. As one organizer 
later reflected, butterfly sit-ins allowed protestors to regain a sense of agency and 
momentum, but as tools for challenging the coup, they soon proved to be a “tactical 
dead end” (interview Belal 22 Jun. 2014).  
As the anti-coup repertoire became more nimble in response to regime 
violence, protests themselves became the preserve of young men and women. 
Qualities that mattered less in sustaining occupations, i.e. being able to run fast and 
carry heavy loads, became essential attributes. In turn, the opportunities for many 
Muslim Brothers and pro-Mursi supporters to participate in demonstrations, 
marches and sit-ins narrowed considerably. Moreover, as I discuss in the next 
section, while the military-backed government could not stop anti-coup protestors 
from protesting entirely, it could strongly influence where those protests unfolded. 
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Sites of Contention 
Anti-coup event data allows us to present a stylized illustration of the ways in 
which sites of contention have shifted as a consequence of repression over the first 
six months of the mobilization. Figure 13 shows the most frequently recurring 
protest start locations (shown as weighted white nodes) and protest end locations 
(weighted red nodes). Connections between nodes (shown as directed edges) 
show the tendency for protest to move from location A to location B. To give an 
example, between 28 June and 14 August there were three hundred and nine 
protests that began in a mosque, of which one hundred and four – over a third – 
ended in a public square. The thickness of the edge connecting the “Mosque” and 
“Square” nodes is weighted to reflect this proportion. In the month after the 
crackdown began, only seventeen marches departed for a square, less than one per 
cent of all mosque-originating protests. Instead, the overwhelming majority of 
marches moved through residential side streets. By November, this had developed 
into a clearly discernible trend: anti-coup marches were avoiding main roads, 
squares and government buildings where security forces were most heavily 
concentrated and where the possibility of attack was highest.  
In Figure 13, isolated nodes or nodes with few or light edges, reflect a high 
proportion of static protests. Consider here the frequency of university protests. 
Beginning with the start of the new academic year in September, these protests 
escalated in early October in response to the heavy-handed policing of an anti-
coup sit-in at al-Azhar University. Solidarity demonstrations, sit-ins and strikes 
soon spread to al-Azhar’s other campuses and tertiary institutes, as well as at the 
universities of Cairo, Ain Shams, Assiut, Zagazig, Mansoura and several others. 
These protests were mainly organized by Students Against the Coup and bucked
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Figure 13. Protest start and end locations, 28 Jun.-30 Nov. 2013 Directed edges show horizontal linkages between start (white nodes) and end locations (red nodes). 
144 
 
the general trend, growing in frequency and size as students began coordinating 
their actions across several faculties. In November, there were a hundred and four 
protests on Egyptian university campuses. Crucially, however, these protests 
rarely left university gates. When protests increased in October, the regime had 
responded by posting armed police and soldiers at campus entrances with orders 
to open fire on any march or demonstration attempting to leave.114 The effect of 
repression was to confine and isolate student contention, ensuring that protests 
could neither scale up nor make common cause with other sectors.115  
Another way to visualize how repression can shape the sites of protest is to 
spotlight one neighbourhood and consider how the routes of marches and 
demonstrations changed over time. Figure 13 shows the path taken by a ‘gathering 
march’ that set off following the Friday Sermon from Muhandiseen in Giza to 
Midan al-Nahda, a public square located next to Cairo University, for the 9 August 
protest anointed the “Friday of the Eid of Victory”. Elsewhere in Giza, marches 
were also heading off to Midan al-Nahda from the neighbourhoods of Umraniyya 
and al-Haram.116 The Muhandiseen march begins outside of the Khalid Ibn al-
Walid mosque, before moving on to al-Maghfira mosque and then Mustafa 
Mahmud mosque. The protestors’ ranks had swelled to several thousand before 
the march turned down al-Batal Ahmad ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Street to arrive at Midan al-
Nahda. The march lasted for several hours and concluded with speeches delivered 
                                                          
114 This represented the evolution of a tactic honed under the Mubarak regime. Writing in 2003, 
Asef Bayat noted: “Students at Cairo University, for example, often stage protest marches inside the 
campus. However, the moment they decided to come out into the street, riot police are immediately 
and massively deployed to encircle the demonstrators, push them into a corner away from public 
view and keep the protest a local event” (2003).  
115 In March 2014, this saw al-Azhar students use sledgehammers and crowbars to fashion 
temporary exits in the campus perimeter walls, from which they surged out onto Mustafa Nahas 
Street. See footage: http://youtu.be/uwZWVXKCPOM.  
116 Near-identical protests were also held in Alexandria, Cairo, Fayoum, Beni Suef, Suez, Assiut, al-
Bahr al-Ahmar, Sharqiyya and Ismailia. 
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from the stage erected in the Midan. This use of space perfectly mirrors the 
repertoire of the 25th January Revolution, with Midan al-Tahrir replaced by Midan 
al-Nahda.117 Indeed, these were often the same mosques from which marches were 
launched on the pivotal “Friday of Anger” of 28 January 2011. Near identical anti-
coup protests – with marches leaving mosques after Friday prayers for squares 
and main roads – were held that day in towns and cities in Alexandria, Assiut, al-
Bahr al-Ahmar, Beni Suef, Cairo, Damietta, Luxor, Sharqiyya and Ismailia.  
After the 14 August massacres, anti-coup protestors continued to use 
mosques as staging points, but the destinations of their marches had changed. 
Figure 15 traces the route of a march departing from al-Mahrusa mosque in 
Muhandiseen. The date is 13 September. At this point, nearly a month has passed 
since the occupation of Midan al-Nahda was violently dispersed. As on every 
Friday since 14 August, the square was sealed off by army APCs and plainclothes 
police fanned out into the side streets alert to any approaching marches. Knowing 
this, protestors set off instead for Gamiʿat al-Duwal al-ʿArabiyya Street, the busiest 
street in Giza. The march made it halfway down Gamiʿat al-Duwal before the 
protestors found their path blocked by black-uniformed Central Security Forces, 
who fired tear gas into the crowd. The march quickly dispersed. Prior to the 14 
August, nearly a quarter of all protests leaving mosques arrived at a main arterial 
road. These protests were public and disruptive, with participants holding aloft 
posters of the deposed president Muhammad Mursi, chanting: “we are the people 
and these are our words: when Mursi comes back, we’ll go home” (ihna al-shaʿb, 
                                                          
117 It is worth noting that these are often the same mosques from which protests were launched 
during the first days of the 25th January Revolution. 
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Figure 14. Anti-coup ‘gathering march’ from three mosques to Midan al-Nahda, 9 Aug. 2013. 
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wa- di kilmitna: Mursi yirgaʿ nirgaʿ baytna)118 By contrast, in September, only six 
marches (less than one per cent) departing from a mosque arrived at a main road.  
The use of mosques as associational spaces for organizing and launching 
anti-coup protests is a constant of the mobilization. As well as providing a natural 
constituency for the Islamist-dominated movement, mosques offered an additional 
advantage in the urban ecology of contention: in many Egyptian neighbourhoods 
particular mosques have a reputation for playing host to protests following the 
conclusion of prayer. This meant that would-be protestors did not need access to 
formal protest networks to participate; they simply needed to turn up. As one 
informant, Youssef, relates, 
For Friday protests, I don’t check online. All week social media is telling us 
what to do. But for Fridays I don’t need to think about it. It’s a part of your 
life. If you want to protest after prayer you know which mosque to go to. 
So you go and protest and then hang out with your friends. I don’t like to 
say this, but protest has even become a part of the prayer itself. People 
start chanting in the mosque the second the prayer has finished. It’s 
always the same chant first: “hasbuna allah wa niʿma al-wakīl” [literally, 
God is our sole and best representative, akin to: God will punish those 
responsible]. Then we chant “yasqut, yasqut hukm al-ʿaskar!” [down with 
military rule!] and go out into the streets (interview 20 Apr. 2014). 
 These low coordination costs ensured that marches departing from 
mosques on Friday afternoons consistently drew the largest crowds, despite the  
 
                                                          
118 Following 14 August, this chant changed to, “we are the people and these are our words: military 
rule over our dead bodies” (ihna al-shaʿb wa-di kilmitna, ʿaskar yahkum ʿala guthitna).  
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Figure 15. Anti-coup march from al-Mahrusa mosque to Gamiʿat al-Duwal al-Arabiyya Street, 13 Sept. 2013. 
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regime’s attempts to deny the anti-coup movement this space.119  
Figure 16 also concerns al-Mahrusa mosque. By early November the 
security presence in Muhandiseen had increased considerably. Following the 
conclusion of the Friday sermon, protestors assembled outside the mosque and 
marched through residential side streets before arriving at al-Radwan mosque, 
where one would imagine the protestors offered prayers before heading home. 
The march was over within minutes and avoided detection. By December, the 
number of marches in Muhandiseen setting off following Friday prayer dropped 
almost to zero. Muhandiseen had become what anti-coup protestors call a “closed 
area” (interview Sara 15 Mar. 2014) due to the high probability that a protest 
would be attacked. Driving this development was a new regime tactic which 
involved stationing CSF units every five hundred meters or so along major roads. 
Armed with shotguns and tear gas grenades, they stood guard beside their ‘boxes’ 
– the distinctively-shaped paddy wagons favoured by the Interior Ministry – alert 
to the approach of any protest. Paid baltagiyya and police informants reported 
back if they detected protestors passing through the side streets. It was still 
possible to protest in these areas, but only at night and always outside of the 
Friday afternoon slot when the security presence was especially heavy. The result 
was that would-be anti-coup protestors living in the area either travelled to 
                                                          
119 Since the 14 August crackdown, police have raided hundreds of mosques associated with the 
Muslim Brothers and their affiliates. Another regime tactic was to station security detachments at 
mosque entrances on Friday mornings, or else prohibit imams from giving the Friday sermon. In 
September 2013, the Ministry of Religious Endowments announced that only graduates of the state-
run al-Azhar University would be allowed to deliver sermons, while optimistically pledging to close 
the tens of thousands of unlicensed mosques that have proliferated in recent decades (see Gaffney 
1991). According to the government’s own statistics, there were over ninety five thousand mosques 
in Egypt at the last count in 2008 (Arab Republic of Egypt – Central Agency for Public Mobilization 
and Statistics 2009). Twenty thousand were unlicensed zāwiya (corner) mosques. All anecdotal 
evidence suggests that this number has increased significantly in the past six years, with new 
zāwiya mosques continuing to open even in spite of the September 2013 moratorium.   
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Figure 16. Anti-coup march from al-Mahrusa mosque via residential streets to al-Radwan mosque, 8 Nov. 
2013. 
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another neighbourhood where there were less police, or they stayed at home 
(Ibid.).120 This tactic of striating public space with armed police was rolled-out 
across Egypt’s major cities. Four months after the dispersal of the Rabaʿa and al-
Nahda occupations, anti-coup protestors celebrated any protest held in the ‘closed’ 
neighbourhoods of Giza, Cairo and Alexandria.  
But just as the Egyptian state struggled to regulate places of worship 
(churches being a notable exception), it had only a shaky grip over large tranches 
of urban space outside of central metropolitan areas. As Salwa Ismail (2006) has 
documented, since the 1980s neo-liberal economic reforms have precipitated the 
retreat of a distributive state and the reengagement of a security state whose 
primary purpose is regime survival.121 As a result, Egypt’s popular quarters, home 
to millions of Egyptians, have become increasingly autonomous and characterized 
by their informality, with the state’s will enforced by hired thugs. During the first 
days of the 25th January Revolution, at least a hundred police stations in Cairo’s 
popular quarters were attacked by local residents, many burnt to the ground 
(Ismail 2011, 2013). Security has never fully returned. Because of the unevenness 
of the regime’s presence in these areas, the anti-coup movement enjoyed far more 
room to manoeuvre.  
                                                          
120 Another frequently reported connection between repression, participation and protest location 
was the reputation of the local police station. In certain neighbourhoods, police acquired a 
reputation for sexually harassing and sometimes raping, female anti-coup protestors. The police 
station in Nasr City in north-east Cairo was particularly infamous for using sexual violence against 
detained protestors. As a result, female anti-coup protestors in Nasr City travelled to al-Matariyya, a 
nearby suburb, where the police were known not to arrest women (interview Sarah 20 Feb. 2014; 
Sarah and Hoda 26 Feb. 2014; Sara 15 Mar. 2014). This was not out of charity or misplaced 
benevolence: informants report that in al-Matariyya, as in Helwan and Shubra, local residents had 
surrounded and threatened to burn down police stations on previous occasions when female 
protestors had been detained, prompting their release (interview Youssef1 6 Feb. 2014).  
121 Beginning with Janet Abu-Lughod’s (1971) account of the “City Victorious,” there have been 
several excellent histories and social anthropologies of the development of urban space in Egypt. 
See variously, Singerman (1995), Rodenbeck (1999) and Abaza (2001). 
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Of course, where a protest occurs matters a great deal, both in symbolic 
terms and in terms of the material structures that shape the protest environment. 
In interviews, anti-coup protestors often put a gloss on this dynamic: one anti-coup 
activist in Alexandria insisted, “Squares are only the symbol of the revolution. But 
now if you go there on a march, it’s a suicide mission. They fill the square with 
informants who report to security if more than ten people gather. So we have 
made squares out of the side streets” (interview Muhammad 26 Feb. 2014). But 
side streets are not squares.122 As Navid Hassanpour (2013) has argued, the 
narrow vistas common to Egypt’s popular quarters and suburbs – the result of an 
architectural style that promotes high density living – impede the flow of 
information and encourage network disruption. It was for this reason, he suggests, 
that Mubarak’s decision to cut mobile phone and internet access on 28 January 
2011 so spectacularly backfired. In the absence of information from other sources, 
residents had to leave their neighbourhoods to find out what was going on – a 
process that saw many chance upon marches en route to Midan al-Tahrir. 
However, the nature of this urban space has similarly contributed to a 
parochialization of anti-coup protests and therefore diminished the impact of the 
hundreds of marches that were launched following the 14 August massacres. With 
squares and main roads mostly out of reach, the potential audience for these anti-
coup actions was limited to shopkeepers, bawwābīn (doormen) and the relatively 
low density foot and vehicle traffic that moves through these areas.123 As the 
                                                          
122 This is a point tacitly acknowledged by other anti-coup protestors who rue the missed 
opportunities that such spaces afforded. “We didn’t know how lucky we were having a square,” says 
one, “we took it for granted. We always thought that we would be able to go back” (interview 
Youssef1 6 Feb. 2014). 
123 Conversely, Cairo’s narrow residential side streets are frequently invoked as contributing to the 
success of the first days of protest in the 25th January Revolution. As marches moved through side 
streets in a bid to avoid the police, it is argued, crowd sizes were amplified, appearing larger and 
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Egyptian media scholar Muhammad ElMasry (2014) has observed, by pushing 
contention into the side streets, anti-coup protests were rendered “invisible,” to 
the vast majority of Egyptians.  
 
Timing of Contention 
Conscious of this dynamic, and in a bid to circumvent security forces and reach a 
wider audience, anti-coup protestors experimented with the timings of their 
protests. The “7 al-Subh” (7 in the morning) movement, in particular, is accredited 
with pioneering the tactic of protesting in the early morning.  Founded in 
Alexandria in September 2013, and with branches in Cairo and the Nile Delta 
governorates of Beheira, Sharqiyya, Kafr el-Sheikh and Menoufiya, 7 al-Subh are 
known for holding sit-ins outside schools and forming human chains beside main 
roads during the rush hour.124 According to Muhammad, one of 7 al-Subh’s 
founders, the movement emerged out of a realization that regime attacks on anti-
coup protests intensified in the late afternoon, especially around 5pm, when 
security forces were most active: “Protests lasted for ten minutes before the police 
came,” he recounts, “so we started going out in the mornings. Suddenly we found 
that we could protest for over an hour because the police were only just coming on 
duty and the baltagiyya were still sleeping off that night’s tramadol [a prescription 
pain killer] and hashish” (interview Muhammad 26 Feb. 2014). The number of 
early morning protests grew steadily, taking off in late December after the Muslim 
                                                                                                                                                                          
more impressive than perhaps they actually were, and thus encouraging bandwagon effects as 
would-be protestors saw security in numbers (Gunning and Baron 2013: 156). But given the high 
frequency of anti-coup protests in precisely these spaces and the overall decline in protest 
numbers, one might conclude that this urban context actually contributed little to an outgrowth in 
protest participation in early 2011. In fact, the destination and the novelty of these protests lent a 
great deal more to their success.  
124 In October 2013, the arrest of twenty one female members of 7 al-Subh members gained 
international media attention after they were given lengthy prison sentences (later suspended) for 
participating in an anti-coup protest in Alexandria. 
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Brothers were designated a terrorist movement. In the second week of January 
alone, forty six anti-coup protests – over half of all protests mounted that week – 
were held before 8am, with protestors lining the sides of major roads chanting to 
passing commuters, “Dihku ʿalayku wa qālu irhāb, wa ihna girān al-bāb fi al-bāb” 
(they fooled you and called us terrorists, but we are your next-door neighbours). 
The decision to protest at 7am underlines how repression both confined 
and constrained the possibilities for contentious politics. Morning protests in high 
traffic areas still carried risks and thus required planning via a closed network. 
Usually protests were planned in advance with a message sent out the night before 
via peer-to-peer smartphone apps, usually Viber or WhatsApp, to a trusted list of 
anti-coup protestors (interview Sara 15 Mar. 2014). With the protestors 
assembled, there were few opportunities for sympathetic onlookers to participate, 
save for beeping a car horn in support, as most were on their way to work or 
taking children to school. In this sense, 7am human chains and sit-ins were the 
antithesis of post-Friday sermon ‘gathering marches’. Whereas gathering marches 
in the first months of the mobilization aimed to build a critical mass of anti-coup 
sentiment in the streets, 7am protests could only hope to communicate a message 
of ongoing struggle.  
Night-time protests are another example in which the regime’s capacity to 
control urban space changed depending on the time of day. Protests beginning 
after 9pm began in mid-July during Ramadan, a period that coincided with a steep 
decline in crowd sizes. With most anti-coup protestors fasting, actions were moved 
to after the Tarawīh prayer, a time when large numbers of Egyptians visit friends 
and relatives, or stay at home to watch specially produced television soaps 
(musalsalāt). Following the clearing of the anti-coup occupations in August, 
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weekday marches again switched timings, with many beginning after the ʿIsha 
prayer, when the majority of police come off their shift. These ‘night marches’ 
(masīrāt layliyya) and night sit-ins (waqafāt layliyya), measured by the frequency 
of attacks over time, were proportionally the safest protests and thus consistently 
attracted large numbers of women, middle-aged men and children. However, this 
did not mean that night time protests were completely out of reach of the regime. 
Police stations, if they heard reports of a night protest, would instruct the state 
electricity company to shut off the grid to that particular neighbourhood, leaving 
the protestors to march in the dark (interview Youssef1 6 Feb. 2014).  
 
Conclusions 
As I have argued in this article, the repression-mobilization nexus can be 
illuminated by studying shifts along the different axes – modalities, sites and 
timings – of contention in response to regime violence. Here, neither repression 
nor mobilization appears as a unitary phenomenon. Rather, a dialogical cycle of 
tactical innovation, regime countermeasure and further innovation saw a 
diminution in the variability and viability of anti-coup contention over time, as 
anti-coup protestors struggled to negate the regime’s monopoly over the 
apparatus of coercion. This dynamic saw protest becoming increasingly mobile, 
but also less visible, as the sites and times available for protest became 
circumscribed, boxing the mobilization into increasingly smaller social spaces. 
Protestors could hold butterfly sit-ins in strategically sensitive areas or hold a 
human chain by a high traffic road in the morning – but they couldn’t occupy a 
public square or blockade the entrance to a government building without risking 
heavy casualties.  
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Consequently, anti-coup protest rapidly became concentrated in those 
spaces where the regime enjoyed less influence, with contention becoming less 
spectacular and less disruptive as a result. In this, the unevenness of the regime’s 
presence in wider Egyptian society and the anti-coup movement’s ability to evade 
and outmanoeuvre the Egypt’s security forces speak to the organic relationship 
between power and contention; in turn, evoking political geographies of protest, 
repression and space found elsewhere in the region (Schwedler 2012; 2013; Tripp 
2013). Driving this process was the effect of repression on the horizontal linkages 
between associational spaces and sites of protest. Prior to the 14 August 
crackdown, anti-coup marches left mosques and squares, and travelled long 
distances to arrive at their pre-agreed destination, often a public space that 
resonated with the mobilization’s demands. The scale and ferocity of regime 
repression after the 14 August ensured that protestors moved to mosques in 
outlying neighbourhoods and popular quarters and stayed there, marching 
through residential side streets before dispersing. University campus protests 
were similarly contained.  
Far from being defeated, opposition to the 3 July coup and the new military-
backed government has instead been delimited in ways that recall Asef Bayat’s 
(2003) observation that, “The metaphorical street is not deserted, so much as it is 
controlled.” In the process, the Muslim Brothers have been transformed into a 
street protest movement. This has interesting, and as yet not fully revealed, 
implications for the movement’s future. With the Brothers' senior leadership 
languishing in jail or abroad and many of its middle-ranking members in hiding, 
the movement is increasingly being represented by its female and youth members 
mobilizing in some of the poorest and most deprived areas of Egypt. They are the 
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generation of the 25th January Revolution. In their early twenties, many came of 
age in the initial occupation of Midan al-Tahrir. They have, though, struggled to 
build a mass movement along the lines that emerged in early 2011. This is partly 
due to the anti-coup movement’s failure to transcend institutional and social 
differences; a legacy of Mursi’s disastrous presidency and the Muslim Brothers’ 
culpability in siding with the military during many of the early exchanges of the 
democratic transition. But more fundamentally, authoritarian regime learning has 
ensured that the 25th January Revolution repertoire of occupying squares and 
disrupting urban space is, in the short-term at least, no longer viable. 
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Conclusion 
How can we understand the 25th January Revolution, its trajectories and legacies? 
From a series of vantage points, this thesis has pursued an analytical and 
empirically-grounded account of the particular ways in which Egyptians have 
mobilized (or demobilized) in the three years since Mubarak’s ousting. Eschewing 
top-down, structuralist and culturally essentialist explanations, this thesis has 
proposed a  processual, agent-centred and bottom-up account that addresses the 
key questions and puzzles arising from the eighteen days of mass mobilization, the 
failed democratic transition and the post-coup period. Taken together, the three 
articles suggest that the 25th January Revolution and its aftermath can only be 
understood by paying close attention to the evolving dynamics of contentious 
politics witnessed in Egypt over the past several years.  
In particular, the thesis has shown how changes in the repertoire of 
contention and developments in the post-Mubarak political process were driven 
by contentious interactions between the Mubarak-era state and a range of 
challengers mobilizing under the banner of the 25th January Revolution. With a 
view to explaining the military’s role during the initial eighteen days of mass 
mobilization, I began by developing a focused account of the micro-interactive 
dimensions of protestor-soldier relations in and around Midan al-Tahrir. How 
protestors respond to the deployment of security forces assumed loyal to a regime 
determined to end protest is often summed-up in the dyad of “fight or flight.” In 
this chapter, I considered a third option: fraternization. The practices that came 
out of these encounters, I argued, were situational and should be understood vis-à-
vis an improvised fraternization repertoire that made immediate, emotional claims 
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on the loyalty of regime forces. Through a relational and social interactionist lens, I 
explored the prevalence of pro-army chants, graffiti, the mounting of military 
vehicles, physical embraces, sleeping in tank tracks and posing for photographs 
with soldiers in and around Midan al-Tahrir during the 25th January Egyptian 
Revolution. I drew on the contentious politics literature, as well as micro-
sociologies of violence and ritual, to suggest that, from initial techniques of micro-
conflict avoidance, protestors and their micro-interactions with soldiers forged a 
precarious “internal frontier” that bifurcated governance from sovereignty 
through the performance of the army and the people as one hand in opposition to 
the Mubarak regime. However, while fraternization contained the possibilities for 
protestor-soldier violence through the forging of a precarious solidarity, these 
performances were later appropriated by the SCAF to legitimate its assumption of 
executive powers in the post-Mubarak democratic transition. 
 I then considered the role played by elections and protests in the first 
eighteen months of the post-Mubarak democratic transition. Proposing an 
alternative account for the derailing of the post-Mubarak democratic project, I 
detailed the consequences of the Muslim Brothers’ retreat from mass mobilization 
and the movement’s decision to put its faith in a transition administered by the 
SCAF, electoral mechanisms and the authority of a new parliament and president.  
As I argued in this chapter, what makes the Egyptian case so striking and so 
different from other cases of democratic transition, is the nature and extent of the 
electoral victories achieved by the Brothers, first in parliamentary terms and then 
in the 2012 presidential election, alongside the effective absence of any real 
electoral representation for other members of the revolutionary coalition and the 
near-complete absence of representation for old regime figures associated with 
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Mubarak’s National Democratic Party. Taken together, these absences rendered 
the Brothers’ electoral victories problematically excessive, as power-sharing, 
compromise and coalition-building, all essential for the kinds of conservative 
democratic consolidation typical of late Third Wave democratic transition, never 
occurred. Drawing on the comparative politics and democratization literatures on 
elections in Egypt, I related these electoral victories to the Brothers’ social 
movement infrastructure, their prior experiences in competing in national 
elections and the advantages accrued the movement’s its nestled position at the 
heart of Islamist associational life. These factors left the Brothers well placed to 
take advantage of the first national post-Mubarak competitive elections, while 
other revolutionary forces were left to advance their agenda by mobilizing in the 
streets and squares of Egypt’s cities, instead of mounting an effective resurrection 
of the secular opposition vote that had featured so prominently in the 
parliamentary and presidential elections of the mid-2000s.  
The post-25 January cycle of contention brought large sections of the 
revolutionary coalition into conflict with the SCAF and the military-backed 
transitional government, culminating in a series of spectacular street battles that 
reached their apogee during the Events of Muhammad Mahmud Street in late 
November 2011. As I went on to argue, despite the Muslim Brothers performing 
well – perhaps too well – on election day, their fading out of street-level 
mobilization and the leadership’s decision not to participate alongside other 
members of the revolutionary coalition in anti-SCAF protests, left the movement 
with a problematic status in Midan al-Tahrir, and with few allies willing to defend 
Egypt’s newly elected democratic institutions against the ‘deep state.’ In this, the 
Brothers’ retreat from mass mobilization in anticipation of securing its place in the 
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state was a gross strategic error, as the movement’s insistence on restricting the 
post-Mubarak political process to a series of procedural interactions, negotiations 
and pacts doomed both the movement in the eyes of the wider revolutionary 
coalition and played a key role in scotching the post-Mubarak democratic project 
itself. Here, pace extant theories of democratic transition, we might very well 
conclude that contentious politics in transgressive mode plays a meaningful role in 
late Third Wave democratization, both in keeping together rapidly convened 
negative coalitions, such as the revolutionary coalition that cohered in Midan al-
Tahrir and elsewhere during the eighteen days of mass mobilization, and in 
deepening the democratization process. As the Egyptian case clearly demonstrates, 
movements well placed to benefit from the first elections following an initial 
democratic breakthrough ignore street-level mobilization at their own peril.  
 The final substantive chapter mapped the patterns of mobilization and 
demobilization after the 3 July coup. Following Mursi’s ousting, the Muslim 
Brothers and members of the anti-coup movement have launched daily protests in 
the streets and squares of Egypt’s cities, and these have continued in spite of 
massive and unprecedented repression. The relationship between repression and 
anti-coup mobilization – as measured by the modes, sites and timings of protests – 
suggests that while anti-coup protestors have creatively adapted to regime 
violence, protest has nevertheless been circumscribed in ways that have led to the 
effective marginalization of the mobilization and allowed the new military-backed 
government to achieve a degree of hegemony. Viewed in this mode, the hegemonic 
position achieved by Egypt’s current president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, was only 
possible through the deployment of unprecedented state violence against anti-
coup protestors and cemented via a series of regime victories in taking control, and 
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effectively defending, key strategic spaces. Following the loss of the anti-coup 
occupations established in the early days of the mobilization, the anti-coup 
movement’s attempts to claim and create alternative ‘squares’ failed in the face of 
repression, after which the mobilization faltered as a succession of alternative sites 
for mobilization became ‘closed spaces’. Against this backdrop, the argument 
advanced in chapter 3 has broader implications for how we study the relationship 
between repression and mobilization. As the Egyptian case vividly illustrates, the 
‘where’ of protest appears critical, as daily protests in residential areas, staged 
with the intention of sidestepping regime violence, failed to build and sustain a 
level of mobilization necessary to topple an entrenched adversary. As such, 
repression should be understood not only in terms of its effects on individuals and 
on the extent of collective action, but also in terms of claims and effects on social 
space, in ways reminiscent of the ‘Haussmannization’ of the mid-nineteenth 
century European city and its impact on the possibilities for popular mobilization 
(see variously Gould 1995; Harvey 2006; Traugott 2010).  
An interesting and underappreciated dynamic that has emerged as a result 
of the anti-coup mobilization is the transformation of the Muslim Brothers into a 
street protest movement. This marks an unprecedented rupture with the Brothers’ 
“accomodationist” (Abed-Kotob 1995) strategy, pursued since the partial 
rehabilitation of the movement in the 1970s, which limited the movements 
activities to providing welfare services to Egypt’s poorest and standing for 
positions in Egypt’s legislature and syndicates (Wickham 2002; El-Ghobashy 
2005). An aversion for contentious street politics is also a hallmark of the early 
history of the movement, with the Brothers’ founder Hassan al-Banna more 
inclined to advance the movement’s agenda through petitions and telegrams to the 
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Palace than through rambunctious and unruly street protests (see Lia 1998; El-
Awaisi 1998; Amin 2003). As I discussed in Chapter 2, the Muslim Brothers’ 
decision to boycott the regular Friday protests in the first eighteen months of the 
post-Mubarak democratic transition can also be related to the movement’s historic 
prioritization of electoral and constitutional means. The Muslim Brothers’ decision 
to pursue a strategy of rolling street protests has important implications then for 
the evolution of what remains of Egypt’s largest and most organized social 
movement.125 While chapter 2 explored the seemingly impending 
embourgeoisement126 and parliamentarization of the Muslim Brothers during the 
post-Mubarak democratic transition, the account advanced in chapter 3 finds the 
Brothers most active in Egypt’s popular quarters and rural areas, mobilizing 
support amongst the urban poor of Cairo, Giza and Alexandria, as well as in the 
agricultural governorates of the Nile Delta and Upper Egypt. The trajectory of the 
anti-coup movement, in turn, foregrounds an important discussion concerning the 
efficacy of non-violent protest. Since the 2011 mobilizations across the Arabic-
speaking Middle East, the imperative for better understanding the repression-
mobilization nexus has never been greater, especially in context of scholarship that 
stresses the long-term returns of “non-violent civil resistance” (Chenoweth and 
Stephan 2012; Nepstad 2011). The travails of the anti-coup mobilization, however, 
as well as goings-on elsewhere in the region (Syria, Bahrain and Libya), suggest 
that not only does repression frequently succeed in demobilizing protestors that 
                                                          
125 While the Muslim Brothers have never published official membership figures, the movement is 
commonly assumed to have over half a million paid members. Parenthetically, and by way of 
comparison, shortly after its founding the Brothers’ Freedom and Justice Party claimed to have over 
a million members, of whom almost half were Muslim Brothers (Martini, Kaye and York 2012: 9).  
126 For more on the embourgeoisement thesis, see Gilbert Achcar’s (2012: ch.6) especially 
unflattering account of the Muslim Brothers’ business activities and embrace of neoliberal 
economic policies in the Mubarak-era. 
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adopt such tactics, but that protestors can sometimes be better served by adopting 
more violent methods (Ukraine) and confronting repression head-on (see 
Goldstone 2014). A question that merits critical consideration, but which is left 
unresolved here, is whether nonviolent tactics work as well for Islamists as they 
are claimed to do for other civil resistance campaigns (this argument is anticipated 
by Hamid 2009).127  
If, in subsequent months and years, members of the anti-coup movement 
and the Muslim Brothers decide to take up arms, or switch their allegiance to 
causes such as the Islamic State currently active in Iraq and Syria, it will have been 
after more than a year of overwhelmingly non-violent street protests in defence of 
a democratically elected president. As I showed in chapter 3, there was no 
hydraulic relationship between the denial of gains made by Islamists at the ballot 
box and violence. It remains to be seen, however, how long the Muslim Brothers’ 
leadership will able to retain control over its membership having lost central 
coordination in the organization, especially as any attempt by the Brothers’ 
imprisoned leadership to reach an accommodation with the military will almost 
certainly result in large swathes of the Muslim Brothers’ youth – who have played 
a key role in sustaining a daily street protest presence despite the regime’s routine 
use of live ammunition and birdshot against protestors – turning against the 
movement’s hierarchy.  This underlines the potential for the Brothers’ youth to 
                                                          
127 Key here is the external context. Maria Stephan and Erica Chenoweth emphasise the part 
international, i.e. U.S. and European, actors play in the success of nonviolent contention: 
“Externally, the international community is more likely to denounce and sanction states for 
repressing nonviolent campaigns than it is violent campaigns.” (2008: 12). Violent repression of 
nonviolent mobilization, they argue, also elicits greater sympathy and legitimacy, and thus more 
readily translates into advocacy for that cause (Ibid. 15). Does this apply to the Arabic-speaking 
Middle East and in particular to Islamist movements using non-violent tactics? Recent history 
would suggest not. Declining U.S. hegemony in the region, combined with enduring geostrategic 
cynicism regarding the Suez Canal, access to Persian Gulf oil and gas, and guaranteeing Israeli 
security saw muted condemnations from Western governments to the 14 August massacres and the 
subsequent crackdown. 
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affect a “radical flank effect” (Haines 2013) on the overall direction of the 
movement as they militate against any recognition of the post-Mursi government 
or accepting a political accommodation that stops short of the full realization of the 
anti-coup movement’s stated goals (see El-Sherif 2014). With many of the 
movement’s senior leadership receiving lengthy custodial sentences and the 
movement’s Islamic associational and welfare activities suspended indefinitely in 
favour of sustaining a street protest presence, the result may well prove to be a far-
reaching metamorphosis of the Muslim Brothers, as authority shifts to the youth 
generation of the 25th January Revolution. If this does occur, it will be further 
evidence of the generative  effects of the eighteen days of mass mobilization in 
early 2011. 
It is therefore obvious that the articles that make up this thesis represent 
only a point of departure. Several further puzzles, questions and topics suggest 
themselves. In particular, there is a need for extensive empirical research into the 
events surrounding the 30 June 2013 protests that paved the way for a military 
coup. Was this a spontaneous ‘People power’ revolution in the mould of the 25th 
January Revolution against an autocratic Islamist president, as the military and the 
Tamarrod movement have insisted? Or did the military and Interior Ministry-
controlled security forces, as I proposed in Chapters 2 and 3, play an important 
role in orchestrating and stimulating these mobilizations? While journalists have 
begun to uncover clandestine links between Tamarrod and the state security 
apparatus, other possible research avenues suggest themselves. One is to consider 
the role played by police and state agents in the 30 June crowds. Video footage of 
the protests shows senior police officers in uniform heading marches to Midan al-
Tahrir, often held aloft on the shoulders of ostensibly civilian protestors, leading 
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chants and waving Egyptian flags. In one video of a march departing for Tahrir 
from outside the Police Officers’ Club in Dokki, a plainclothes police officer, 
identifiable by the pistol holster under his arm, instructs the assembled crowd, “If 
you’ve got a uniform, go and put it on.”128 Were these officers acting as concerned 
citizens or were they present in a more coordinated, institutional capacity? And to 
what degree did these interventions lead and direct the mobilization? 
 We also know very little about anti-Mursi protests outside Cairo. While 
large crowds were recorded in Midan al-Tahrir and outside the Ittihadiyya 
Presidential Palace, there has been scarce documentation of mobilizations in 
Egypt’s other major cities. Was this a predominantly Cairo-centric phenomenon, 
and if so, how does this inform our understanding of state power, the distribution 
of support for the 25th January Revolution and the possibilities for future anti-
coup mobilization? If mobilizations occurred elsewhere, how did their timings, 
planning and coordination compare to the Cairo protests? Do we also see a similar 
role played by local iterations of Tamarrod, or were they inspired and enabled in 
other ways? To what extent were these protests facilitated and influenced by the 
intermediation of businessmen, local bosses and former NDP politicians? A study 
employing the heuristic framework developed is this thesis, marshalled alongside 
                                                          
128 See footage: http://youtu.be/cCM0jekx0DU. A common scene relayed in this footage was the use 
of the chant, “The people and the police are one hand!” Interestingly, the “one hand” metaphor was 
also used by pro-Mursi supporters in the streets near the Rabaa al-Adawiyya occupation in Medinat 
Nasr. When news of the coup broke, many chanted “The army and the people are one hand,” as 
army officers wrestled with Mursi supporters trying to climb aboard their vehicles (The Guardian 3 
Jul. 2013). Of course, the different valences of the “one hand” metaphor belie a common heritage: 
both draw on the repertoire of claim making employed during the 25th January Revolution, while 
illustrating how different actors and coalitions draw on the same modalities of protest, even as 
power configurations change. 
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video footage, still photographs, informant testimony and event data, , would be 
highly instructive indeed.129   
Insofar as I can only gesture towards these and other unresolved questions 
and puzzles raised over the course of the present study, it is apparent that there is 
a need for a great deal of further study on the 25th January Revolution, its 
trajectories and legacies; studies that will only be enriched by the passage of time, 
as further sources, voices and perspectives become available. Having itself been 
born of a series of eventful encounters in Cairo in the revolutionary spring of 2011, 
when I might otherwise have been safely ensconced in the Egyptian national 
archives studying a quite different series of mobilizations playing out in an earlier 
moment in world historical time, it is hoped that this thesis has, at the very least, 
put down some markers for ongoing research into the 25th January Egyptian 
Revolution and suggested some potentially profitable avenues for future 
scholarship on the dynamics of contentious politics more broadly.  
                                                          
129 A close comparative analysis of the similarities and differences between other episodes of mass 
mobilization involving the redeployment of ‘People power’ by conservative forces against 
democratically elected governments, as has recently occurred, for example, in Thailand under the 
aegis of the ‘Yellow Shirts,’ suggests a further dimension to the 30 June protests to be considered 
and resolved.   
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